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Abstract 
The world relies heavily on industrial voluntary consensus standards to serve public 
interests through the development of uniform and harmonized social and economic 
procedures.  The research problem focused on generating suggestions for improving 
collaborative practices between U.S.-based accredited and unaccredited standards 
development organizations that create voluntary consensus standards.  The research 
centered on assessing the level of consensus among experts regarding what actions may 
be conducive to improving collaborative practices through the lenses of stakeholder and 
institutional theory.  This modified 3-round qualitative Delphi study began with open-
ended questions in Round 1 and progressed towards consensus in Rounds 2 and 3 using 
close-ended questions.  The results encompassed consensus on 12 actions for preserving 
the historically deliberative and inclusive democratic U.S. voluntary consensus standards 
process spanning 6 categories: competition, deregulation, oversight, organizational 
structure, leadership training, and market-driven.  The most notable of the 12 actions was 
an increase in internal and external liaison functions between standards development 
organizations and more participation on the part of industry and trade groups.  This was 
the 1st study to apply the construct of consensus to the generation of actions focused on 
reducing the rise of an exclusive and nondemocratic voluntary consensus standards 
process and preserving a historically deliberative and inclusive democratic process.  
Incorporating the suggestions identified in this study may lead to positive social change 
by improving collaborative practices between standards development organizations and 
preserving the legitimacy of this important social function.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Voluntary consensus standards created by standards development organizations 
(SDOs) serve public interests by establishing uniform and harmonized social and 
economic procedures.  In industrial manufacturing environments, voluntary consensus 
standards serve public interests by promoting uniform and harmonized 
occupational/consumer safety and quality control procedures (Timmermans & Epstein, 
2010).  When industrial voluntary consensus standards do not exist, are ignored, or are in 
conflict, the uniformity and harmonization of occupational/consumer safety and quality 
control procedures are at risk (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson, Rasche, & Seidl, 
2012; Ernst, 2013; Reinecke, Manning, & Hagen, 2012).   
The United States has historically been a global leader in the development of 
industrial voluntary consensus standards through accredited industrial SDOs (Behr & 
Diaz, 2014; Ernst, 2013; Hopper, 2013).  Per the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI), the only congressionally approved U.S. industrial standards setting organization 
(SSO), there are currently over 240 accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs operating 
under the auspices of ANSI 
(http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/domestic_programs/overview.aspx?menuid=3).  
Accredited industrial SDOs are generally composed of professionals (often engineers) 
with specific skills.  Typical accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs are incorporated as 
nonprofit organizations but are increasingly considered hybrid organizations because of 
funding generation activities.  Accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs fund their activities 
through membership fees, professional publication fees, certification fees, and fees 
  
 
2 
generated by selling standards.  Most professionals participate on a voluntary basis, with 
financial support for travel and other participation related expenses being provided by the 
volunteers’ employers.  The goal of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs is to develop 
normative guidelines that promote uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer 
safety and quality control procedures designed to serve public interests by establishing 
agreed upon industrial voluntary consensus standards (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Ponte & 
Cheyns, 2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Industrial voluntary consensus standards 
can include designs (e.g., automotive seat belts), the meaning of terminology (e.g., should 
versus shall), performance specifications (e.g., interference between electrical devices), 
and operating procedures (e.g., hospital sterilization protocols). 
Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there has been an increase in the 
number of unaccredited industrial SDOs participating in development, adoption, and 
diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards, particularly in the United States 
(Ernst, 2013; Rindt & Mouzas, 2015).  This increase in the number of unaccredited 
industrial SDOs is thought to be a direct result of deregulation (Coates, 2015; Wijen, 
2014) and has created challenges for leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs 
and unaccredited industrial SDOs who now often find their organizations in competition 
(a struggle for legitimacy).  Competition of this nature threatens to reduce the legitimacy 
of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and industrial voluntary consensus standards in 
general by creating conflicts between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs (Osula 
& Ng, 2014).  The challenge is of particular importance in the United States because of 
the unique U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to voluntary consensus standards 
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development, adoption, and diffusion (Strauss, 2013) and that accredited U.S.-based 
industrial SDOs must adhere to ANSI essential requirements that do not apply to 
unaccredited industrial SDOs (Hopper, 2013).  Collaboration rather than competition 
with unaccredited industrial SDOs might ultimately be a less contentious approach to 
developing and establishing uniform and harmonized industrial voluntary consensus 
standards for all stakeholders.  If leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs are not prepared to collaborate with each other, there is the 
risk of turning the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process into a political 
and economic conflict as accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs fight for 
legitimacy (Fransen, 2011).  Such conflicts could potentially endanger public interests by 
threatening the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus process that has historically focused 
on the collaborative establishment of uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer 
safety and quality control procedures through a deliberative and inclusive democratic 
process (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  
Chapter 1 includes the background and statement of the problem associated with 
the increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs.  The purpose and 
significance of this qualitative modified three-round Delphi study was to discover how 
leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may 
improve collaborative practices to preserve the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary 
consensus standards process and better serve public interests.  Chapter 1 also includes the 
research question and subquestions, nature of the study (research design), conceptual 
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framework that supports the study, definitions, assumptions, scope, delimitations, 
limitations, and chapter summary. 
Background of the Study 
Standards development was originally a relatively informal process on the part of 
the scientific community to establish common practices.  Establishing common practices 
would then allow scientists to reproduce experiments conducted by others (Sandholtz, 
2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  By the early 1900s, and based on early scientific 
community successes, some organizations that would become the model for today’s 
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs were beginning to form.  The U.S. government 
legitimized standardization efforts during WWI, partially as a cost saving method but 
also driven by safety and quality concerns (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Yates & 
Murphy, 2015).  Another well-known SDO, the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), was the result of a collaborative post-WWII United Nations effort 
to promote postwar trade through the voluntary coordination of recommended procedures 
(Brunsson et al., 2012; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013).   
Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, the power of accredited U.S.-based 
industrial SDOs has declined significantly as a result of an increase in the number of 
unaccredited industrial SDOs (Allen & Ramanna, 2013).  This decline in the power of 
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and the increase in the number of unaccredited 
industrial SDOs is thought to be a direct result of deregulation, which became politically 
and economically popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Coates, 2015; Wijen, 2014).  
Prior to deregulation, the legitimacy of industrial SDOs and the industrial voluntary 
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consensus standards they developed was mostly the result of consensus building through 
a deliberative and inclusive democratic process within and between a highly-concentrated 
number of accredited industrial SDOs that remained politically and economically neutral 
while serving public interests.  The net result of deregulation in the United States is that a 
process that has historically been politically and economically neutral is being replaced 
by a contentious political and economic process whereby accredited and unaccredited 
industrial SDOs compete for legitimacy (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Fransen, 2011).  The 
increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs has led to compromises, power 
plays, competing standards, and other conflicts that potentially threaten public interests 
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012).  Franzen (2011) suggested that political and ideological 
differences between interest groups must now be considered a cornerstone of any 
discussion regarding industrial voluntary consensus standards.  The rationalization 
offered by Franzen is that once formed, SDOs in general are reluctant to let go of what is 
publicly claimed to have added value and privately perceived to be more about power.  If 
allowed to continue, many industrial SDOs and the industrial voluntary consensus 
standards they create may be reduced to the status of “paper tiger” (Timmermans & 
Epstein, 2010, p. 79).  Timmermans and Epstein (2010) claimed that the study of 
voluntary consensus standards in general is now a sociological concern and needs to be 
treated as such. 
The U.S. approach to industrial voluntary consensus standards development, 
adoption, and diffusion is also unique compared with industrial voluntary consensus 
standards processes in other parts of the world (Ernst, 2013; Strauss, 2013).  In the United 
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States, the industrial voluntary consensus standards process is based upon a market-
driven, bottom-up approach with little if any government oversight or participation.  The 
market-driven, bottom-up approach makes the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus 
standards process for the development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary 
consensus standards unique because industrial voluntary consensus standards processes 
in other parts of the world are top-down and involve some sort of government oversight 
and participation.  The U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach creates a situation that is 
ideal for the rise of competing interests driven by economic and political motivations.  
Another consideration important to this study is the structure of industrial SDOs.  
Most industrial SDOs in the United States, although legally established as nonprofit 
organizations, are increasingly considered hybrid organizations in that they must deal 
with competing institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities (Pache & Santos, 
2013).  Leaders of accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs may find themselves 
facing a situation where there is no single goal (Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  Leaders of 
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs may find the situation particularly challenging 
because the very nature of being accredited means an accredited organization subscribes 
to a business model that places mission and vision ahead of profit and discourages over 
representation by parties with vested interests (Farrell & Simcoe, 2012).  Unaccredited 
industrial SDOs are not constrained in the same way, allowing leaders of unaccredited 
industrial SDOs greater flexibility in selecting a single goal (Gadinis, 2014).  Leaders of 
industrial SDOs often come from a forprofit or nonprofit background (usually forprofit) 
and may not be prepared to address the conflicting institutional logics that define a hybrid 
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organization’s structure that places the competitive and economic business model of 
forprofit activities in conflict with the social, philosophical, and moral business model of 
nonprofit activities (Pinho, Rodrigues, & Dibb, 2014).  The collaborative component of 
leading a hybrid organization may therefore be an underdeveloped skill set of leaders 
who come from either a forprofit or nonprofit background (Benner & Pastor, 2015; Osula 
& Ng, 2014; Smith, 2014), requiring accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs to 
more carefully select and train their leaders (Walston, 2014).  The net result is that 
leadership of hybrid organizations such as accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs may represent “an extreme leadership challenge” (Battilana 
& Lee, 2014, p. 422).  Pache and Santos (2013) suggested that what makes leaders able to 
deal with the competing institutional logics of hybrid organizations represents a gap in 
general leadership studies. 
The overarching research literature gap that currently exists, and the focus of this 
study, is a lack of specific strategies for how leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial 
SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may improve collaborative practices to reduce 
conflicts that threaten the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards 
process (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Fransen, 2011; 
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  The current study is needed because even though the 
public is generally unaware of how the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards 
process works (Ashley, 2015; Gadinis, 2014), the public represents a large group of 
stakeholders who are greatly affected by industrial voluntary consensus standards 
(Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  A functional approach to the development, adoption, 
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and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards is critical to protecting public 
interests and promoting positive social change by maintaining a deliberative and 
inclusive democratic process that supports the legitimacy of industrial SDOs and the 
U.S.industrial voluntary consensus standards process (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et 
al., 2012; Hopper, 2013; Olshan, 1993; Sandholtz, 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; 
Yates & Murphy, 2015). 
 Problem Statement   
In industrial manufacturing environments, voluntary consensus standards serve 
public interests by promoting uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer safety and 
quality control procedures (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  When industrial voluntary 
consensus standards do not exist, are ignored, or are in conflict, uniformity and 
harmonization of occupational/consumer safety and quality control procedures are at risk 
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Ernst, 2013; Reinecke et al., 2012).  
The general problem is that regulatory and collaborative efforts to develop uniform and 
harmonized industrial voluntary consensus standards to serve public interests are under 
threat caused by an increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs (Allen & 
Ramanna, 2013; Yates & Murphy, 2015).  The rise of unaccredited industrial SDOs is 
thought to be a direct result of deregulation, which became politically and economically 
popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Coates, 2015; Wijen, 2014).  Prior to 
deregulation, the legitimacy of industrial voluntary consensus standards was established 
among a highly concentrated number of organizations that remained politically and 
economically neutral while serving public interests by creating a win-win environment.  
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In the postderegulation environment, accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs 
increasingly compete with one another, creating conflicts that threaten public interests by 
creating a win-lose environment (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Fransen, 2011). 
The specific problem is that leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs are unprepared to collaborate with each other (Krug, 
Rabczuk, & Cenian, 2015; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013).  Leaders of accredited U.S.-based 
industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs need to improve collaborative 
practices to serve public interests and promote positive social change by reducing 
conflicts between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs (Fransen, 2011; Ponte & 
Cheyns, 2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative modified three-round Delphi study was to discover 
what consensus could be built among a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding 
desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial 
SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improved collaborative practices 
and better serve public interests.   
Research Question 
Overarching Research Question:  What is the level of consensus among a panel of 
SMEs regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-
based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve 
collaborative practices and better serve public interests?  
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Subquestion (SQ) 1: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs 
regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions regarding competition that 
leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs 
may take to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
SQ 2: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable 
and feasible future-oriented actions in deregulation that leaders of accredited U.S.-
based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve 
collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
SQ 3: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable 
and feasible future-oriented actions in oversite that leaders of accredited U.S.-based 
industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve 
collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
SQ 4: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable 
and feasible future-oriented actions in organizational structure that leaders of 
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take 
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
SQ 5: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable 
and feasible future-oriented actions in leadership training that leaders of accredited 
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve 
collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
SQ 6: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable 
and feasible future-oriented actions in market-driven standards that leaders of 
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accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take 
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
Conceptual Framework 
The development of this study drew on institutional theory and stakeholder theory 
to explore the institutional mechanisms by which industrial voluntary consensus 
standards are developed, adopted, and diffused and the tensions that exist between 
significant stakeholders.  Institutional theory and stakeholder theory assisted in exploring 
the challenges leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited 
industrial SDOs must confront in the face of increasing conflict caused by competition 
(See Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework.   
The Figure 1 conceptual framework describes all the various aspects reviewed in 
this study.  Six themes were derived from the literature as depicted in Figure 1 and 
formed the basis for this study.  
The process of acceptance and convergence of industrial voluntary consensus 
standards by potential adopters typically follows a path that includes development, 
adoption, and diffusion (Slager, Gond, & Moon, 2012).  The ultimate goal in the case of 
industrial SDOs is that voluntary consensus standards developed by industrial SDOs will 
become legitimate through acceptance by industry, government, society, SSOs, and other 
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SDOs (Stranieri, Cavaliere, & Banterle, 2015).  Industrial voluntary consensus standards, 
perceived as legitimate, enhance perceptions of legitimacy of the SDOs that developed 
them (Stranieri et al., 2015).  Stakeholders affected by industrial voluntary consensus 
standards and the U.S. voluntary consensus standards process often have different value 
systems, cultures, and agendas (Eskerod & Huemann, 2013).  Competing interests 
between industrial SDOs, regulatory bodies, end users, or even between members who 
are part of a given SDO tend to make the development, adoption, and diffusion of 
industrial voluntary consensus standards a time consuming, costly, and politically and 
economically contentious process (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013).  Depending on the mix of 
stakeholders potentially affected by a specific industrial voluntary consensus standard, 
the environment can be dynamic and confrontational with political and economic agendas 
within and between stakeholder groups changing over time (Verbeke & Tung, 2013).  
Institutional Theory   
Institutional theory was appropriate for this study because institutional theory 
deals with what, why, how, and when ideas are adopted and diffused (Brunsson et al., 
2012; Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Suddaby, 2010).  These concepts are an important part 
of how industrial voluntary consensus standards processes work (Simpson, Power, & 
Klassen, 2012).  The primary concept behind institutional theory involves a tendency 
towards convergence through normative, coercive, and mimetic institutional pressure 
(Brunsson et al., 2012; Suddaby, 2010).  Convergence is often described using the terms 
isomorphism or homogeneity.  According to institutional theory, organizations tend to 
resemble one another over time (institutional isomorphism) through the use of similar 
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practices driven by institutional pressures (Zorn, Flanagin, & Shoham, 2011).  Gadinis 
(2014) suggested that convergence brought about by normative institutional pressure 
(normative institutional isomorphism) is generally most compatible with the deliberative 
and inclusive democratic process employed by accredited industrial SDOs.  Competition 
between SDOs can also increase institutional pressure (Fernando, Ng, & Walters, 2015), 
but competition tends to result in convergence driven by coercive institutional pressure 
(coercive institutional isomorphism) or mimetic institutional pressure (mimetic 
institutional isomorphism) because of power imbalances (Gadinis, 2014).  Coercive and 
mimetic pressures, compared with normative pressures, are generally not as compatible 
with a deliberative and inclusive democratic industrial voluntary consensus standards 
development process (Gadinis, 2014).  Coercive or mimetic behavior is often the form of 
institutional isomorphism practiced by unaccredited industrial SDOs whose motives tend 
to be more about securing economic and competitive advantages rather than taking a 
deliberative and inclusive democratic approach (Gadinis, 2014).  In the case of accredited 
and unaccredited industrial SDOs, the increase in conflicts in pursuit of legitimacy only 
invites more institutional pressure of the coercive and mimetic variety and causes rivalry 
between power structures (Rindt & Mouzas, 2015) or encourages “free rider” behavior 
(Behr & Diaz, 2014, p. 598).  Institutional theory does not necessarily point to a best 
approach for dealing with institutional pressures, but the lens of institutional theory can 
help explain the tensions created by what has been described as an emerging standards 
market (Reinecke et al., 2012).  At the heart of any SDO is the SDOs culture, which is 
largely determined by leadership behavior.  How institutional isomorphism works is then 
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of importance to leaders of accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs who should be 
striving for all parties to adopt a normative approach in support of a deliberative and 
inclusive democratic process. 
Stakeholder Theory   
Stakeholder theory was appropriate for this study because stakeholder theory 
deals with conflicts of interest that may exist between various parties affected by direct or 
indirect interactions (Garriga, 2014; Hasnas, 2013; Tullberg, 2013).  The development, 
adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards involves multiple 
stakeholders, each with their own personal and/or group bounded rationalities (Tashman 
& Raelin, 2013).  The primary or critical stakeholders involved during the development, 
adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards tend to be classified 
as influencers (Miles, 2012).  Influencers can include accredited and unaccredited 
industrial SDOs, SSOs, end users (industry), manufactures (suppliers), employees, 
legislative bodies, and potentially even the public at large (Tullberg, 2013).  Members of 
accredited industrial SDOs are often also members of unaccredited industrial SDOs.  
Dual participation can complicate identifying stakeholders and determining each 
stakeholder’s relative importance and motivations (Tashman & Raelin, 2013).  Per Yates 
and Murphy (2015), some unaccredited industrial SDOs further complicate the 
stakeholder picture by interjecting standards they develop into existing accredited 
industrial SDO processes to enhance adoption and diffusion.  There is also a leadership 
component to stakeholder theory in that several studies placed leaders at the center of the 
stakeholder discussion and suggest that it is the responsibility of leaders to identify and 
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classify various stakeholders and then identify what each stakeholder considers to be of 
value (Garriga, 2014).  Parmar et al. (2010) suggested that leaders must also engage 
stakeholders from a “two-way” perspective (p. 22) in that leaders must look inward as 
well as outward.  Since accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs tend to compete in 
the same space, stakeholder theory becomes an important lens for trying to understand 
the tensions that exist between industrial SDOs and significant stakeholders. 
Chapter 2 expands upon the potential roles of institutional theory and stakeholder 
theory to better explore the dynamics of industrial voluntary consensus standards 
processes, particularly in the United States.  Included in Chapter 2 is a discussion of how 
deregulation and the unique U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to industrial 
voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and diffusion has encouraged an 
increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs and presented leaders of 
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs with unique 
institutional and stakeholder challenges.  
Nature of the Study 
In this dissertation, I used a qualitative modified three-round Delphi study 
designed to discover what consensus could be built among a panel of SMEs from 
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented 
actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial 
SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests.  
Qualitative research is consistent with the goal of exploring how leaders of industrial 
SDOs approach industrial voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and 
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diffusion, and what changes in leadership approach might be conducive to improving 
collaborative practices between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs.  The 
selection of a Delphi design was deemed appropriate because of the desire to compare 
expert opinions (Hasson & Keeney, 2011).  Gaining insight into the current mindset, 
behavior, and qualifications of leaders of industrial SDOs might suggest changes in how 
leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs deal 
with potential conflicts, and how collaborative practices may be improved between 
accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs.  Although generally incorporated as 
nonprofits, industrial SDOs are increasingly considered hybrid organizations that present 
leaders with unique challenges because of the blending of conflicting forprofit and 
nonprofit institutional logics (Dimitrios, Sakas, & Vlachos, 2013; Osula & Ng, 2014; 
Pache & Santos, 2013; Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  Researchers suggested that leaders of 
hybrid organizations that come from forprofit or nonprofit backgrounds may be 
unprepared to manage the conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit 
activities inherent to hybrid organizations (Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  Other researchers 
suggested studies regarding leadership of hybrid organizations are neglected in favor of 
research specifically focused on forprofit organizations, and to a lesser extent on 
nonprofit organizations (Smith, 2014).  Understanding desirable characteristics of leaders 
of hybrid organizations could illuminate potential collaborative practice improvements 
(McMurray, Islam, Sarros, & Pirola-Merlo, 2012).  Researchers posited that hybrid 
organizations may benefit from adopting some forprofit leadership practices because of 
the forprofit focus on profit and competition that is increasingly a component of 
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industrial SDOs (Pinho et al., 2014).  Researchers also suggested that leaders of hybrid 
organizations may need to be specifically selected or trained to do justice to a hybrid 
organizations’ unique leadership challenges (Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  Exploring these 
considerations made a Delphi design appropriate for this study.  
For this study, SMEs who qualified as potential expert panel members where 
defined as individuals with similar experiences (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014), with a 
focus on expertise with accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs.  Assuring similar 
experiences was accomplished by selecting expert panel members who were currently 
active in accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and met a specific set of criteria outlined 
in detail in Chapter 3.  All questionnaires were sent electronically to expert panel 
members using SurveyGizmo.  In Round 1 of the study, semistructured open-ended 
research questions were sent to the expert panel members.  The questions were based 
upon the outcome of the literature review in which six themes related to management 
practices were identified as being critical for improving collaborative practices.  The 
expert panel members responded to the questions by identifying actions for improving 
collaborative practices that exemplify each management practice.  Based on word 
frequency and interpretation of responses using traditional text analysis (Bright & 
O’Connor, 2007), a series of closed-ended questions for each theme was created.  In 
Rounds 2 and 3, a Likert-type approach was applied to each question and descriptive 
statistics were used to evaluate the ratings expert panel members provided for enabling 
the evaluation of consensus for each question.  
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Analysis of the data from Round 1 focused on looking for subthemes and 
considering which subthemes and resulting questions under the six major themes 
demonstrated a level of consensus or not in Rounds 2 and 3.  The ultimate goal was to 
analyze the data in a way that answered the primary research question (Laick, 2012; 
Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007) and to suggest topics for future research (Asselin & 
Harper, 2014).  
Definitions of Terms 
Throughout the dissertation, the follow definitions are used: 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI): A congressionally authorized 
accrediting organization responsible for representing the United States in the 
development of international consensus standards and managing the U.S. standards 
development organization accreditation process (Hopper, 2013). 
Bounded rationality:  A concept whereby individual and/or organizational sense-
making and rational decision-making abilities are constrained (Tashman & Raelin, 2013). 
Delphi design:  A research technique used to understand group behavior by 
interviewing subject matter experts in the area of focus (Davidson, 2013). 
Forprofit organization:  An organization specifically formed to generate profit for 
the organization and for selected stakeholders (shareholders) (Cooper, Santora, & Sarros, 
2011). 
Hybrid organization:  An organization that incorporates competing institutional 
logics of both forprofit and nonprofit organizations (Pache & Santos, 2013). 
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Institutional theory:  A theoretical approach to understanding organizational 
behavior through a social lens rather than just an economic lens (Suddaby, 2015). 
Isomorphism:  A similarity of the processes or structures between organizations 
representing a trend towards convergence or homogeneity (Zorn et al., 2011). 
Knowledge experts: Individuals with specific or unique knowledge regarding an 
area of interest.  Knowledge experts in industrial settings tend to be those with specific 
technical or scientific skills (Sandholtz, 2012). 
Nonprofit organization:  An organization whose mission is primarily one of social 
responsibility and philanthropic values (Cooper et al., 2011). 
Servant leadership: A theory of leadership that is marked by a leaders concern for 
others and a desire to help others grow (Cooper et al., 2011). 
Stakeholder theory:  A theoretical approach for connecting ethics and strategy that 
creates value for a broad group of stakeholders (Harrison & Wicks, 2013). 
Standard development organizations (SDOs):  Organizations whose primary 
responsibility is to develop voluntary consensus standards (Behr & Diaz, 2014). 
Standards setting organizations (SSOs):  Organizations whose primary function is 
to review standards developed by SDOs and to establish criteria for SDOs that wish to 
become accredited (Behr & Diaz, 2014). 
Subject matter experts (SMEs): Individuals with specific or unique competence in 
the subject of interest (Hopper, 2013).   
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Systems theory:  A group of specific propositions that when brought together can 
aid in the understanding of complex systems, especially those that operate on a long-term 
basis (Adams, Hester, Bradley, Meyers, & Keating, 2014). 
Transactional leadership: A theory of leadership that is marked by leaders 
motivating followers through a system of reward and punishment (McMurray et al., 
2012). 
Transcendent leadership: A theory of leadership that is marked by a leaders 
concern for followers that takes into account the motivation and empowerment of others 
(Shiva & Suar, 2010, p. 118). 
Transformational leadership:  A theory of change leadership that is marked by 
relationship-oriented and inspirational behavior (Bordia, Restubog, Jimmieson, & Irmer, 
2011). 
Voluntary consensus standards: Nonlegally binding standards created by 
deliberation of interested parties who attempt to reach consensus and a balance of 
interests through respectful dialogue between members of a development committee 
(Yates & Murphy, 2015). 
Assumptions 
This Delphi design relied on input from a panel made up of SMEs with me (the 
researcher) playing an integral role in soliciting input and analyzing data.  This study was 
based on nine assumptions regarding expert panel members and my role.  The first 
assumption was that the established criteria did qualify an individual as a SME.  The 
second assumption was that individuals who agreed to become expert panel members met 
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the established criteria of being a SME regarding industrial voluntary consensus 
standards processes, especially from a U.S. perspective.  The third assumption was that 
expert panel members would provide thoughtful and truthful answers to questionnaire 
questions and statements.  The forth assumption was that expert panel members were 
familiar with the function of accredited SDOs and at least anecdotally familiar with the 
function of unaccredited industrial SDOs.  The fifth assumption was that expert panel 
members understood the development, adoption, and diffusion processes by which 
standards become legitimized.  The sixth assumption was that expert panel members 
tended to represent the attitudes of the larger body of SMEs familiar with the U.S. 
process.  The seventh assumption was that expert panel members had no ulterior political 
and/or economic motivations for participating in this study.  The eighth assumption was 
that definitions of consensus and data analysis supported claims of rigor and infused this 
study and the study results with “a quality of undeniability” (Miles, Huberman, & 
Saldana, 2014, p. 4).  The ninth assumption was that my personal biases would not 
adversely impact input or analysis. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of the study was accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs and the discovery of how a panel composed of SMEs 
familiar with industrial SDO processes could build consensus regarding desirable and 
feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better 
serve public interests.  Per studies discovered during the literature review, accredited 
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U.S.-based industrial SDOs in particular could be facing challenges from several 
quarters.  These included challenges directly from unaccredited industrial SDOs, 
legislation that could either be too restrictive or not restrictive enough, the SSO (ANSI) 
that oversees the industrial SDO accreditation process in the United States, the U.S. 
market-driven, bottom-up approach to voluntary consensus standards development, 
adoption and diffusion, and leaders themselves who may be unprepared to manage 
industrial SDOs.   
The delimitations were established boundaries within the study (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2010).  One delimitation was having a purposive sample.  In this qualitative 
modified three-round Delphi study, the purposive sample included SMEs from accredited 
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and did not include SMEs from only unaccredited industrial 
SDOs. 
Per the literature reviews, a lack of collaboration between accredited and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs is the primary threat to SDO legitimacy and the legitimacy 
of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process.  Leaders of accredited U.S.-
based industrial SDOs are constrained by the accreditation requirements to which their 
organizations subscribe.  Such constraints generally do not apply to leaders of 
unaccredited industrial SDOs.  The pool from which SMEs were recruited to participate 
as expert panel members were comprised of selected ANSI accredited SDOs.  ANSI is 
the only congressionally approved U.S. SSO authorized to represent the United States on 
international industrial voluntary consensus standards matters and manage the U.S. SDO 
accreditation process.  Selected SDOs were sent a request to extend the invitation to 
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participate as an expert panel member to their respective volunteer membership bases, or, 
potential expert panel members were contacted directly by me.  Expert panel members 
drawn from this pool of SMEs were expected to represent a competent source of opinion 
regarding challenges faced by leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs.  Another delimitation was that I was only looking at two 
theories, institutional theory and stakeholder theory.  These theories were selected 
because they came up most frequently during the voluntary consensus standards literature 
reviews.  Institutional theory was of interest to explore what types of institutional 
isomorphism resulted from the current competition between accredited and unaccredited 
industrial SDOs, what types of institutional isomorphism would be desirable, how to 
achieve desirable institutional isomorphic behavior, and what impediments may exist that 
interfere with desirable institutional isomorphism.  Stakeholder theory was of interest to 
explore how stakeholders with similar or different agendas were affected by industrial 
voluntary consensus standards and could be managed in ways that promoted 
collaboration that did not significantly favor or disenfranchise specific stakeholders.   
Limitations 
The primary limitations were time, cost, communication, fatigue, panel member 
dropout, attracting potential expert panel members, selecting expert panel members 
(uncritical adoption), and biases.  Accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and their 
volunteer members tend to be geographically dispersed.  This presented a problem 
regarding travel time and cost.  My contact and subsequent communication with potential 
SMEs during the expert panel member attraction and selection process was conducted by 
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electronic means.  While a relatively efficient and cost effective way to communicate, 
there was the inevitable loss of visual and audio cues that could increase the possibility of 
not getting appropriate or sufficient expert panel members prior to starting the study or a 
failure to communicate between expert panel members and me during the study.   
Another aspect of time that was a potential limitation was how long each expert 
panel member took to complete each questionnaire and resulting fatigue that might drive 
expert panel members towards a central selection tendency.  Related to the central 
selection tendency limitation were dropout limitations.  Birko, Dove, and Özdemir (2015) 
suggested designing questionnaires that took no more than 30 to 45 minutes to complete 
as a defense against a tendency towards central selection and dropout.   
Attracting qualified expert panel members was a limitation from the perspective 
of who volunteered.  Presenting a compelling reason to participate hopefully mitigated 
the potential for attracting expert panel members who were not committed to the study.  
Selecting qualified expert panel members (avoiding uncritical adoption) represented 
another potential limitation.  Uncritical adoption occurs when one takes an individuals’ 
claim of expertise at face value (Rowe & Wright, 2011).  I had little choice but to accept 
potential expert panel member claims that they were SMEs.  Presenting a simple but 
concise list of qualifications that accurately defined the desired skill sets hopefully 
mitigated this limitation.   
Biases of expert panel members were also a potential limitation.  I had little 
control or even awareness of expert panel member biases.  The biases I was most 
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concerned with involved nonobjective mindsets on the part of panel members.  Biases 
could adversely affect the objectivity of self-reporting. 
Significance of the Study 
Industrial voluntary consensus standards are an important way in which the world 
communicates on a local and international level (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  The 
development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards 
contributes to positive social change by serving public interests through the establishment 
of uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer safety and quality control procedures.  
When industrial voluntary consensus standards do not exist, are ignored, or are in 
conflict, the uniformity and harmonization of occupational/consumer safety and quality 
control procedures are at risk (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Ernst, 
2013; Reinecke et al., 2012).  From an industrial perspective, most industrial voluntary 
consensus standards have historically been created by accredited industrial SDOs through 
established processes designed to provide equal (democratic) representation (Yates & 
Murphy, 2015).  These types of industrial voluntary consensus standards have often been 
referred to as soft law (Wijen, 2014).  As suggested by Reinecke et al. (2012), the recent 
and uncoordinated proliferation of industrial voluntary consensus standards has created a 
standards market that threatens the legitimacy of industrial SDOs and the legitimacy of 
industrial voluntary consensus standards processes.  This threat needed to be explored 
because society relies on industrial voluntary consensus standards to clarify designs, 
terminologies, performance, and procedures (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). 
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This study was significant for several reasons.  First, there is the importance of 
exploring the political and economic aspects of modern industrial voluntary consensus 
standards processes so that what is an increasingly competitive and crowded field of 
participants can work together to serve public interests.  The increase in competition 
between accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs in 
particular could be leading to conflicts that are not politically and economically neutral, 
and threaten public interests (Fransen, 2011).  From a political perspective, the effects of 
deregulation in the United States (Coates, 2015; Wijen, 2014) made this study significant 
because deregulation has resulted in a situation where there is increasingly little if any 
legislative oversight regarding the creation of industrial SDOs.  Any U.S. state or 
industry consortium can create an SDO, and seeking improvements in collaborative 
practices with unaccredited industrial SDOs may be a moot point without reengagement 
on the part of legislative bodies (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 
2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  From an economic perspective, unaccredited 
industrial SDOs are often motivated by business related objectives (Reinecke et al., 
2012).  Business related objectives tend to be about regulating private markets and are at 
odds with historical industrial voluntary consensus standards processes that have favored 
a deliberative and inclusive democratic approach.  As suggested by Ponte and Cheyns 
(2013), the moral responsibility of industrial SDOs to serve public interests primarily by 
promoting uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer safety and quality control 
procedures is in danger of being replaced by political and economic motivations that 
placed special interests ahead of public interests.  Researchers claimed the development, 
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adoption, and diffusion of voluntary consensus standards in general is now a sociological 
concern that demands greater research to understand how the processes are changing and 
potentially affecting all stakeholders (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; 
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).   
Second, there was a need to understand how industrial SDOs work from a 
leadership perspective.  Most industrial SDOs, although legally established as nonprofits, 
are increasingly considered hybrid organizations in that they must deal with the 
conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit organizations (Pache & Santos, 
2013).  Leaders of accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs may find themselves 
facing a situation where there is no single goal (Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  Leaders of 
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs may find the situation particularly challenging 
because the very nature of being accredited means an accredited organization subscribes 
to a business model that places mission and vision ahead of profit and prevents over 
representation by parties with vested interests (Farrell & Simcoe, 2012).  Unaccredited 
industrial SDOs are not constrained in the same way, allowing leaders of unaccredited 
industrial SDOs greater flexibility in selecting a single goal (Gadinis, 2014).  Leaders of 
industrial SDOs often come from a forprofit background and may be unprepared to deal 
with the conflicting institution logics that are inherent to hybrid organizations (Pinho et 
al., 2014).  The collaborative component of leading a hybrid organization may be an 
underdeveloped skill set of leaders who come from a forprofit background (Benner & 
Pastor, 2015; Osula & Ng, 2014), requiring industrial SDOs to more carefully select and 
train their leaders (Walston, 2014).  The net result is that leadership of hybrid 
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organizations such as accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs may represent “an 
extreme leadership challenge” (Battilana & Lee, 2014, p. 422).  Pache and Santos (2013) 
suggested that what makes leaders able to deal with the conflicting institutional logics of 
hybrid organizations represented a gap in leadership studies.  
Third, the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process is unique in that 
the U.S. process is based on a market-driven, bottom-up approach instead of the more 
top-down approach employed by regions outside of the United States, (Ernst, 2013).  The 
U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach has served the U.S. industrial voluntary 
consensus standards process well for many years, but with changes brought about by 
deregulation and globalization, the market-driven, bottom-up approach may be facing 
challenges.  Researchers suggested that the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach was 
part of the reason that U.S. industrial SDOs are losing legitimacy compared with their 
non-U.S. counterparts (Kaplan & Kinderman, 2015: Lampland & Star, 2009).  The loss 
of legitimacy poses a problem not only for leaders of industrial SDOs, but for U.S. 
governmental organizations who have been hesitant to interfere in the industrial 
voluntary consensus standards process as long as the market-driven, bottom-up approach 
appeared to be working (Krug et al., 2015).  When industrial SDOs begin to compete, 
some researchers suggested that a robust oversight process led by governmental 
organizations may be a necessary part of the solution (Makiya & Fraisse, 2015).  Olshan 
(1993) claimed that the power to set premise by the private rather than the public sector 
in the United States is a battle that was won by the private sector.  However, since 
deregulation, the private sector approach has resulted in a contentious and political 
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process that only seems to be getting worse.  As a result, the development, adoption, and 
diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards in the United States are increasingly 
contested and fought over (Vogel, 2010).  The net result is recent concern that the U.S. 
market-driven, bottom-up approach to industrial voluntary consensus standards 
development, adoption, and diffusion may not be able to survive without increased 
government involvement (Coates, 2015). 
Significance to Practice 
Improvements to practice in the United States could come from three directions.  
First is the potential need for leaders of industrial SDOs to be properly selected and 
trained so that they can be better prepared to deal with the conflicting forprofit and 
nonprofit institutional logics that are inherent to hybrid organizations (Smith, 2014).  
Second is the possibility that increased government intervention may be deemed 
necessary in order to maintain the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus 
standards process (Hopper, 2012; Vogel, 2010).  Third is the need for greater 
collaboration between various stakeholders in order to reduce conflict (Ashley, 2015; 
Brenner & Pastor, 2015). 
Significance to Theory 
Institutional theory and stakeholder theory have long been used as lenses to view 
the behavior of forprofit organizations (Hasnas, 2013; Modell, 2012).  However, there 
has been less research into how institutional theory and stakeholder theory apply to 
nonprofit organizations and even less research into how institutional theory and 
stakeholder theory apply to hybrid organizations (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Hasnas, 
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2013).  This study has the potential to expand the use of institutional theory and 
stakeholder theory beyond the forprofit and nonprofit sectors and discover new and 
potentially unique ways that institutional theory and stakeholder theory can be used to 
understand and guide the behavior of industrial SDOs from both an internal and external 
perspective.  Leadership theory (although not a focus of this research) might also benefit 
from this study because leadership research in hybrid organizations has been relatively 
overlooked in favor of leadership research in forprofit sectors and to a lesser extend in 
nonprofit sectors (Brown & Yoshioka, 2003; Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Cho & Perry, 2012; 
Goldkind, 2015; Lazurko, Miller, & Ghoneim, 2014). 
Significance to Social Change 
There are four implications for positive social change because of this study.  First, 
this study could result in improvements to collaborative practices in industrial voluntary 
consensus standards development, adoption, and diffusion that “help to ensure the quality 
and safety of production processes, products, and services” (Ernst, 2013, p. 9).  These 
potential improvements would be primarily focused on how accredited and unaccredited 
industrial SDOs share the industrial voluntary consensus standards landscape, and how 
other stakeholders participate in developing, adopting, and diffusing industrial voluntary 
consensus standards.  Second, the results of this study could aid in the development of 
more effective oversight of the industrial voluntary consensus standards process (Hopper, 
2013).  Improving oversite practices could help reduce conflicts, resulting in more robust 
and legitimate industrial voluntary consensus standards (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  
Third, the results of this study could help the public gain a greater understanding of 
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industrial voluntary consensus standards processes and remove some of the mystery often 
referred to as the black box that surrounds industrial voluntary consensus standards 
(Gadinis, 2014; Slager et al., 2012).  A greater understanding of industrial voluntary 
consensus standards processes might encourage more participation on the part of the 
public in crafting industrial voluntary consensus standards.  Finally, the results of this 
study could support positive social change by strengthening the claim that industrial 
voluntary consensus standards and industrial voluntary consensus standards processes 
should be treated as a sociological concern and not as processes that are simply technical, 
political, or economic (Fransen, 2011; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). 
Summary and Transition 
In Chapter 1, I addressed the challenges faced by accredited U.S.-based industrial 
SDOs and their leaders brought about by an increase in the number of unaccredited 
industrial SDOs.  I also addressed the importance of how industrial voluntary consensus 
standards support public interests by promoting uniform and harmonized 
occupational/consumer safety and quality control procedures.  I described the role of 
institutional theory and stakeholder theory as a lens through which industrial voluntary 
consensus standards processes and the role of SDOs could be explored.  I also described 
the potentially unique role leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs could play in improving collaborative practices.  
Considering the importance of industrial voluntary consensus standards regarding 
commerce, social order, and supporting public interests, gaining an understanding into 
how the processes work and are potentially changing is of importance to all stakeholders 
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(Behr & Diaz, 2014; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Fransen, 2011; 
Reinecke et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  I also discussed potential study 
limitations and steps taken to mitigate these limitations. 
In Chapter 2, I provide literature reviews of historical and current industrial 
voluntary consensus standards development processes and the changing roles of SDOs.  
The literature review includes selected studies focused on institutional theory and 
stakeholder theory as lenses for understanding how industrial voluntary consensus 
standard processes work and the potential role of SDOs.  I also include literature reviews 
of leadership in specific types of organizations and the unique role that leaders of 
accredited industrial SDOs play in supporting functioning industrial voluntary consensus 
standards processes.  The literature review also touches on the claims made by some 
researchers that the processes by which industrial voluntary consensus standards are 
developed, adopted, and diffused are now a sociological concern and should be treated as 
such (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Fransen, 2011; Timmermans & 
Epstein, 2010).  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The general problem is that regulatory and collaborative efforts to develop 
uniform and harmonized industrial voluntary consensus standards that serve public 
interests are under threat caused by an increase in the number of unaccredited industrial 
standards development organizations (SDOs) (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Yates & 
Murphy, 2015).  The specific problem is that leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial 
SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs are unprepared to collaborate effectively with 
each other (Krug et al., 2015; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013).  The purpose of this qualitative 
modified three-round Delphi study was to discover what consensus could be built among 
a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented 
actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial 
SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests.  
Major sections of Chapter 2 include the literature search strategy, conceptual framework, 
the general literature review, and summary.   
The gap in current literature was a lack of research into how leaders of accredited 
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs could improve 
collaborative practices.  This gap raised questions regarding how leaders of industrial 
SDOs can work with significant stakeholders to encourage more effective collaboration 
in order to reduce conflicts that threaten public interests (Fransen, 2011; Ponte & Cheyns, 
2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  
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Literature Search Strategy  
The primary sources for the literature review were scholarly peer reviewed 
journal articles.  The topics of the literature were voluntary consensus standards, SDOs, 
tensions that exist between competing interests, leadership challenges based on 
organizational structure, institutional theory, stakeholder theory, and Delphi design 
considerations.  Literature sources came from databases available from Walden 
University, Google Scholar, and the University of Nevada Reno.  Key words used for the 
literature review searches included voluntary consensus standards, standards 
development, leadership, hybrid organizations, institutional theory, stakeholder theory, 
deregulation, and collaboration. 
For the literature review, I started by examining the general role of voluntary 
consensus standards in society.  I was primarily interested in industrial voluntary 
consensus standards and how industrial voluntary consensus standards are incorporated 
into the fabric of society.  I then turned my attention to the history of industrial voluntary 
consensus standards and the unique U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to industrial 
voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and diffusion.  I next focused on 
industrial voluntary consensus standards processed today, primarily from a U.S. 
perspective.  This section includes a more detailed review of the conflicts that have 
developed between accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial 
SDOs, and how the increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs in the United 
States is affecting a voluntary consensus standards process that has historically followed 
a deliberative and inclusive democratic approach.  During the review of literature related 
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to voluntary consensus standards, references to institutional theory and stakeholder 
theory were constant features as researchers sought to understand and explain tensions.  
Subsequently, part of the literature review strategy included literature relating to 
institutional theory and stakeholder theory.  I had initially anticipated adding system 
theory to the literature review, and although there were several references to voluntary 
consensus standards systems or systems that included voluntary consensus standards 
(Behr & Diaz, 2014; Delmas & Montiel, 2008; Ernst, 2013; Krug et al., 2015), I did not 
find any references to systems theory.  Finally, I addressed literature on leadership 
challenges based on organizational type (nonprofit, forprofit, and hybrid).  My primary 
focus was on hybrid organizations (the most common U.S. industrial SDO type).  What 
became apparent as the literature review progressed was that in the United States, the 
increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs since the 1970s and 1980s has 
increased conflicts between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs, presenting 
leaders of industrial SDOs with unique challenges.  
There was no shortage of literature regarding the tensions involved in the 
development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards.  There 
was also no shortage of literature regarding the increase in conflicts between industrial 
SDOs driven primarily by the increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs.  
The literature review revealed five major topics of interest.  First, today’s industrial 
voluntary consensus standards are ubiquitous, but the processes by which they are 
developed, adopted, and diffused are considered black boxes (Behr & Diaz, 2014; 
Lampland & Star, 2009; Slager et al., 2012).  Second, although incorporated as 
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nonprofits, the increasingly hybrid nature of industrial SDOs may present a special 
challenge to leaders of industrial SDOs because of the need in hybrid organizations to 
address the conflicting institutional logics of forprofit versus nonprofit constructs (Pache 
& Santos, 2013; Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  Third, the unique U.S. market-driven, bottom-
up approach to industrial voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and 
diffusion creates an environment that is ideal for the rise of competing interests between 
accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs (Ernst, 2013; Strauss, 2013).  Forth, the 
industrial voluntary consensus standards development process in the United States may 
be facing a problem of legitimacy brought about by the increase in conflicts between 
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs.  Fifth, 
institutional theory and stakeholder theory were the primary lenses used by researchers to 
examine the tensions that exist regarding how industrial voluntary consensus standards 
are developed, adopted, and diffused, and how industrial SDOs compete for legitimacy.  
The overarching gap in the literature was a lack of specific recommendations regarding 
actions that could be taken by leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs to reduce conflicts and improve collaborative practices.   
Conceptual Framework  
Yates and Murphy (2015) stated that voluntary consensus standards processes, in 
general, work best when combined with a deliberative and inclusive democratic 
approach.  In the United States, accredited industrial SDOs must subscribe to a 
deliberative and inclusive democratic process that provides a venue for all significant 
stakeholders to participate in the industrial voluntary consensus development process.  By 
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allowing all significant stakeholders to play a role in the development of industrial 
voluntary consensus standards, there is an opportunity for buy-in by “multiple others” 
(Timmermans & Epstein, 2010, p. 75).  Unaccredited industrial SDOs do not have to 
subscribe to a deliberative and inclusive democratic process, and voluntary consensus 
standards developed by unaccredited industrial SDOs are less a result of consensus 
building and more related to an exclusive and preferential process (Behr & Diaz, 2014). 
The Value of a Deliberative and Inclusive Democratic Process 
Industrial voluntary consensus standards processes that follow a deliberative and 
inclusive democratic approach offer a number of benefits.  First, industrial voluntary 
consensus standards processes that follow a deliberative and inclusive democratic 
approach are not driven by the desires of a small group of powerful players whose 
motivations are frequently intrinsic in nature, such as increased sales or competitive 
advantage (Simpson et al., 2012).  Second, a deliberative and inclusive democratic 
approach tends to guarantee the processes are open to multiple participants and are not 
based on proprietary technology or intellectual property often used to ensure competitive 
advantages based on power relationships (Rindt & Mouzas, 2015).  Involving multiple 
participants tends to reduce the potential for industrial voluntary consensus standards to 
be used as a method for excluding certain actors (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013).  Third, 
involving multiple participants also increases the potential for knowledge experts with 
potentially opposing views to be part of industrial voluntary consensus standards 
processes.  Including knowledge experts with potentially opposing views tends to 
increase the flexibility of industrial voluntary consensus standards, making standards 
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more adaptable for different stakeholders (Sandholtz, 2012; Simpson et al., 2012).  Forth, 
flexible industrial voluntary consensus standards tend to reduce resistance to normative 
institutional isomorphism.  Reducing resistance to normative institutional isomorphism 
increases the chances of industrial voluntary consensus standards gaining support because 
of the appearance of legitimacy of industrial voluntary consensus standards processes, the 
legitimacy of industrial SDOs that develop standards, and the ability of adopting 
organizations to more effectively harmonize institutional requirements with user 
capabilities (van den Ende, van de Kaa, den Uijl, & de Vries, 2012; Simpson et al., 
2012).  Fifth, employing a deliberative and inclusive democratic process is likely to 
reduce the threat of legislative or regulatory intervention.  Industrial voluntary consensus 
standards are considered a form of soft-law and tend not to be legally enforceable 
(Stranieri et al., 2015; Vogel, 2010).  The soft-law aspect is of particular importance to 
the U.S. market drive, bottom-up approach where an important component of the 
industrial voluntary consensus standards process is to demonstrate that the process works 
and there is no need for legislative intervention (Kaplan & Kinderman, 2015; Pirard, 
Fishman, Gnych, & Obidzinski, 2015; Vogel, 2010).  
Threats 
The primary threat to the existing deliberative and inclusive democratic industrial 
voluntary consensus standards development process in the United States is the increase in 
the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs that are in direct competition with accredited 
U.S.-based industrial SDOs (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et 
al., 2012; Ernst, 2013; Yates & Murphy, 2015).  The increase in the number of 
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unaccredited industrial SDOs is thought to be a direct result of deregulation that became 
politically and economically popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Coates, 2015; 
Wijen, 2014).  As a result of deregulation, any state or industry consortium in the United 
States can create an SDO (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Timmermans 
& Epstein, 2010).  In the United States, the threat created by the increase in the number 
of unaccredited industrial SDOs has several facets. 
First, there is the threat that a process that has historically been politically and 
economically neutral is becoming more exclusive and preferential, resulting in an 
increase in conflicts between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs.  Increases in 
conflicts could reduce political and economic neutrality, and threaten public interests 
(Fransen, 2011).  Second, there is the threat to the legitimacy of accredited industrial 
SDOs and the legitimacy of the industrial voluntary consensus standards process (Botzem 
& Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012).  Third, there is the threat of U.S. legislative 
intervention driven by political and economic concerns and potential threats to public 
interests (Brunsson et al., 2012; Coates, 2015).  Some researchers concluded that re-
engagement on the part of governmental organizations will be necessary because the 
current conflicts between accredited and unaccredited U.S. industrial SDOs may not be 
something that can be resolved without legislative intervention (Coates, 2015; Delmas & 
Montiel, 2008; Ernst, 2013). 
Leaders 
Industrial SDOs are typically set up as nonprofit organizations (Anheier & Krlev, 
2015; Smith, 2014).  However, there is a growing body of research that suggests 
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nonprofit organizations like industrial SDOs are actually hybrid organizations because of 
their funding generation activities (Pache & Santos, 2013; Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  
Hybrid organizations present unique challenges in that leaders of such organizations must 
deal with conflicting institutional logics that pit the economic institutional norms of 
forprofit organizations against the mission driven institutional norms of nonprofit 
organizations.  The potential problem is that leaders of industrial SDOs may be 
unprepared to deal with conflicting institutional logics due to lack of proper training 
(Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012; Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  Battilana et al. (2012) 
suggested that most leaders of hybrid organizations come from forprofit backgrounds.  
Lack of proper training may present a special challenge for leaders of industrial SDOs in 
that they may only be familiar with the competitive and economic responsibilities of 
forprofit organization leaders, and may be unprepared to deal with the politically and 
economically neutral functions of nonprofit organizations.  Specifically, collaboration 
with competitors is not the norm with forprofit organizations (Anheier & Krlev, 2015), 
and leaders of industrial SDOs who come from forprofit backgrounds may lack the 
necessary collaboration skills.  The challenge might not be as great for leaders of 
unaccredited SDOs whose organizations are frequently motivated more by forprofit 
institutional logics, thereby making unaccredited industrial SDO leaders less prone to 
being incompatible with an unaccredited industrial SDOs leadership needs (van den Ende 
et al., 2012; Hopper, 2013).  The challenge is potentially the same for leaders who come 
from a nonprofit background in that they may not be prepared to address the competitive 
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and economic responsibilities required of forprofit organizational leadership (Battilana & 
Lee, 2014). 
The Role of Theory 
Institutional theory deals with institutional isomorphism and the mechanisms by 
which similar organizations tend to respond to pressure and resemble each other over 
time (Modell, 2012, Scott, 2008; Suddaby, 2015; Zorn et al., 2011).  The three most 
common mechanisms are normative, coercive, and mimetic pressure (Brunsson et al., 
2012; Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Guerreiro, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2012; Heras-
Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013).  Some researchers suggested that voluntary consensus 
standards development, adoption, and diffusion driven by deliberative and inclusive 
democratic processes are most compatible with normative isomorphic pressures (Behr & 
Diaz, 2014; Olshan, 1993; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Wijen, 2014).  These same researchers 
indicated that coercive and mimetic isomorphic pressures are becoming more common 
because of an increase in conflicts between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs.  
Institutional theory provided a lens by which I expected to gain insight into what a panel 
of SMEs believed was the effect of an increase in the number of unaccredited industrial 
SDOs on institutional isomorphism, and the role of leaders of industrial SDOs in the 
United States to affect institutional isomorphic mechanisms and pressures.   
Stakeholder theory deals with how organizations could or should address the 
needs and wants of affected stakeholders (Hasnas, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012).  
Researchers suggested that one of the first steps that need to be taken is to understand the 
motivations of different stakeholders (Eskerod & Huemann, 2013; Tashman & Raelin, 
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2013; Tullberg, 2013; Verbeke & Tung, 2013).  Stakeholders are not a homogeneous 
group, and often have agendas that are not compatible (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; 
Garriga, 2014).  Stakeholder agendas also change over time (Verbeke & Tung, 2013).  
Stakeholder theory provided a lens by which I expected to gain insight into who a panel 
of SMEs considered significant stakeholders, what these SMEs believed are the 
stakeholder agendas, and the role of leaders of industrial SDO in the United States to 
identify, understand, and work with significant stakeholders. 
Figure 2 represents a current view of the tensions that exist between accredited 
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs.  Traditional SDOs that 
have not subscribed to the ANSI essential requirements for accreditation (e.g., the 
American Institute of Chemical Engineers) are not included in the unaccredited sector.  
Figure 2 is meant to depict the potential conflicts that could or do exist between 
accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs as they seek to retain or gain legitimacy.  
The overlap between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs represents situations 
where a member may be part of either type of SDO, or where there is some form of 
interaction between accredited and unaccredited SDOs.  The slight overlap between 
unaccredited industrial SDOs and ANSI represents ANSI’s attempts to encourage 
communication with unaccredited industrial SDOs through an abbreviated process known 
as “Publicly Available Specifications” (Yates & Murphy, 2015, p. 32).  The challenge for 
leaders of industrial SDOs is to reduce the potential conflicts indicated by Figure 2.  
Since the central research question deals with future collaborative practices designed to 
  
 
44 
reduce the potential conflicts indicated by Figure 2, a qualitative method employing a 
Delphi design was used to conduct the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Existing tensions.   
Literature Review 
The Role and Value of Voluntary Consensus Standards 
Voluntary consensus standards contribute greatly to how the world communicates 
both locally and internationally (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; 
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communication primarily by opening discussion and dialog between interested parties 
through a deliberative and inclusive democratic process (Allen & Ramanna, 2013).  Van 
den Ende et al. (2012) referred to this potential for communication through open 
discussion and dialog as a form of collective action.  Open discussion and dialog can 
enhance voluntary consensus standards processes by bringing together a “community of 
interest” (Behr & Diaz, 2014, p. 592).  Voluntary consensus standards developed, 
adopted, and diffused through a deliberative and inclusive democratic process can also 
encourage “mutual and non-coercive justifications” (Yates & Murphy, 2015, p. 25).  
Communication with the goal of creating voluntary consensus standards has long 
benefited society by serving public interests through the establishment of coherent social 
order, creating prescriptions for how to behave, and enabling and restraining social 
behavior (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Sandholtz, 2012; Yates & Murphy, 2015).  
Voluntary consensus standards often represent rules for organizing society (Brunsson et 
al., 2012), and voluntary consensus standards often support social and global 
convergence (Reinecke et al., 2012).  Other benefits to society include the promotion of 
innovation, interoperability, uniformity, mutual compatibility, and consistent interface 
procedures (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Strauss, 2013).  SDOs that 
develop voluntary consensus standards can support the process by encouraging adopters 
to seek direct or independent auditing and surveillance services that may strengthen the 
legitimacy of voluntary consensus standards and the legitimacy of SDOs that create them 
(Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; 
Slager et al., 2012).  Voluntary consensus standards also act as a form of voluntary 
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governance (Brunsson et al., 2012; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013).  By acting as a 
form of voluntary governance, voluntary consensus standards present opportunities for 
adopters to increase perceptions of legitimacy among significant stakeholders by 
increasing trust (Fernando et al., 2015; Sandholtz, 2012; Slager et al., 2012; Zorn et al., 
2011).  Voluntary consensus standards also provide a level of protection for adopters by 
helping to control risk (Rindt & Mouzas, 2015; Ringsberg, 2015; Stranieri et al., 2015; 
Vogel, 2010).  Risk control occurs by providing adopters with a safe haven for both 
producers and users (Hopper, 2013).  The greater the perceive legitimacy of voluntary 
consensus standards and the SDOs that develop them, the greater the level of risk control 
(Brunsson et al., 2012, Fernando et al., 2015; Slager et al., 2012). 
Industrial Voluntary Consensus Standards 
Industrial voluntary consensus standards help to ensure the quality and safety of 
processes, products, and services, and to prevent negative impacts to public health and 
the environment (Ernst, 2013; Fernando et al., 2015).  In these ways, industrial voluntary 
consensus standards can increase trust and perceived legitimacy of organizations, the 
products they design, and the institutions that help organize societal and organizational 
interactions (Ernst, 2013; Sandholtz, 20120).  Botzem and Dobusch (2012) defined 
voluntary consensus standards of all types as “detailed rules structuring interaction” (p. 
739).  When treated as rules, industrial voluntary consensus standards can act as artifacts 
of legitimacy that in some cases are accentuated by displaying symbols of the SDOs that 
created them (Fernando et al., 2015, Slager et al., 2012; Zorn et al., 2011).  Industrial 
voluntary consensus standards developed by SDOs with perceived legitimacy can 
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encourage neutral participation among interested stakeholders (Farrell & Simcoe, 2012) 
and help push the development of formalized and inclusive committees which then 
potentially benefits adoption and diffusion (Gadinis, 2014).  Industrial voluntary 
consensus standards and the SDOs that create them can also educate potential adopters 
and significant stakeholders by helping adopters and significant stakeholders “separate 
objectives and policy considerations” (Gadinis, 2014, p. 9). 
Industrial voluntary consensus standards often provide cost benefits.  First, there 
is the potential cost benefit to public organizations and governments.  Industrial voluntary 
consensus standards are often utilized by governments to create codes that reduce the cost 
to government and indirectly to taxpayers and organizations (Abrams, 2014; Strauss, 
2013).  In the United States, the method is called incorporation by reference (IBR).  
Incorporation by reference has the advantage of borrowing industrial voluntary consensus 
standards that already exist, resulting in codes that are familiar to many stakeholders.  
Industrial voluntary consensus standards can also have a cost benefit by keeping 
switching costs high (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; van den Ende et al., 2012).  At first 
glance, keeping switching costs high may seem like a contradiction.  But by keeping 
switching cost high, some researchers suggested this helps ensure that considerations 
such as uniformity and mutual compatibility remain relatively stable (Brunsson et al., 
2012; van den Ende et al., 2012).  Industrial voluntary consensus standards can also have 
positive economic value by improving efficiency within and between organizations by 
establishing common rules (Brunsson et al., 2012; Gadinis, 2014).  Industrial voluntary 
consensus standard have the potential to improve traceability and reduce fraud, both of 
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which can have positive economic impacts (Henrik, 2015).  Industrial voluntary 
consensus standards are often “nested” in other standards (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010, 
p. 71) such as ISO 9001 and 14001.  Nesting of standards in what Heras-Saizarbitoria and 
Boiral (2013) refer to as Meta-Standards can help harmonize more specific standards 
which then improves the potential for supporting uniform and harmonized globalization 
through the coordination of interchanges.  Industrial voluntary consensus standards can 
therefore stimulate trade and reduce obstacles by providing a basis for reducing 
information related transaction costs and reduce conflicts that can result from duplication 
of effort (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Hopper, 2013; Pirard at al., 2015).  Per 
Timmermans and Epstein (2010), even if standards do not directly harmonize or 
globalize interchanges they can help lead in that direction.   
Industrial voluntary consensus standards can also benefit society when 
governmental regulations are weak or incompatible.  Like governmental regulations that 
are supposed to be applicable to a wide segment of society, industrial voluntary 
consensus standards are often considers common rules or “rules of the many” (Brunsson 
et al., 2012, p. 621).  In addition, industrial voluntary consensus standards are generally 
considered voluntary rules or soft-law (Brunsson et al., 2012; Perkins & Neumayer, 
2009; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Ringsberg, 2015).  Soft-laws that result from industrial 
voluntary consensus standards can help fill the voids between governmental regulations 
and accepted societal norms (Sandholtz, 2012).  By using industrial voluntary consensus 
standards to fill voids, governments and society may enjoy the benefits of industrial 
voluntary consensus standards that are already in place and may be more flexible than 
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government created regulations.  As a result, industrial voluntary consensus standards 
may at times act as viable substitutes for regulations (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; 
Vogel, 2010; Wijen, 2014). 
Flexibility tends to be another positive feature of industrial voluntary consensus 
standards.  Although flexibility may be considered an oxymoron, many researchers 
suggested that flexibility is often what makes industrial voluntary consensus standards 
strong and desirable (Sandholtz, 2012; Simpson at al., 2012; Slager et al., 2012; 
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  By leaving room for flexibility, room is left for 
interpretation by various stakeholders, which can then increase opportunities for adoption 
and diffusion because adopters are better able to make the standard work within the 
confines of their organizations’ existing structure and capabilities (Wijen, 2014).  
Flexibility also allows firms to adopt industrial voluntary consensus standards in ways 
that better comply with stakeholder concerns and demands (Perkins & Neumayer, 2009). 
Industrial voluntary consensus standards are often a viable means to limit 
government intervention (Coates, 2015; Delmas & Montiel, 2008; Gadinis, 2014; Heras-
Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Hopper, 2013; Krug et al., 2015; Pirard et al., 2015).  The 
ability to limit government intervention depends heavily on culture (Ernst, 2013; Strauss, 
2013).  In China, for example, industrial voluntary consensus standards are typically 
developed, adopted, and diffused by the central government (Kim, Lee, Kwak, & Seo, 
2014).  Using this model, the government is essentially in control of industrial voluntary 
consensus standards and industrial voluntary consensus standards have limited effects on 
controlling government intervention.  At the other extreme is the United States that 
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practices a market-driven, bottom-up approach to industrial voluntary consensus 
standards development, adoption, and diffusion.  The U.S. government has demonstrated 
a willingness to let the free market drive the industrial voluntary consensus standards 
process as long as the process works (Krug et al., 2015).  The U.S. culture can encourage 
collaboration between SDOs because all stakeholders recognize the potential economic 
benefits of not inviting regulatory intervention (Ernst, 2013; Krug et al., 2015).  Europe 
and similar cultures represent a sort of middle ground in that governments participate in 
industrial voluntary consensus standards processes, but the SDOs and SSOs tend to be 
allowed to drive the processes (Strauss, 2013).  Some researchers suggested the European 
model may work the best because all stakeholders realize that governments can not only 
step in at any time, but since governments are already involved in industrial voluntary 
consensus standards processes, governments are better prepared to step in (Ernst, 2013; 
Strauss, 2013; Vogel, 2010).  In contrast, the same researchers suggested that the China 
approach to tightly controlling industrial voluntary consensus standards may be too 
restrictive, and the U.S. hands-off approach may result in insufficient oversight and 
unfamiliarity with what has traditionally been a deliberative and inclusive democratic 
process.  For most of the world, when industrial voluntary consensus standards processes 
work, there is reduced incentive on the part of governments to interfere (Ponte & Cheyns, 
2013). 
Finally, industrial voluntary consensus standards can help empower significant 
stakeholders.  The first way in which industrial voluntary consensus standards can help 
empower significant stakeholders is by providing tools outside of state systems (Vogel, 
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2010).  Although not legally binding unless codified, if an industrial voluntary consensus 
standard has been generally adopted, just the act of adoption may establish a precedent 
that can be used to bring attention to perceived problems.  The second way industrial 
voluntary consensus standards can help empower significant stakeholders is that 
industrial voluntary consensus standards can be used as a threat (Makiya & Fraisse, 
2015).  When industrial voluntary consensus standards are used as a threat, the threat 
usually comes in the form of coercive pressure to adopt a standard (coercive 
isomorphism).  The ability to pressure organizations to adopt an industrial voluntary 
consensus standard is enhanced when industrial voluntary consensus standards are made 
legitimate through the process of adoption and diffusion, giving significant stakeholders a 
benchmark with which to gauge performance.  Such a benchmark can empower 
significant stakeholders to apply pressure to other significant stakeholders to adopt a 
standard or face economic penalties.  The most common economic penalty usually comes 
in the form of one party refusing to do business with another party unless an industrial 
voluntary consensus standard is adopted (Olshan, 1993).  Sandholtz (2012) suggested that 
once an industrial voluntary consensus standard is perceived as being sufficiently 
legitimate, the potential for economic penalties tends to drive adoption and diffusion 
through processes that are more normative and mimetic, and less coercive. 
The History of Industrial Voluntary Consensus Standards  
Industrial voluntary consensus standards are a relatively recent phenomenon with 
beginnings in the late 1800s as a way for the scientific community to communicate in a 
consistent manner (Brunsson et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  As a result of 
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the industrial revolution, knowledge experts (often engineers) had begun to create 
societies of like experts in an effort to share experiences.  Industries had also become 
interested in these early societies because many processes were still based on the 
craftsmanship mentality and few interoperability standards were available to help guide 
how processes could be harmonized (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Interchangeability 
of parts was, for example, a relatively new concept as parts produced individually were 
just beginning to be replaced by parts manufactured on an industrial scale.  So the sheer 
volume of components being manufactured was one of the driving forces behind the need 
for stakeholders to have a common platform or community for exchanging ideas 
(Brunsson et al., 2012).  Governments at the time were also playing an important role 
because modern industries were in their infancy and governments often represented the 
only central power for organizing societal behavior.  Prior to the industrial revolution, 
voluntary consensus standards were mostly civil interactions (Vogel, 2010).  Voluntary 
consensus standards of the civil variety had been in existence for hundreds if not 
thousands of years and were used to govern activities like commerce and other forms of 
trade.  Industrial voluntary consensus standards were a relatively new phenomenon 
driven by the rise in manufacturing activities, and the need for manufacturers and the 
scientific and engineering communities that supported manufacturing to be able to 
communicate using a common language (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Organizations 
frequently had nowhere else to turn but to legislative bodies in order to have a central 
authority that could coordinate standard development and setting activities.  Part of this 
turn to legislative bodies was also the result of resistance to involvement by firms.  The 
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rationale was that technical standards should be the domain of technical experts, not firms 
(Yates & Murphy, 2015).  Only later would the development of industrial voluntary 
consensus standards become a more deliberative and inclusive democratic process (Yates 
& Murphy, 2015).  Complexity and scale of manufacturing activities and the number of 
products produced were also increasing rapidly, and in many cases the lack of standards 
produced devastating results.  Pressure vessels such as boilers were a prime example of 
the problems that could occur as the result of a lack of standardization.  The failure of 
such devices in the early 20
th
 century because of a lack of standardization in construction 
frequently had catastrophic consequences that often resulted in significant loss of 
property and life (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Industrial voluntary consensus 
standards were seen as a way to establish directives and norms (Sandholtz, 2012) so that 
industrial firms could produce goods that were “comparable in their key aspects” 
(Brunsson et al., 2012, p. 614).  Consequently, in the early days of industrial voluntary 
consensus standards, there was rarely a focus on industrial voluntary consensus standards 
from an organizational perspective, but rather from a functional perspective (Brunsson et 
al., 2012).   
One of the first major standardization projects was ordered by the U.S. 
government during World War I (WWI) as the result of numerous boiler explosions 
aboard ships that had resulted from the lack of pressure vessel standards (Timmermans & 
Epstein, 2010).  This task fell to an organization that would eventually become the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), a currently accredited U.S.-based 
industrial SDO.  During the early part of the 20
th
 century, the United States played a 
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major role in industrial voluntary consensus standards development along with the United 
Kingdom and Europe because the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe were 
often the leaders at the time in large-scale manufacturing and technical innovation 
(Brunsson et al., 2012; Lampland & Star, 2009; Olshan, 1993).  Public pressure was also 
starting to play a significant role in the development of industrial voluntary consensus 
standards (Ernst, 2013).  The public not only wanted consistency in the products they 
used but concerns about an increasing number of catastrophic events was creating alarm 
that essentially forced governments to act.  It is important to point out that although 
public pressure often provided a driving force behind the development of early industrial 
voluntary consensus standards, the general public was frequently uninformed regarding 
how industrial voluntary consensus standards processes actually worked (Lampland & 
Star, 2009).  During WWII, there were numerous situations where lack of standards 
created problems for allied forces because items as simple as nuts and bolts were not 
standardized between various forces (Yates & Murphy, 2015).  After WWII, the United 
Nations expanded upon the concept of institutionalized standards development and 
created the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) whose purpose was to 
encourage commerce through the establishment of international standards that focused on 
everything from units of measure to manufacturing norms (Timmermans & Epstein, 
2010).  In the case of industrial voluntary consensus standards, the processes were based 
on the premise that “technical evidence and argument encourages mutual and non-
coercive justification” (Yates & Murphy, 2015, p. 25). 
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After WWII, industrial voluntary consensus standards processes tended to take 
different directions depending on the country and culture.  In the United States, there was 
a clear battle forming between two competing interest groups, the National Bureau of 
Standards (now the National Institute of Standards and Technology or NIST) and the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI).  ANSI, formed in 1918, was originally 
intended to coordinate the activities of the National Bureau of Standards and other 
organizations, but not necessarily have direct control.  The battle was primarily one of 
hard-law (regulation) versus soft-law (voluntary consensus standards), and who would 
address which aspects of hard-law or soft-law (van den Ende et al., 2012).  The battle was 
also between governance of standards (Ernst, 2013).  The United States never established 
a centralized authority for creating and enforcing industrial voluntary consensus 
standards, instead learning to rely on the free-market approach to sort out which 
standards would dominate (Ernst, 2013).  The argument made by proponents of little 
government involvement or intervention was that the free-market approach promoted 
innovation and suggested an optimistic approach where economic pressures would lead 
to convergence (Fransen, 2011).  This optimistic approach was that organizations were 
considered logical and altruistic, therefore supporting the convergence argument.  The 
pessimistic view was that a free-market approach would only encourage organizations to 
support whatever was in their best interests (Fransen, 2011).  The pessimistic approach 
was essentially the opposite of the optimistic approach in that organizations were 
considered logical but self-serving, therefore supporting the best interests argument 
(Fransen, 2011).  Over time, the power to set premise for how industrial voluntary 
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consensus standards should be developed in the United States was successfully claimed 
by the private sector and led by ANSI (Olshan, 1993).  The Nation Bureau of Standards 
became specifically responsible for helping the U.S. government establish regulations 
such as those used by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OHSA) and 
government procurement activities.  Per Ernst (2013), ANSI recently argued in 2009 that 
there was no reason to change the U.S. approach because the market-driven, bottom-up 
system worked well.  This argument was predicated based on an increasing call by some 
stakeholders for government involvement to address conflicts being caused by growing 
standards wars.  In 2010, ANSI suggested that convergence of industrial voluntary 
consensus standards would be more efficient and involve less conflict if the rest of the 
world adopted industrial voluntary consensus standards processes that followed the U.S. 
market-driven, bottom-up approach (Ernst, 2013).  One of ANSI’s responses to concerns 
over the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach has been the establishment of essential 
requirements for accredited SDOs which was implemented in 1993 (Hopper, 2013).  
However, other researchers suggested that as the result of deregulation that started in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S.-based market-driven, bottom-up approach has 
created a more crowded field of SDOs which despite the activities of ANSI to created 
essential requirements has promoted competition and conflict based on political and 
economic motivations.  Reinecke et al. (2012) suggested that the increasing tendencies of 
accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs to “sell their brand” (p. 798) in the absence 
of oversight should not be an unexpected outcome.   
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Industrial Voluntary Consensus Standards Today 
Industrial voluntary consensus standards processes have always been contested 
and volatile (Behr & Diaz, 2014, Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; 
Hopper, 2013; Howard, Tallontire, Stinger, & Marchant, 2015).  Even before 
deregulation in the United States and the increase in the number of unaccredited 
industrial SDOs, disagreements existed but were addressed through a deliberative and 
inclusive democratic process.  As mentioned earlier, in 2010 ANSI suggested that 
convergence of industrial voluntary consensus standards would be more efficient and 
involve less conflict if the rest of the world adopted industrial voluntary consensus 
standards processes that followed the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach (Ernst, 
2013).  However, recent studies have indicated the United States is losing out to Europe 
as the dominant industrial voluntary consensus standards driver (Ernst, 2013).  If true, the 
ANSI contention of 2010 may have been premature, or simply inaccurate due to an 
increasing preoccupation among accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs to retain or 
gain legitimacy for political or economic reasons (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et al., 
2012; Ernst, 2013; Farrell & Simcoe, 2012; Strauss, 2013; van den Ende et al., 2012).  
Some researchers suggested that political and economic considerations are at the heart of 
the convergence conflict (Fransen, 2011; Lampland & Star, 2009, Olshan, 1993; Perkins 
& Neumayer, 2009; Slager et al., 2012; Stranieri et al., 2015) and are likely to continue 
unless specific stakeholders alter their behavior (Gadinis, 2014, Strauss, 2013; Vogel, 
2010).  One group of researchers suggested that the private authority approach supported 
by the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up process has resulted in a trend away from moral 
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responsibility and towards a “here-and-now” rationale (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013, p. 471).  
Part of this trend away from moral responsibility could also be the result of a lack of any 
reason for SDOs to collaborate because of the absence of a credible threat from U.S. 
regulatory bodies (Pirard et al., 2015).  So while Botzem and Dobusch (2012) suggested 
that industrial voluntary consensus standards processes still tend to follow a deliberative 
and inclusive democratic approach, they also warned this may be changing towards a 
more confrontational, exclusive, and preferential process. 
Existing Tensions and Threats to Legitimacy 
Today in the United States, there are three major non-state actors involved in the 
industrial voluntary consensus standards process, all vying for legitimacy of one form or 
another.  These three major non-state actors include corporations, industry consortia 
(often formed by corporations), and private organizations such as SDOs and SSOs 
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012).  Industry consortia and private organizations seem to be 
playing the leading role in creating tensions between SDOs, the industrial voluntary 
consensus standards developed by SDOs, and the resulting battle for legitimacy (Botzem 
& Dobusch, 2012).  The overarching tension in the battle for legitimacy is the tension 
created by competition and conflict between the deliberative and inclusive democratic 
process advocated by ANSI and accredited industrial SDOs, and the exclusive and 
preferential process advocated by industry consortia and unaccredited industrial SDOs 
(Behr & Diaz, 2014, Fransen, 2011; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013, Makiya & 
Fraisse, 2015).  The battle for legitimacy between accredited and unaccredited industrial 
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SDOs is also a battle for market share (Pirard et al, 2015) and is likely to continue under 
the current U.S. market-driven, bottom-up system.   
The battle for legitimacy in general is being waged using several approaches.  
First is the approach of legitimizing industrial voluntary consensus standards themselves 
(Behr & Diaz, 2014; Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Fernando et al., 2015; Wijen, 2014, Yates 
& Murphy, 2015).  Botzem and Dobusch (2012) argued that the legitimacy of industrial 
voluntary consensus standards is both a function of input and output legitimacy.  From a 
functionalist perspective that tends to define industrial voluntary consensus standards (an 
engineering or technical approach), output legitimacy (a standards effectiveness) has 
become more important than the legitimacy of the input (the need for the standard) 
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012).  Industrial voluntary consensus standards deemed most 
effective are the ones that tend to garner greater perceptions of legitimacy by appealing to 
a wide variety of stakeholders (van den Ende et al., 2012).  When the output is deemed to 
be legitimate, there is also a feedback loop that enhances the perceive legitimacy of the 
SDOs that developed the standard (Hopper, 2013).   
In addition to using industrial voluntary consensus standards to enhance an SDOs 
perceptions of legitimacy, another approach to enhancing perceptions of legitimacy is 
through the granting or selling of certificates (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; 
Perkins & Neumayer, 2009).  When adopters agree to be certified by industrial SDOs, the 
SDOs benefit because the adopter is essentially acknowledging the SDOs legitimacy 
(Sandholtz, 2012).  An increasingly popular approach for both adopters and industrial 
SDOs to advertise certificates is for adopters to display what is effectively a symbolic 
  
 
60 
seal of the adopters’ recognition of the industrial SDOs legitimacy (Sandholtz, 2012).  
Slager et al. (2012) referred to this approach as encouraging the display of artifacts of 
legitimacy.  When an adopter displays an artifact of legitimacy, this can have a 
snowballing effect, especially if the adopter is well known.  Other organizations are 
likely to copy well-known adopters through a process known as mimetic institutional 
isomorphism (Zorn et al., 2011).  If an industrial SDO is already considered legitimate, 
adopters that agree to the certification process can increase their own perceptions of 
legitimacy by showing affiliation with an already legitimate industrial SDO.  One major 
criticism of the current certification process is that certification is not only used by SDOs 
to increase perceptions of legitimacy, but also used by SDOs to prevent the adoption of 
competing standards (Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; 
Howard et al., 2015, Pirard et al., 2015; Reinecke et al., 2012; Stranieri et al., 2015; 
Strauss, 2013).  This process of preventing adoption through granting or selling 
certificates has been referred to as capture (Coates, 2015).  Several researchers suggested 
this problem has only gotten worse with the increase in the number of unaccredited 
industrial SDOs and is likely to continue (Brunsson et al., 2012; Ernst, 2013; 
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).   
Along with issuing certificates, industrial SDOs have also begun to encourage 
adopters to submit to auditing processes (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012).  Auditing started to 
gain popularity in the United States in the 1980s as a direct result of deregulation 
(Brunsson et al., 2012; Ernst, 2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Encouraging 
adopters to submit to an auditing process has become another way for industrial SDOs to 
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increase perceptions of legitimacy.  Some organizations like ISO have made auditing a 
requirement for an adopter to display or otherwise use ISO’s artifacts of legitimacy 
(Boiral & Gendron, 2011).  Auditing can also enhance perceptions of an adopters’ 
legitimacy by demonstrating that adoption of the standard was more than just ceremonial.  
Ceremonial adoption occurs when an organization adopts a voluntary consensus standard 
primarily for economic or political reasons, but has little intention of actually complying 
with the standard (Hopper, 2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Zorn et al., 2011).  
Several researchers referred to ceremonial adoption as a form of decoupling (Brunsson et 
al., 2012; Sandholtz, 2012; Wijen, 2014).  When a voluntary consensus standard is 
adopted but decoupled from an organizations business model, the standard becomes 
symbolic only (Brunsson et al., 2012; Sandholtz, 2012; Wijen, 2014).  Depending on the 
perceived legitimacy of an industrial SDO, potential adopters may find themselves not 
only compelled to adopt the SDOs industrial voluntary consensus standards, but also 
compelled to agree to the SDOs terms of use.  This form of coercive or memetic 
isomorphism (Makiya & Fraisse, 2015) can be particularly effective if adoption of an 
industrial voluntary consensus standard has become a requirement for conducting 
business, but also tends to increase ceremonial adoption (Hopper, 2013; Timmermans & 
Epstein, 2010; Zorn et al., 2011).   
The current overarching criticism of auditing processes in the United States is that 
there is little if any oversight of the auditing process, and this lack of oversight 
encourages the ceremonial adoption of industrial voluntary consensus standards (Delmas 
& Montiel, 2008; Fernando et al., 2015).  Several researchers suggested the auditing 
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process and the resulting competition between industrial SDOs have become nothing 
more than a race to the bottom (Ashley, 2015; Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Henrik, 2015; 
Reinecke et al., 2012).  Adopters of industrial voluntary consensus standards are also 
accused of being complicit in this alleged race to the bottom for two reasons.  First, 
adopters increasingly do not seem to care how industrial voluntary consensus standards 
are developed if the standards are economically and competitively advantageous (Behr & 
Diaz, 2014; Fernando et al., 2015).  Second, adopters know that supporting perceptions of 
legitimacy help keep the U.S. government playing the role of interested observer (Behr & 
Diaz, 2014).  One group of researchers indicated that the lack of a credible oversight 
process favors unaccredited industrial SDOs because unaccredited industrial SDOs are 
not bound by the essential requirements ANSI imposes on accredited industrial SDOs 
(Yates & Murphy, 2015).  Until the U.S. government is able or willing to engage in 
oversight of the auditing processes, some researchers suggested the battle for legitimacy 
between industrial SDOs is only going to get worse (Krug et al., 2015; Simpson et al., 
2012; Strauss, 2013; Vogel, 2010; Wijen, 2014).   
Industrial Voluntary Consensus Standards Flexibility  
A related tension in the competition between accredited and unaccredited 
industrial SDOs, and part of the legitimacy battle, is that industrial voluntary consensus 
standards are becoming less flexible.  According to some researchers, flexibility is what 
makes industrial voluntary consensus standards valuable by increasing the standards 
appeal to a wider range of stakeholders (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Howard et al., 2015; 
Simpson et al., 2012; van den Ende et al., 2012).  These same researchers suggested that 
  
 
63 
part of the explanation for a decrease in industrial voluntary consensus standards 
flexibility is an increasing tendency on the part of industrial SDOs to try and block the 
adoption of competing standards.  Technology has played a large part in the apparent 
trend towards decreasing flexibility, in particular, using essential patents (Behr & Diaz, 
2014; Delmas & Montiel, 2008; Ernst, 2013; Fransen, 2011; Rindt & Mouzas, 2015).  
One of the key components of the ASNI essential requirements document created in 1993 
was a specific focus on the fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory availability of patent 
licensing and the early and enforced disclosure of essential patents (Ernst, 2013).  
Complying with ANSI essential requirements is mandatory for accredited industrial 
SDOs.  The same constraints do not apply to unaccredited industrial SDOs.  Some 
researchers suggested that suppliers who are part of industry consortia and unaccredited 
industrial SDOs appear to be the biggest threat to the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial 
voluntary consensus standards process because there is an unsupervised economic motive 
for not sharing essential patents (Gadinis, 2014; Makiya & Fraisse, 2015; van den Ende et 
al., 2012).   
Knowledge Experts 
Knowledge experts have always been a critical participant in the development, 
adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards (Brunsson et al., 
2012).  Accredited industrial SDOs have historically been national organizations and 
knowledge experts helped industrial voluntary consensus standards support public 
interests through respectful deliberation that involved a wide range of interested 
stakeholders (Yates & Murphy, 2015).  Vested interest participants where always 
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assumed to be a component of developing industrial voluntary consensus standards, but 
the involvement of a wide range of knowledge experts helped to create a balanced 
process (Brunsson et al., 2012).  The role of knowledge experts, although extremely 
important to supporting the legitimacy of industrial voluntary consensus standards, has 
largely been overlooked until recently (Sandholtz, 2012).  Before deregulation, one 
traditional benefit of knowledge expert participation was the willingness of the 
government to accept industrial voluntary consensus standards as an alternative to 
regulation (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  As an alternative to regulation, industrial 
voluntary consensus standards promised adopters expertise without political 
entanglements (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Postderegulation, and in the interest of 
cost control, the U.S. government increasingly adopted industrial voluntary consensus 
standards as code (Abrams, 2014; Straus, 2013) because the legitimacy of industrial 
voluntary consensus standards was backed by knowledge experts (Hopper, 2013). 
While the participation of knowledge experts has historically been important to 
supporting perceptions of industrial voluntary consensus standards legitimacy, the role of 
knowledge experts in the United States has changed considerably with the increase in the 
number of unaccredited industrial SDOs (Brunsson et al., 2012; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; 
Slager et al., 2012).  One change has been the availability of knowledge experts.  
Knowledge experts are expensive, especially for long-term participation in developing 
industrial voluntary consensus standards (Hopper, 2013).  Cost has resulted in an 
increasing lack of knowledge expert participation as employers of knowledge experts 
have been reluctant to provide financial and logistical support unless there were clear 
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economic and political benefits.  Globalization has also had an impact as industrial 
SDOs, especially accredited industrial SDOs, seek experts with global and/or diverse 
credentials (Hopper, 2013; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013).  At the same time, knowledge experts 
are becoming increasingly important in the pursuit of legitimacy by unaccredited 
industrial SDOs who can often afford to be more selective and frequently do not need 
experts with global or diverse credentials (Brunsson et al., 2012; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; 
Slager et al., 2012).   
Unaccredited industrial SDOs, especially those created by industry consortia, tend 
to focus on single issues driven by personal interests (Lampland & Star, 2009).  As a 
result, unaccredited industrial SDOs often seek out knowledge experts with similar vested 
interests (Brunsson et al., 2012).  This approach to the use of knowledge experts has 
created conflict where knowledge experts are increasingly pitted against one another in 
the battle for legitimacy (Brunsson et al., 2012; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013).  Per Ponte and 
Cheyns (2013), using knowledge experts in this way lacks “principals of justice” (p. 472).  
By selecting specific experts to support personal interests, industrial voluntary consensus 
standards are often created in isolation (Sandholtz, 2012).  Knowledge experts are also 
used increasingly by all types of industrial SDOs to validate field testing claims (Ponte & 
Cheyns, 2013) or to convince potential adopters that everyone is already using an 
industrial voluntary consensus standard (Lampland & Star, 2009).  Lampland and Star 
(2009) suggested that the current approach to using knowledge experts to support 
industrial voluntary consensus standards has had the net effect of turning knowledge 
experts into technical bureaucrats.  
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For accredited industrial SDOs, the use of knowledge experts is a necessity (Ponte 
& Cheyns, 2013).  For unaccredited industrial SDOs, the use of knowledge experts is a 
convenience (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013).  What seems to be a consistent perception is that 
all sides need knowledge experts (Hopper, 2013).  The question seems to be, in what 
capacity. 
The Ubiquitous Black Box 
Many researchers suggested that voluntary consensus standards processes of all 
types are at risk of being dragged in to what has been characterized as an expanding 
standards war (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Ernst, 2013; Farrell & 
Simcoe, 2012; Pirard et al., 2015).  Voluntary consensus standard today have become so 
ubiquitous as to have been driven below the level of public awareness, become taken for 
granted, and have simply become black boxes (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Fransen 2011; 
Lampland & Star, 2009).  Today, the inclusive De jure approach to industrial voluntary 
consensus standards development, adoption, and diffusion is being replaced by the 
personal interest De facto approach (Farrell & Simcoe, 2012).  Olshan (1993) recognized 
this over two decades ago and suggested that the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach 
encouraged by the late 1970’s and early 1980s trend towards deregulation heralded an era 
where SDOs were becoming the product of a struggle for organizational power and 
survival.  The net result per Olshan (1993) has been a procedure for developing an 
“unending output of taken-for-granted standardized technologies” (p. 332).  Several 
groups of researchers suggested that social sciences need to play a greater role in 
researching voluntary consensus standards processes (Lampland & Star, 2009; Ponte & 
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Cheyns, 2013).  Other researchers have gone further and suggested that voluntary 
consensus standards are so pervasive and ubiquitous that they have become a sociological 
concern that affect all individuals, and need to be treated as such (Botzem & Dobusch, 
2012; Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Brunsson et al., 2012; Fransen, 2011; Olshan, 1993; 
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  
The Role of Theory 
Many studies regarding industrial voluntary consensus standards have addressed 
the processes behind standards development, adoption, and diffusion (Botzem & 
Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Delmas & Montiel, 2008; Heras-Saizarbitoria & 
Boiral, 2013; Kaplan & Kinderman, 2015; Krug et al., 2015; Perkins & Neumayer, 2009; 
Reinecke et al., 2012; Simpson et al., 2012; Slager et al., 2012; Stranieri et al, 2015; van 
den Ende et al., 2012; Vogel, 2010; Wijen, 2014).  Frequently, these studies have alluded 
to or directly mentioned institutional theory and stakeholder theory to explain the 
dynamics involved in the development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary 
consensus standards (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Farrell & Simcoe, 
2012; Hopper, 2013; Howard et al., 2015; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Reinecke et al., 2012; 
Ringsberg, 2015; Simpson et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; van den Ende et 
al., 2012).  Systems theory (although not mentioned in the voluntary consensus standards 
literature and not a focus of this study) may also play a role in future research because the 
development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards 
represents a complex system that tends to operate on a long-term basis (Adams et al., 
2014; Andretta, 2014; Meadows, 2008; Senge, 2006). 
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Institutional Theory 
The majority of studies discovered during the literature review considered 
institutional theory to play the primary role as the lens through which the tensions 
surrounding development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus 
standards can be viewed and potentially understood (Brunsson et al., 2012; Fernando et 
al., 2015; Fransen, 2011; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Lampland & Star, 2009; 
Makiya & Fraisse, 2015; Olshan, 1993; Sandholtz, 2012, Simpson et al., 2012; Slager et 
al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Wijen, 2014; Zorn et al., 2011).  Repeated 
mention of institutional theory informed the decision to include institution theory in this 
study. 
Modern or neo-institutional theory had beginnings in 1991 as a theory that 
organizations strategically responded to organizational pressures.  The inclusion of a 
strategic response to modern institutional theory replaced the previous view of 
institutional theory that organizational responses were essentially reactive and naturally 
resulted in organizations resembling each other over time (Suddaby, 2010).  Modern 
institutional theory did not replace the thought that organizations responded to pressure 
and tended to represent each other over time, but modern institutional theory now 
suggested the process was also strategic and proactive, and not merely reactive.  The 
primary approach used by researchers to incorporating institutional theory into the 
development, adoption, and diffusion process was through the concept of institutional 
isomorphism (Brunsson et al., 2012; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Olshan, 1993; 
Sandholtz, 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).   
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Some researchers referred to the process of institutional isomorphism as a form of 
pressure (Brunsson et al., 2012; Zorn et al., 2011).  Isomorphism is generally defined as 
“A similarity of the processes or structures between organizations representing a trend 
towards convergence or homogeneity” (Zorn et al., 2011, p. 6).  Behr and Diaz (2014) 
suggested that isomorphic pressures in the world of industrial voluntary consensus 
standards development, adoption, and diffusion involved six key incentives that included 
(1) advancing standards that promoted economic or business interests, (2) increasing the 
ability to gain advanced knowledge of emerging standards, (3) a desire to avoid standards 
that might create a competitive disadvantage, (4) gaining of corporate intelligence, (5) 
avoiding an influence vacuum, and (6) engendering a sense of individual professionalism.  
The types of isomorphic pressures described in industrial voluntary consensus standards 
research included normative isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and coercive 
isomorphism (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Grob & Benn, 2014; Guerreiro et al., 2012; 
Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Modell, 2012; Scott, 2008: Sandholtz, 2012; 
Suddaby, 2010; Suddaby, 2015).   
Normative isomorphism.  Normative isomorphism is convergence driven by 
social or professional norms (Brunsson et al., 2012; Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Grob & 
Benn, 2014; Guerreiro et al., 2012).  In the realm of industrial voluntary consensus 
standards, the general assumption as suggested by Brunsson et al. (2012) is that the 
coexistence of multiple industrial voluntary consensus standards is perceived as being 
counterproductive, and that convergence of industrial voluntary standards and their 
adoption and diffusion will take a normative path that eventually results in consistent or 
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normal behavior.  Brunsson et al. (2012) also suggested that following the 
recommendations made by industrial SDOs represents a normative response to the 
adoption and diffusion of standards based on institutionalized practices.  Normative 
isomorphism tends to represent the most common form of industrial or technical 
convergence with early adopters seeking economic benefits, and later adopters seeking to 
comply with now established institutional practices in pursuit of legitimacy (Brunsson et 
al., 2012; Chandler & Hwang, 2015).   
Fransen (2011) suggested that an idealist institutional approach assumes 
convergence is logical and will lead to normative adoption, but also suggested an idealist 
institutional perspective may be increasingly naive with the rise of economic and political 
motivations that have tended to drive convergence in a way that is beneficial to powerful 
actors or those organizations with a specific economic and/or political agenda.  In support 
of this concern, other researchers suggested that the voluntary consensus standards wars 
common among commodities such as coffee and timber are now becoming more 
common with industrial voluntary consensus standards due to the increase in the number 
of unaccredited industrial SDOs and the resulting battle for legitimacy (Botzem & 
Dobusch, 2012; Reinecke et al., 2012). 
Mimetic isomorphism.  Mimetic isomorphism is convergence driven by the 
perceived benefits of copying or mimicking the behavior of others.  Copying or 
mimicking the behavior of other groups has long been an accepted and normal practice 
among potential adopters, and can increase perceptions of legitimacy for all stakeholders 
(Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Grob & Benn, 2014; Guerreiro et al., 2012).  While many 
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organizations have embraced standards copied from others for both functional and 
legitimacy reasons, some have used mimetic isomorphism as a form of ceremonial or 
symbolic adoption strictly in pursuit of legitimacy (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et al., 
2012; Sandholtz, 2012; Zorn et al., 2011).  The problem from an industrial SDO 
perspective is that many organizations do not seek a standards designation for technical 
reasons, but rather for gaining legitimacy in the eyes of significant stakeholders 
(Sandholtz, 2012).  ISO standards were often referenced by researchers as examples of 
voluntary consensus standards adopted for ceremonial or symbolic reasons strictly in 
pursuit of perceptions of legitimacy (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et al., 2012; 
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Ceremonial or symbolic adoption, or the decoupling of 
standards adoption from incorporation into actual practice (Wijen, 20140), has 
ramifications for industrial SDOs who increasingly deal with potential adopters who do 
not care if an industrial voluntary consensus standard comes from an accredited or 
unaccredited SDO (Behr & Diaz, 2014).   
The primary ramification is that industrial SDOs are increasingly more interested 
in encouraging mimetic isomorphic adoption to enhance their own legitimacy and the 
legitimacy of the industrial voluntary consensus standards they develop.  Several 
researchers suggested that mimetic isomorphic pressures dominate when innovations are 
new or there is ambiguity, and then are replaced by normative and coercive isomorphic 
pressures as the innovation becomes mainstream (Zorn et al., 2011).  As technological 
innovations advance at an ever-increasing pace, some unaccredited industrial SDOs have 
attempted to take advantage of innovations using proprietary technology or essential 
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patents and hope once adopted by a select group of organizations, mimetic isomorphism 
will then drive further adoption and increase perceptions of legitimacy (Ernst, 2013). 
Coercive isomorphism.  Coercive isomorphism is convergence that is essentially 
forced either through political and/or economic means (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Grob 
& Benn, 2014, Guerreiro et al., 2012).  Enforcement of the adoption of industrial 
voluntary consensus standards by legislation is one form of coercive isomorphism that 
happens when industrial voluntary consensus standards (soft-law) are converted to code 
or codified (hard-law) through a process that in the United States is known as inclusion 
by reference (IBR) (Abrams, 2014; Ernst, 2013; Ringsberg, 2015; Strauss, 2013).  This 
form of coercive isomorphism tends to combine both economic and legal pressures.  A 
more common form of coercive isomorphism regarding industrial voluntary consensus 
standards occurs when both formal and informal pressure is exerted on organizations by 
other organizations, or by cultural expectations (Grob & Benn, 2014).  ISO is an example 
of an SDO that has successfully moved from a position of mimetic isomorphism to one of 
coercive isomorphism (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  ISO industrial voluntary 
consensus standards that were once copied because of mimetic isomorphic pressures are 
today frequently adopted because of coercive pressures exerted by other organizations 
that carry an implicit or explicit economic threat, usually in the form of loss of business 
and loss of legitimacy (Behr & Diaz, 2014).  These types of threats tend to be tangible in 
that there is a direct cause and effect, but rarely is there an explicit legal threat.  Coercive 
isomorphic pressure can be the result of current or future threats (Botzem & Dobusch, 
2012; Fernando et al., 2015; Wijen, 2014).  Liability concerns also represent situations 
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where an organization may feel compelled (coerced) to adopt an industrial voluntary 
consensus standard to shield themselves against future legal threats (Stranieri et al., 
2015).  For industrial SDOs that wish to act in a more aggressive fashion, Vogel (2010) 
suggested one approach is for industrial SDOs to harden the functions of their voluntary 
consensus standards (soft-law) to raise the specter of certain threats, thereby creating a 
coercive effect without changing soft-law into hard-law. 
Regardless of the type of isomorphic pressures in play, researchers seem to agree 
on two points.  First, alignment with goals is what drives development, adoption, and 
diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards and alignment of goals is a central 
component of institutional theory (Guerreiro et al., 2012).  Second, the primary goal 
among primary stakeholders is the perception of legitimacy (Heras-Saizarbitoria & 
Boiral, 2013; Hopper, 2013; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Reinecke et al., 2012; Sandholtz, 
2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Applying institutional theory could help leaders of 
industrial SDOs understand current institutional pressures and help them prepare for a 
more collaborative future that protects public interests and is conducive to positive social 
change (Ernst, 2013; Hopper, 2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).   
One important criticism of institutional theory is that it tends to be used 
increasingly without the inclusion of a temporal factor (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; 
Suddaby, 2015).  By excluding temporal factors, institutional theory may be used to focus 
only on real-time events while selectively ignoring antecedents or potential future 
ramifications (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Modell, 2012; Suddaby, 2015).  In the case of 
industrial voluntary consensus standards, the speed at which technology is advancing 
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may explain some of the trend away from temporal considerations in the use of 
institutional theory.  Convergence of industrial voluntary consensus standards takes time 
and is often at odds with a desire to advance new technology or gain a competitive or 
economic advantage (Gadinis, 2014; Yates & Murphy, 2015).  The result from an 
industrial voluntary consensus standards perspective is that institutional theory may 
ultimately be relegated to considering only short-term views of institutional pressures 
with consideration of long-term consequences tending to fade into the background (Yates 
& Murphy, 2015).  Potential solutions to the temporal criticism represent a gap in the 
literature.   
Stakeholder Theory 
The majority of  studies discovered during the literature review into voluntary 
consensus standards made mention of the importance of stakeholders and the role 
stakeholders play in the development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary 
consensus standards (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Coates, 2015; 
Ernst, 2013; Farrell & Simcoe, 2012; Hopper, 2013; Howard et al., 2015; Keenan, 2015; 
Krug et al., 2015; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Reinecke et al., 2012; Ringsberg, 2015; 
Stranieri et al., 2015; van den Ende et al., 2012).  Repeated mention of stakeholders 
informed the inclusion of stakeholder theory in this study.   
Stakeholder theory first appeared in 1963 to challenge the notion that only 
stockholders or shareholders mattered to organizations (Parmar et al., 2010).  The core 
assumption behind stakeholder theory was that anyone affected by business was a 
stakeholder.  Stakeholder theory addressed three problems that included how value was 
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created and traded, connecting ethics and capitalism, and helping management think 
about the first two problems (Parmar et al., 2010).  Over time, there have been additional 
refinements to stakeholder theory from the perspective of what stakeholder theory is and 
is not.  Stakeholder theory is not about who and what really counts, an excuse for 
management opportunism, concern only with financial distributions, a suggestion that all 
stakeholders must receive equal treatment, requires law changes, is a socialist construct, 
or a comprehensive moral doctrine (Hasnas, 2013; Parmer et al., 2010).  Stakeholder 
theory is about procedural justice, fair stakeholder treatment, and a normative construct 
based on fairness (Hasnas, 2013; Parmer et al., 2010).   
Concerning ethics, Parmar et al. (2010) suggested one cannot discuss business 
without discussing ethics.  Tullberg (2013) supported the business/ethics link by 
suggesting business and moral discourse should be integrated.  The same researchers 
suggested stakeholder theory is one of the dominant approaches to analyzing and 
understanding the obligations of those engaged in business.  The underlying assumption 
appears to be that regardless of the type of stakeholder, all stakeholders want to be treated 
fairly (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014).  Another consistent perspective through the lens of 
stakeholder theory was that organizations should consider all stakeholders with a valid 
claim, not just those with the highest perceived value, and that stakeholder theory must be 
applied to all stakeholders regardless of how stakeholder are defined (Hasnas, 2013).  
The perception that organizations should consider all stakeholders, and that stakeholder 
theory must apply to all is stakeholders is supported by other researchers who suggested 
that there is an urgent need to have a more inclusive approach to stakeholders so that all 
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organizations become better stewards of society (Laczniak & Murphy, 2012).  
Researchers have also suggested that a more inclusive approach can improve 
organizational performance while not damaging profits (Laczniak & Murphy, 2012).  
This inclusive approach supports a hard form of dealing with stakeholders that looks at 
all stakeholders as being important, rather than a soft form of dealing with stakeholders 
that pays lip service to some stakeholders by only pretending that all stakeholders are 
important.  Many stakeholder theory researchers suggested that stakeholders are not 
homogeneous, that different stakeholders can have different claims, and that stakeholder 
values can and do change over time (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; Garriga, 2014; Hasnas, 
2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012). 
Current Schools of Stakeholder Theory 
Current schools of stakeholder theory tend to classify stakeholder theory into four 
categories that include normative, descriptive, instrumental, and managerial (Parmar et 
al., 2010).  The normative perspective focuses on what managers and/or corporations 
should do (Parmar et al, 2010; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Verbeke & Tung, 2013).  The 
normative perspective includes a focus on the moral or ethical component of business 
(Hasnas, 2013).  The descriptive perspective focuses on research that factually reports 
what organizations do (Parmer et al., 2010; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Verbeke & Tung, 
2013).  The instrumental perspective focuses on research that explores the outcomes of 
specific organizational behavior (Parmer et al., 2010; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Verbeke 
& Tung, 2013).  The managerial perspective focuses on the needs of practitioners and 
research that supports these needs (Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012; 
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Tashman & Raelin, 2013).  Variations to schools of stakeholder theory do exist, but 
always appear to include normative, descriptive, and instrumental perspectives (Hasnas, 
2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Verbeke & Tung, 2013).   
Of the three schools that all researchers seem to agree upon, the instrumental and 
normative schools are deemed most important from two perspectives.  The first 
perspective deals with what is ultimately most pertinent to supporting stakeholder theory.  
Based on this perspective, the school deemed most important is the normative school.  
The rationale for suggesting the normative school is most important is the claim that 
stakeholder theory is primarily a vehicle for connecting ethics and business (Harrison & 
Wicks, 2013).  The second perspective deals with what is most often practiced.  From the 
perspective of practice, the instrumental school is deemed most important (Laczniak & 
Murphy, 2012; Tashman & Raelin, 2013).  This tends to make sense from an economic 
point of view.  Regardless of which school is favored, researchers tended to conclude that 
normative and instrumental schools can and maybe should coexist in the same space at 
the same time (Hasnas, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012; Parmar et al., 2010; Tashman 
& Raelin, 2013). 
Defining Stakeholders 
Miles (2012) pointed out that as of 2011 there were over 435 definitions of 
stakeholders, which in his opinion was too many for organizations to manage in any 
consistent fashion, and has resulted in frequently contested approaches to defining and 
dealing with stakeholders.  For example, ISO defines stakeholders as “interested parties” 
(Eskerod & Huemann, 2013, p. 43).  Eskerod and Huemann (2013) questioned this 
  
 
78 
definition because they claimed the ISO definition did not provide much guidance as to 
what constituted an interested party.  Yates and Murphy (2015) also appeared to take 
issue with the interested party definition because they claimed that unaccredited 
industrial SDOs tended to define interested parties based on who the SDO though would 
support the SDO agenda and excluded interested parties they thought would not support 
the SDO agenda.  A different and maybe more inclusive definition of stakeholders 
suggested by some researchers was anyone who could be affected (Eskerod & Huemann, 
2014; Garriga, 2014).  One objection to using this definition of stakeholders in the case of 
industrial voluntary consensus standards was that society could be defined as a 
stakeholder because standards affect everyone either directly or indirectly (Vogel, 2010).  
Yet another definition of stakeholders was anyone that had something to offer (Hasnas, 
2013).  However, per Eskerod and Huemann (2013), all stakeholders have something to 
offer.  Still other researchers considered anyone who is a customer to be a stakeholder 
(Harrison & Wicks, 2013).  The problem with this definition is that there is no consistent 
definition of what defines a customer, or what a customer brings in the way of value 
(Harrison & Wicks, 2013).  The problem per Parmar et al, (2010) and Hasnas (2013) with 
describing stakeholders as anyone who has anything to offer is that everyone could be 
defined as a stakeholder.  Miles (2012) suggested that definitions of stakeholders are so 
contested that depending on the chosen definition, any person or group could be 
considered a stakeholder, “even terrorists” (p. 294).  The contested perspective seems to 
turn stakeholder theory and what defines a stakeholder into a catchall that can be 
whatever one wants it to be.  Per Tullberg (2013), stakeholder theory should not be used 
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to “weave a basket big enough to hold the world’s misery” (p. 127).  Miles (2012) 
suggested the best that can be hoped for is working towards a common core.  Tullberg 
(2013) supported this sentiment and suggested the inability to agree on a definition of 
stakeholders is what keeps the debate about stakeholder theory alive, and prevents 
stakeholder theory from being properly or consistently implemented.  The net result is 
that stakeholder theory is in a constant state of flux (Parmar et al., 2010).  Parmar et al, 
(2010) suggested that until this state of flux is brought under control, confusion would 
continue and stakeholder theory would remain at best a framework for deriving other 
theories.   
One solution to considering everyone a stakeholder was to view stakeholders 
based on a stakeholders’ utility (Harrison & Wicks, 2013).  The four utilities suggested 
by Harrison and Wicks (2013) were based on what a stakeholder had to offer, how a 
stakeholder viewed organizational justice, a stakeholders’ affiliation, and opportunity 
costs presented by a given stakeholder.  By considering stakeholders from a utility 
perspective, potential stakeholders with no utility value could be eliminated from 
consideration.  Another school of thought was to view stakeholders from a capabilities 
perspective.  While a utilities perspective only considers what a stakeholder could offer, a 
capabilities perspective suggested adding consideration of a stakeholders’ opportunity to 
act, or what the stakeholder could offer (Garriga, 2014).  Considering a stakeholders 
capability or potential to provide value may add to the complexity of classifying potential 
stakeholders, but adds another dimension that can be used to reduce or at least help 
organizations map stakeholders, and only discard those with no utility or capabilities 
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value (Garriga, 2014; Laczniak & Murphy, 2014).  Garriga (2014) went further and 
suggested a utilities approach is a subset of the more overarching capabilities approach 
and that viewing stakeholders from a utility perspective should be replaced by a 
capabilities perspective.   
Another consideration for reducing confusion was to identify stakeholders by 
classification (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014).  Although Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2104) 
suggested that all stakeholders want to be treated fairly, they also stated fairness is 
subjective and what appears fair to one stakeholder may not be considered fair by 
another.  A solution offered by Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2014) was to classify 
stakeholders in two ways to help organizations work through issues of fairness.  The first 
classification included those stakeholders considered to be self-regarding.  Self-regarding 
stakeholders tend to care only about personal payoff (an intrinsic reward), and definitions 
of fair are directly related to definitions of personal payoff.  Many unaccredited industrial 
SDOs and potential adopters fit this description (Brunsson et al., 2012; Farrell & Simcoe, 
2012; Lampland & Star, 2009).  The second classification included stakeholders 
considered to be reciprocating.  Reciprocating stakeholders tend to care about fairness 
(intrinsic and extrinsic) and will often punish treatment they consider unfair.  Bridoux 
and Stoelhorst (2014) conceded that reciprocating stakeholders may present organizations 
with a greater challenge because determining what a reciprocating stakeholder defines as 
fair can be more challenging than determining what a self-regarding stakeholder defines 
as fair.  Regardless of the potential difficulties in defining fair, Bridoux and Stoelhorst 
(2014) suggested taking an arms-length approach to dealing with stakeholders identified 
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as self-regarding, and to be more embracing towards stakeholders identified as 
reciprocating. 
Another attempt at classifying stakeholders was to sort stakeholders by groups.  
Verbeke and Tung (2013) suggested five groups that included suppliers, consumers, 
employees, competitors, and government/regulators.  The assumption, per Verbeke & 
Tung (2013), was that over time the values of each group of stakeholders would change 
through isomorphic pressure and become stable.  Verbeke and Tung (2013) drew heavily 
from institutional theory and suggested that normative isomorphic pressures would reveal 
to organizations what values were most important to various stakeholder groups.  The 
rationale was that although stakeholders are not homogeneous from a motivational 
perspective, isomorphic pressures would only increase with time (a temporal 
perspective); allowing organizations to detect patterns that could help an organizations’ 
leaders adjust their approach to different stakeholder groups and also allow time to give 
voice to more stakeholders.  From an isomorphic perspective, Parmar et al. (2010) 
suggested that stakeholder theory and institutional theory were very similar, but the 
connection on both sides has largely been ignored.  Other researchers supported a 
temporal view along similar lines to those proposed by Verbeke and Tung (2013) in that 
stakeholder values would change over time, and successful organizations were those that 
were aware of the potential for stakeholder value change and could adapt to these 
changes (Eskerod & Huemann, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012).  Eskerod and 
Huemann (2013) considered a temporal view as being representative of stakeholder 
management from a for perspective (more inclusive and fair) rather than an of perspective 
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(more superficial and biased).  A temporal view was supported by other researchers, but 
from the perspective of technology change.  With the speed at which technology is 
changing, organizations need to be aware of stakeholder temporal constraints (Parmar et 
al., 2010; Tashman & Raelin, 2013).  This approach was not unlike comments made by 
researchers focused on industrial SDO motivations who suggested that one of the reasons 
for the increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs was based on the fleeting 
temporal relevance of new technology, and the slow speed at which accredited industrial 
SDOs tended to move (Gadinis, 2014; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Researchers who 
suggested that a temporal aspect was important when dealing with stakeholders agreed 
that a temporal perspective was missing from current applications of stakeholder theory 
and needed to be included as a future component of stakeholder theory (Eskerod & 
Huemann, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012; Parmar et al., 2010; Tashman & Raelin, 
2013; Verbeke & Tung, 2013). 
Stakeholder Value 
An important and original component to stakeholder theory was that stockholders 
or shareholders were not the only stakeholders who mattered to organizations, and that 
other stakeholders could contribute value (Parmar et al., 2010).  This concept of value has 
become a central part of stakeholder theory.  An early focus was on the value 
stakeholders potentially provided for organizations (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014).  The 
definitions of value have since expanded and now include a suggestion that stakeholders 
have value in their own right (Eskerod & Huemann, 2013), and that stakeholders are real 
people and not just placeholders (Garriga, 2014).  Some researchers also suggested the 
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value of stakeholders should not be viewed just from an economic return perspective, but 
more holistically (Harrison & Wicks, 2013).  Harrison and Wicks (2013) suggested the 
economic return focus on value was primarily driven by organizational unwillingness to 
deal with non-economic intangibles and was in retrospect, short sighted.  Harrison and 
Wicks (2013) also suggested that value is a grey area, which continues to cause 
disagreement among researchers because of the subjective nature of values (Bridoux & 
Stoelhorst, 2014).   
Some researchers have claimed that there is a current focus on two few definitions 
of value, not too many (Harrison & Wicks, 2013).  According to these researchers, 
expanding the definitions of value would only enhance the ability to see the potential 
value presented by different stakeholders.  Other researchers suggested that stakeholder 
theory tries to include too many definitions of value and has resulted in stakeholder 
theory becoming a dumping ground for any definition of value (Hasnas, 2013).  
According to these researchers, reducing definitions of value could help organizations 
move away from the concept that everyone is a stakeholder and encourage organizations 
to focus on those that should be considered stakeholders (Tullberg, 2013).  One point of 
agreement among many researcher is that all stakeholders have value, but not necessarily 
the same value (Garriga, 2014; Hasnas, 2013; Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Parmar et al., 
2010), and organizations need to spend time understanding stakeholder values.  This 
perspective is also supported by researcher claims that one of the consistent aspects of 
stakeholders is that stakeholders are not homogeneous and have different claims that 
must be explored (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; Garriga, 2014; Hasnas, 2013; Laczniak & 
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Murphy, 2012).  Such exploration would not only help surface different stakeholder 
values, but could also lead to the discovery of “intersections of interest” (Garriga, 2014, 
p. 495).  Several researchers suggested the best way for organizations to understand 
stakeholders was not to participate in discussion alone, but to include dialogue (Tashman 
& Raelin, 2013; Tullberg, 2013; Verbeke & Tung, 2013).  These researchers suggested 
that too often organizations and their leaders attempt to interpret stakeholder values from 
an arm’s length perspective (discussion), and never actually reach the point of getting to 
know stakeholders (dialogue). 
Trust 
Organizations must also instill a level of trust among stakeholders.  Per Harrison 
and Wicks (2013), trust is an important aspect of stakeholder theory, but a largely ignored 
aspect of actually dealing with stakeholders.  As part of building trust, leaders must strive 
for consistency in their dealings with stakeholders (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014).  Being 
consistent does not necessarily mean behaving in the same way.  Many researchers 
suggested that consistency is more about figuring out which stakeholders one is dealing 
with, how stakeholder values may change over time, and modifying relationships that 
address differences or potential changes in a consistent fashion (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 
2014; Eskerod & Huemann, 2013; Garriga, 2014; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Verbeke & 
Tung, 2013).  A suggestion made for building trust with stakeholders was to consider 
enlisting the aid of arbitrators (Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Tashman & Raelin, 2013).  
Arbitrators could be in the form of private third parties or government affiliated 
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arbitrators.  Involving arbitrators could help organizations resolve not only external 
issues, but also internal issues.   
Organizations as Stakeholders 
So far, stakeholder theory has been discussed primarily from an external 
perspective regarding how organizations might view stakeholders.  However, the 
literature review also demonstrated that many researchers suggested stakeholder theory 
could benefit from a more inclusive perspective.  Specifically, that when helping leaders 
understand stakeholder value, power, and legitimacy, leaders must also understand the 
role they and their own organization play in stakeholder theory (Tashman & Raelin, 
2013).  Currently when discussing stakeholder theory, organizations tend to be placed at 
the hub, with external stakeholders forming the wheel (Laczniak & Murphy, 2012; 
Parmar et al., 2010; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Tullberg, 2013).  Researchers suggested 
that a large part of understanding stakeholders requires organizations and leaders to 
understand themselves (Tashman and Raelin, 2013), which makes organizations a part of 
the stakeholder mix (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; Eskerod & Huemann, 2013; Hasnas, 
2013; Tullberg, 2013).  Per Garriga (2014), the rationale for leaders and their 
organizations to consider themselves as stakeholders assumes that external stakeholders 
also consider organizations as stakeholders.  By inserting themselves into the stakeholder 
mix, leaders and their organizations may better understand who is a claimant, and who is 
an influencer (Tashman & Raelin, 2013).  The point being made by Tashman and Raelin 
(2013) is that when organizations and leaders do not include themselves in the 
stakeholder mix, they may miss important considerations regarding how an organization 
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is seen by external stakeholders and how internal stakeholders can affect the external 
stakeholder view.  Parmar et al. (2010) were very direct in their suggestion that all 
organizations should be moved towards the wheel, and away from the hub of stakeholder 
theory.  In this way, organizations are less likely to view stakeholders from an 
ingroup/outgroup perspective, and realize that their organizations are also stakeholders.   
Leadership 
Possibly the greatest challenge for leaders of industrial SDOs is the structure of 
SDOs (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Pache & Santos, 2013; Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  SDOs 
are incorporated as nonprofit organizations (Coates, 2015; Strauss, 2013), but a review of 
the literature has indicated that looking at any organization incorporated as a nonprofit 
from a strictly nonprofit perspective does not present an accurate representation of the 
organization or the challenges faced by the organizations leaders.  As suggested by Smith 
(2014) and Schröer and Jäger (2015), there is almost no such thing as a purely nonprofit 
organization because even nonprofit organizations have some financial requirements.  
The financial requirements then result in most organizations that are incorporated as 
nonprofit organizations acting as hybrid organizations in that they must address the 
conflicting logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities.  Regarding leadership from an 
organizational perspective, there has been abundant research regarding leadership needs 
in forprofit organizations, considerably less research regarding leadership needs in 
nonprofit organizations, and even less research regarding leadership needs in hybrid 
organizations.  This lack of research into hybrid organization leadership needs represents 
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a gap in the literature regarding specific challenges faced by leaders of hybrid 
organizations (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Schröer & Jäger, 2015). 
The Nature of Hybrid Organizations and Leadership Challenges 
According to researchers, hybrid organizations have existed for some time, but it 
is only in the last three decades that hybrid organizations have started to become a 
mainstream phenomenon (Battilana et al., 2012).  Originally, hybrid organizations were 
primarily an outgrowth of nonprofit organizations that needed or wanted to address 
forprofit issues in addition to their nonprofit missions, and were often the result of 
unintended consequences of organizational development (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Pache 
& Santos, 2013).  As suggested by some researchers, the increase in the number of hybrid 
organizations over the last three decades have become more planned, driven by 
increasing concerns about internal governance and management challenges (Anheier & 
Krlev, 2015).  Other researchers suggested the increase in the number of hybrid 
organizations is a result of governments’ abdication of responsibility (Smith, 2014).  Still 
other researchers suggested the increase in the number of hybrid organizations are the 
result of increasing pressure from competition or as a defense mechanism against 
regulatory intervention (Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Osula & Ng, 2014).  Regardless of the 
reasons for the increase in the number of hybrid organizations, Anheier and Krlev (2015) 
suggested that hybrids are becoming the norm, with true nonprofit structures fading in 
popularity. 
The overarching feature of hybrid organizations has been their need to address the 
conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities (Anheier & Krlev, 
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2015; Osula & Ng, 2014).  Battilana et al. (2012) and Benner and Pastor (2015) have 
referred to these conflicting institutional logics as a source of friction both internally and 
externally.  Originally, these conflicting institutional logics were considered a form of 
double hybridity, with economic versus mission focus forming the two extremes 
(Battilana et al., 2012).  Other researchers have used different terms to describe double 
hybridity.  Anheier & Krlev (2015) and Schröer and Jäger (2014) use the terms private 
market (competition) versus civil society (cooperation).  Hailey and James (2004) use the 
terms competitive versus collaborative.  McMurray et al. (2012) used the terms 
competitive mission approach versus collaborative mission approach.  Battilana et al. 
(2012) used the terms market forces versus social forces. 
More recently, the term triple hybridity has become popular as legitimacy has 
been added to the challenges faced by hybrid organizations that try and balance the 
conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities (Anheier & Krlev, 
2015).  While Anheier and Krlev (2015) suggested the appearance of integrity in pursuit 
of legitimacy most accurately described the legitimacy component, other researchers 
have simply used the term legitimacy (Battilana et al., 2012; Battilana & Lee, 2014; 
Benner & Pastor, 2015; Pache & Santos, 2013; Smith, 2014).  Anheier and Krlev (2015) 
described the quest for legitimacy as a form of stability, primarily aimed at convincing 
stakeholders that dealing with an organization that incorporated forprofit and nonprofit 
institutional logics was not a threat to a hybrids’ legitimacy.   
Hybrid organizations are a combination of multiple organizational identities and 
forms (Battilana & Lee, 2014).  Researchers have also described hybrid organizations 
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more colorfully as a “locus of disorder” (Battilana & Lee, 2014, p. 398) and “arenas of 
contradiction” (Pache & Santos, 2013, p. 972).  Pache & Santos (2013) suggested that 
hybrids by their very nature are confused constructs because of the challenges of dealing 
with different institutional logics.  Dealing with different institutional logics makes 
hybrid organizations pluralistic, differentiating them from the more unitary structure of 
organizations that are strictly focused on forprofit or nonprofit activities (Chadwick-
Coule, 2011; Pache & Santos, 2013).  Battilana et al. (2012) suggested that one of the 
first challenges hybrid organizations must face because of their pluralistic constructs is 
one of planning.  Hybrid organizations are frequently the result of plugging together 
unfamiliar activities.  Without planning, combining unfamiliar activities can result in 
mission drift or goal ambiguity, and consequently leadership ambiguity (Battilana et al., 
2012; Cho & Perry, 2012).  The resulting misalignment of mission and goal values can 
present a threat to hybrid organizations (Osula & Ng, 2014).  Workforce composition can 
also be a source of tension because hybrid organizations are generally composed of 
individuals steeped in nonprofit or forprofit traditions (Battilana & Lee, 2014).  Hybrid 
organizations must also deal with a larger and more diverse set of stakeholders (Benner & 
Pastor, 2015).  A larger and more diverse set of stakeholders translates into a greater need 
for leaders of hybrid organizations to be skilled in the art of collaboration across 
institutional logics (Hailey & James, 2004; Osula & Ng, 2014; Pinho et al, 2014).  
Battilana & Lee (2014) suggested “leadership of hybrids may represent an extreme 
leadership challenge” (p. 422).   
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A common leadership challenge is the leadership structure of hybrid 
organizations.  Hybrid organizations, regardless of actual function, are generally 
incorporated as nonprofit entities (Battilana & Lee, 2014).  As a result, the board of 
directors is critical to addressing leadership issues because leadership tends to be more of 
a group activity than in organizations incorporated as forprofit entities (Battilana & Lee, 
2014; Goldkind, 2015).  A specific concern mentioned by several researchers is that the 
board (hereafter referred to as leaders) may not be prepared to deal with the competing 
institutional logics characteristic of hybrid organizations (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Benner 
& Pastor, 2015).  Being unprepared to address competing institutional logics could have 
several causes.  The first and overarching cause is that leaders of hybrid organizations 
collectively tend to come from forprofit backgrounds and therefore have little experience 
with nonprofit institutional logics (Chadwick-Coule, 2011).  Conversely, and of less 
concern, is that leaders of hybrid organizations collectively may come from nonprofit 
backgrounds and therefore have little experience with forprofit institutional logics 
(Dimitrios et al., 2013).  A third cause may be the mix of leaders.  Depending on the mix 
of leader backgrounds, blending leaders who come from nonprofit and forprofit 
backgrounds can be a source of tension, resulting in behavior that demonstrates a lack of 
competence (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Osula & Ng, 2014).  A forth cause may be the 
background of the board president.  If a president comes from either a nonprofit or 
forprofit background, they may favor one approach or the other, resulting in 
ingroup/outgroup tensions (Benner & Pastor, 2015).  Regardless of the source of tension, 
the overarching leadership challenge comes back to how to deal with the conflicting 
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institutional logics that result from blending forprofit and nonprofit activities (Anheier & 
Krlev, 2015; Battilana et al., 2012; Benner & Pastor, 2015).   
In addition to leadership background issues, the literature review into hybrid 
organizations revealed several other leadership considerations.  First, leaders of hybrid 
organizations must look at organizational design in order to understand how conflicting 
logics need to be managed (Battilana & Lee, 2014, Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Pache & 
Santos, 2013; Walston, 2014)).  Understanding how to manage conflicting institutional 
logics begins with figuring out what a hybrids’ mission really is (Brown & Yoshioka, 
2003).  If the leadership approach to dealing with conflicting institutional logics are at 
odds with the organizations mission, legitimacy of the organization will be under threat.  
This type of mismatch is particularly common when leaders try and force nonprofit and 
forprofit structures together (Battilana et al., 2012).  Leaders must also be aware of 
incentives and what motivates various stakeholders (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Brown & 
Yoshioka, 2003; Cho & Perry, 2012).  Hybrid organizations tend to deal with a relatively 
larger and more diverse group of stakeholders compared with pure forprofit and nonprofit 
organizations, making an understanding of different incentives even more important from 
a collaboration perspective (Benner & Pastor, 2015).  At some point, leaders of hybrid 
organizations will have to address stakeholders who adhere to either forprofit or nonprofit 
institutional logics, or are themselves hybrid organizations (Anheier & Krlev, 2015).  To 
address specific institutional logics, leaders must be careful not to compartmentalize 
stakeholders, but rather try and integrate stakeholders by understanding the boundary 
conditions of each group of stakeholders (Battilana & Lee, 2014).  A leader’s ability to 
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demonstrate both advocacy and collaborative skills is a necessary leadership skill when 
dealing with “diverse constituencies” (Benner & Pastor, 2015, p. 308).  As suggested by 
Benner and Pastor (2015), hybrid organizations and their leaders are not able to just 
ignore or suppress stakeholder that may be seen as problematic.  Rather, a mix of 
coercion and participation skills are a leadership requirement from an internal and 
external perspective for hybrid organizations to address both business and civil situations 
(Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Benner & Pastor, 2015).  Anheier and Krlev (2015) suggested 
that the need to collaborate with diverse stakeholders makes leadership in hybrid 
organizations a more adaptive process compared with leadership processes found in 
forprofit and nonprofit organizations.   
A review of the literature also indicated that researchers tended to suggest 
volunteer employees represented a class of internal stakeholder that could present special 
leadership challenges.  In hybrid organizations, many if not most of the participants, are 
volunteers (Bordia et al., 2011).  Per Bordia et al. (2011), volunteers tend to want a 
greater role in how a hybrid organization functions, tend to be motivated by mission 
rather than money, and are not as easily threatened.  Several researchers suggested that 
getting input from internal stakeholders such as volunteers could be enormously 
beneficial to creating a collaborative environment within hybrid organizations (Bordia et 
al., 2011; Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Dimitrios et al., 2013; Hailey & James, 2004; Shiva & 
Suar, 2010).  Another suggestion was to get internal stakeholders to become advocates 
for specific solutions (Benner & Pastor, 2015).  Regardless of how internal stakeholders 
were asked to become engaged, the rationale for enlisting internal stakeholders was that 
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getting to know an organizations internal culture was more important for leaders of 
hybrid or nonprofit organizations than for leaders of forprofit organizations (Pinho et al., 
2014).  Getting to know an organizations’ internal culture may present a special challenge 
for leaders who come from forprofit backgrounds because getting to know an 
organizations’ internal culture is largely ignored by leaders in forprofit organizations 
(Chadwick-Coule, 2011).  As suggested by Benner and Pastor (2015), the best leaders of 
hybrid organizations were those who can maintain credibility with internal stakeholders 
while building ties with external stakeholders.   
Although some researchers suggested understanding internal cultures was 
important for leaders of hybrid organizations (Bordia et al., 2011; Pinho et al., 2014; 
Walston, 2014), other researchers considered dealing with external stakeholders to be a 
greater and maybe more important challenge for leaders of hybrid organizations (Anheier 
& Krlev, 2015; Benner & Pastor, 2015; Dimitrios et al., 2013; Goldkind, 2015).  As 
mentioned, hybrid organizations tend to deal with a relatively larger and more diverse 
group of stakeholders compared with pure nonprofit and forprofit organizations (Anheier 
& Krlev, 2015; Benner & Pastor, 2015).  Diverse external stakeholders can present a 
special challenge for leaders of hybrid organizations because it is with external 
stakeholders that hybrid organizations are most likely to encounter the different 
institutional logics of nonprofit and forprofit activities (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Battilana 
et al., 2012; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Dimitrios et al., 2013; Pache 
& Santos, 2013).   
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Overall, researchers tended to suggest that hybrid organizations that were 
successful at achieving legitimacy did so because of leaderships’ ability to appropriately 
address the blending of conflicting institutional logics of nonprofit and forprofit 
activities.  (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Battilana et al., 2012; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Benner 
& Pastor, 2015, Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Cooper et al., 2011; Dimitrios et al., 2013; 
McMurray et al., 2012; Osula & Ng, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2013; Pinho et al., 2014; 
Schröer & Jäger, 2015; Smith, 2014).  Just how leaders could achieve legitimacy through 
blending was more nuanced.  Benner and Pastor (2015) suggested success was based on 
leaderships’ ability to adjust continuously between conflict and collaboration, and know 
when and how to adjust.  Benner and Pastor (2015) also described this leadership skill as 
the practice of “collaboration during conflict” (p. 308).  Pinho et al. (2014) suggested that 
leaders of hybrid organizations needed to focus on collaboration through conflict 
reduction, and that an important consideration in establishing collaborative practices was 
to understand how and why various stakeholders conflict.  Vessey, Barrett, Mumford, and 
Johnson (2014) suggested the ability to collaborate in hybrid organizations was based on 
leaderships’ ability to plan strategically.  Other researchers supported this strategic 
planning approach by suggesting that employing a strategic rather than operational form 
of management would allow leaders of hybrid organizations to be more successful at 
addressing multiple stakeholder identities and forms (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Chadwick-
Coule, 2011; Dimitrios et al., 2013).  Walston (2014) made a more general suggestion 
that the solution for leaders of hybrid organizations was to manage better, not lead better.  
Finally, Goldkind (2015) and Waters, Burnett, Lamm, & Lucas (2009) suggested that 
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leaders in hybrid or nonprofit organizations needed to also focus on utilizing social media 
to encourage collaboration, and pointed out that using social media was an under 
developed skill set in hybrid and nonprofit organizations.   
Leadership Styles 
Leadership styles deemed conducive to reducing conflict and increasing 
collaboration included transformational, transactional, transcendent, and servant styles 
(Benner & Pastor, 2015, Bordia et al., 2011; Cooper & Santora, 2011; McMurray et al., 
2012; Shiva & Suar, 2010).  McMurray et al. (2012) suggested blending transactional 
(reward and punishment) and transformational (identification of motives and values) 
styles, with a transactional style being potentially most appropriate when dealing with 
external stakeholders.  Benner and Pastor (2015) and Bordia et al. (2011) suggested either 
transformational or transcendent styles might be most appropriate depending on the 
specific situation.  McMurray et al. (2012), Osula and Ng (2014), and Shiva and Suar 
(2010) suggested a transformational style was best overall, with Osula and Ng (2014) and 
Cooper and Santora (2011) suggesting a servant leadership style may be more appropriate 
as the forprofit/nonprofit ratio shifted towards the nonprofit side.  Stoker, Grutterink, and 
Kolk (2012) suggested the importance of leadership style could be greatly reduced by 
focusing on building a high feedback seeking top management team. 
Preparing Leaders for Hybrid Situations   
Regardless of leadership style, the common thread regarding why leaders in 
hybrid organizations seem to face unique challenges came down to leadership 
background and training rather than style.  From a background perspective, researchers 
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suggested that leaders familiar with only forprofit or nonprofit institutional logics were 
not qualified to act as leaders of hybrid organizations (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Battilana 
& Lee, 2014; Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Dimitrios et al., 2013).  The suggestions for how to 
remedy this situation came down to screening and training.  Screening of potential 
leaders would in theory prevent unqualified individuals from being placed in a hybrid 
leadership situation in the first place (Cho & Perry, 2012; Hailey & James, 2004; Osula 
& Ng, 2014; Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  While screening might be viable as a preventative 
measure, training of leaders was considered the best long-term solution (Chadwick-
Coule, 2011; Cooper & Santora, 2011; Hailey & James, 2004; Lazurko et al., 2014; 
Schröer & Jäger, 2015; Smith, 2014; Vessey et al., 2014; Walston, 2014).  However, the 
same researchers who suggesting training as the best long-term solution were not always 
in agreement regarding how training should be approached and when training should 
begin.  Lazurko et al. (2014) made a firm suggestion that training needs to begin at the 
college level.  Battilana et al. (2012) were more vague and suggested training potential 
leaders when they were young.  Hailey and James (2004) suggested early screening was 
needed to see if specific individuals were even trainable.  The remaining researchers 
either suggested that training during the early part of a leader’s tenure was important, or 
that more research into hybrid organization leadership challenges might result in better 
training programs. 
Synthesis 
The research question is, “what is the level of consensus among a panel of subject 
matter experts (SMEs) regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of 
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accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to 
improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests?”  Based on the literature 
review, researchers tended to agree that there are conflicts between accredited and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; 
Fransen, 2011; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Conflicts are particularly intense in the 
United States because of the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to the 
development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards (Ernst, 
2013; Strauss, 2013).  The literature review also showed that researchers made frequent 
reference to institutional isomorphism and stakeholders when exploring and explaining 
the tensions that exist in the battle for industrial voluntary consensus standards legitimacy 
and accredited and unaccredited industrial SDO legitimacy (Brunsson et al., 2012; 
Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Garriga, 2014; Tashman & Raelin, 2013.  Regarding 
organizational structure, the literature review showed that organizations like accredited 
and unaccredited industrial SDOs are hybrid organizations in that they attempt to 
incorporate the conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities, and 
present a special challenge to leaders (Dimitrios et al., 2013; Osula & Ng, 2014; Pinho et 
al., 2014).  Researchers suggested that leaders of hybrid organizations like SDOs may be 
unprepared to address hybrid organization challenges (McMurray et al., 2012; Schröer & 
Jäger, 2015; Smith, 2014).  The primary gap in the leadership literature which supports 
the importance of this study was that researchers who concluded leaders of hybrid 
organizations may not be qualified could only offer vague suggestions regarding potential 
solutions (Cooper & Santora, 2011; Lazurko et al., 2014; Schröer & Jäger, 2015; Smith, 
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2014).  The selection of a qualitative modified three-round Delphi study design as 
outlined in Chapter 3 was appropriate because this study is forward looking, and I sought 
to explore gaps in the literature, provide answers to the research question, and gain 
insight into the expert panel members’ opinions regarding desirable and feasible future-
oriented solutions to the challenge of improving collaborative practices and better serving 
public interests (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).   
Summary and Conclusions 
Several concepts emerged from the literature review.  First, the increase in the 
number of unaccredited industrial SDOs in the United States is creating conflicts that 
threaten the legitimacy of what has historically been a deliberative and inclusive 
democratic process for developing industrial voluntary consensus standards.  Second, 
institutional isomorphism and stakeholder considerations were key lenses for 
understanding how conflicts are affecting development, adoption, and diffusion of 
industrial voluntary consensus standards.  Third, industrial SDOs represent hybrid 
constructs that present leaders with unique challenges as leaders attempt to deal with 
blending the conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities.  The 
primary result that makes this study valuable is that while researchers generally 
concluded leaders of industrial SDO are faced with unique challenges, little seemed to be 
known about what actions could be taken to reduce these challenges, create a more 
collaborative environment between all significant stakeholders, and better serve public 
interests. 
  
 
99 
Chapter 3 contains an analysis of the qualitative method and modified three-round 
Delphi design selected for this study.  Included is a description of the Delphi design in 
general, the merits of using a modified three-round Delphi design for this study compared 
with other designs, and details for how a modified three-round Delphi design is 
anticipated to be applied in this study.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this qualitative modified three-round Delphi study was to discover 
what consensus could be built among a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding 
desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial 
standard development organizations (SDOs) and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take 
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests.  The specific focus 
was on steps that could be taken to improve collaborative practices to preserve the 
legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process, ensure 
occupation/consumer safety and quality control, and protect public interests.  In this 
chapter, I address the research design and rationale, my role as the researcher, 
methodology, expert panel member selection, instrument development, data collection 
procedures, ensuring confidentiality (privacy and security), data analysis plans, 
addressing rigor, ethical issues, and chapter summary.  
Research Design and Rationale 
Overarching Research Question:  What is the level of consensus among a panel of 
SMEs regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-
based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve 
collaborative practices and better serve public interests?  The sub-questions that 
supported the primary question were: 
Subquestion (SQ) 1: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs 
regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions regarding competition that 
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leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs 
may take to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
SQ 2: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable 
and feasible future-oriented actions in deregulation that leaders of accredited U.S.-
based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve 
collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
SQ 3: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable 
and feasible future-oriented actions in oversite that leaders of accredited U.S.-based 
industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve 
collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
SQ 4: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable 
and feasible future-oriented actions in organizational structure that leaders of 
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take 
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
SQ 5: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable 
and feasible future-oriented actions in leadership training that leaders of accredited 
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve 
collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
SQ 6: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable 
and feasible future-oriented actions in market-driven standards that leaders of 
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take 
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests? 
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The phenomenon of interest was what desirable and feasible future-oriented 
actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial 
SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests.  
Industrial voluntary consensus standards developed by unaccredited industrial SDOs are 
frequently self-serving and are increasingly in competition and conflict with industrial 
voluntary consensus standards developed by accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs 
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  To 
date, most conflicts between competing SDOs and the voluntary consensus standards 
they develop have been limited to commodity or sustainability related issues such as 
fishing, coffee, timber, and palm oil production (Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Henrik, 2015; 
Kaplan & Kinderman, 2015; Makiya & Fraisse, 2015).  However, the problem is starting 
to expand to voluntary consensus standards domains that deal with industrial 
environments where voluntary consensus standards are designed to serve public interests 
by promoting uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer safety and quality control 
procedures (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012). 
The research approach selected for this study was a qualitative method and a 
modified three-round Delphi design (Davidson, 2013; Rowe & Wright, 2011).  The 
rationale for selecting this method and design and the approach was four-fold.  First, the 
data used in this study came from the subjective opinions of a group of SMEs.  The use 
of subjective data is a cornerstone of qualitative research (Patton, 2015).  Second, the 
central question being asked was one of future collaborative practices.  This is a 
predictive challenge for which a Delphi design is appropriate (Skulmoski et al., 2007; 
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Withanaarachchi, Pushpakumara, & Nanayakkara, 2015).  Third, multiple rounds are 
often best for prognostication purposes.  In the case of this study, three rounds were 
selected because fewer rounds may not have been sufficient to explore the problem, and 
more than three rounds could increase the study complexity and increase the chance of 
expert panel member drop out (Davidson, 2013; Gill, Leslie, Grech, & Latour, 2013; 
Green, 2012; Habibi, Sarafrazi, & Izadyar, 2014; Withanaarachchi et al., 2015).  Fourth, 
being forward looking, a Delphi approach did not require the use of established 
instruments nor that those being questioned participate in the creation of the instrument.  
In the case of this study, SMEs did not help create the questions for Round 1, and the first 
round questionnaire was created by me based primarily on literature reviews.  This 
approach of not expecting SMEs to help craft the questions for Round 1 was also 
recommended for novice researchers and is considered a modification to a classic or 
traditional Delphi design (Asselin & Harper, 2014, Davidson, 2013; Skulmoski et al., 
2007). 
In comparison with other qualitative designs, a Delphi design was appropriate for 
conducting the study for several reasons.  An ethnographic approach would have been 
inappropriate because I did not focus on learning about the past or present culture of a 
group of people (Sunstein & Chiseri-Strater, 2012).  A phenomenological approach 
would have been inappropriate because I was not trying to understand the meaning and 
essence of the lived experience of the group or groups of people that make up U.S.-based 
industrial SDOs (Brinkmann, 2012).  A grounded theory approach would have been 
inappropriate because I did not attempt to expand existing theories or create new theories 
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(Birks & Mills, 2011).  A narratological approach would have been inappropriate because 
I did not attempt to obtain a narrative analysis of one individual in order to understand a 
past or present life or culture (Holstein & Gubrium, 2012).   
An argument could have been made that challenges facing uniformity and 
harmonization proceedures with regard to occupational safety and quality control might 
fit into a case study approach (Yin, 2014).  However, such an approach would have been 
a study in how the system currently functions and might not have illuminate how leaders 
of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs approached 
improving future collaborative practices.  Since improving future collaborative practices 
formed the basis of the primary research question, a case study approach was deemed 
inappropriate. 
Role of the Researcher 
My method was qualitative using a modified three-round Delphi design.  Based 
on my method and design, my role as the researcher included research design, selecting 
expert panel members, creation of the research instrument, administering the research 
instrument, establishing themes and codes, data reduction and analysis, member 
checking, providing controlled and timely feedback to expert panel members, controlling 
or at least addressing personal biases, ensuring confidentiality (privacy and security), 
interpreting questionnaire results, establishing trustworthiness, and adhering to ethical 
standards. 
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Professional Background and Relationships 
I have worked for over 16 different organizations with cultural bases in North 
America and Europe, but all with a global reach.  These organizations are for the most 
part considered suppliers as opposed to end users, and my primary roles involved middle 
to upper-middle management activities in engineering, marketing, and sales.  Many of 
my responsibilities revolved around making sure products were compliant with existing 
standards (soft or De facto law) or existing codes (hard or De jure law), and 
understanding end user requirements.  I have also been involved with domestic and 
international industrial SDOs since the mid-1980s, and my involvement with industrial 
standards has continued essentially without interruption from the mid-1980s up to the 
present.  I have also worked with governmental regulatory organizations such as the Food 
and Drug Administration, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.  Governmental regulatory organizations 
typically deal with codes, many of which have their roots in voluntary consensus 
standards. 
Based on my professional background, there were certainly professional 
similarities between me and this study’s expert panel members, and I expected these 
professional similarities to be beneficial to my research for several reasons.  First, the 
SMEs I recruited as expert panel members were typically in the middle to upper 
management roles within their perspective organizations.  These are roles I have shared.  
Second, I shared many of the same experiences regarding industrial voluntary consensus 
standards development, adoption, and diffusion activities.  Third, I was not currently 
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working for any end user or supplier and functioned as an independent industrial 
consultant, which placed me in a relatively neutral and therefore trusted position.  The 
combination of similar professional and standards development experiences, in addition 
to my independent consultant status, created a collegial environment between me and the 
expert panel members.  An abridged description of my career history was included in the 
package sent to selected expert panel members.  
Regarding issues relating to personal and professional relationships, I could not 
say at the beginning of the recruitment process if I would have any personal or 
professional relationships with SMEs who would become part of my panel.  However, 
since a SMEs qualifications were of primary importance to this study, personal or 
professional relationships with SMEs were not considered an obstacle to recruitment.  
The only potential limitation from a personal and professional relationship perspective 
were situations where I was known to a potential expert panel member even though I was 
not aware of this relationship.  To the best of my knowledge, this potential limitation 
never became a reality. 
Personal Biases and Power Relations 
I anticipated that controlling my own biases would be an important and 
potentially challenging task based on my past professional experience.  Even without the 
support of literature that suggested industrial voluntary consensus standards development 
was becoming a political and economic free-for-all in the United States (Timmermans & 
Epstein, 2010), I was and continue to be of that mind.  Other potential personal biases 
included predilections for some suggestions discovered during the literature reviews 
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regarding problems and solutions, which included biases related to desirability and 
feasibility.  For example, I tended to agree with some researchers that more government 
oversight is needed to counteract the effects of deregulation.  However, my views of 
government oversight are a bias that I kept to myself as far as expert panel members were 
concerned.  The literature I reviewed presented another potential bias in how I might 
have interpreted the literature, or the fact that I did not review every potentially 
applicable piece of literature ever published (Cheung & Vijayakumar, 2016).  Power 
relations were not an issue as I was retired and not working for or being paid by any 
industrial organization.   
Ethical Issues 
Ethical issues were primarily related to maintaining participant confidentiality 
from one another and anyone other than myself (Paré, Cameron, Poba-Nzaou, & 
Templier, 2013), securing information (Asselin & Harper, 2014), and following IRB 
recommendations.  The individuals that made up the panel of experts were not considered 
at-risk populations.  However, should potential participants have felt vulnerable (e.g., 
being pregnant, elderly, or injured), I encouraged them to make their vulnerabilities 
known to me if they volunteered to become an expert panel member.  As previously 
mentioned, I was retired and did not select expert panel members from an organization 
where I ever worked, so ethical conflicts of interest or power differentials were never 
expected to be an issue.  A personal ethical issue was my past work history, affiliation 
with SDOs, and involvement in voluntary consensus standards development.  I disclosed 
my professional history to potential expert panel members in the package I sent to those 
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who expressed interest.  I expected that any potential panel member who was concerned 
would simply decline to participate. 
Methodology 
My selected approach used a qualitative method based on a modified three-round 
Delphi design.  The Delphi design was named after the Oracle at Delphi, a character in 
Greek mythology capable of forecasting future events.  One of the first modern 
applications of a Delphi design was the 1950’s study by the RAND Corporation to obtain 
expert opinion and reach consensus regarding cold war prognostication issues.  For 
security reasons, the Delphi design was not published until 1963 by Dalkey and Helmer 
(Birko et al., 2015).  Since then, Delphi designs have been used with increasing 
frequency as a forecasting tool in situations such as education, business, and health care 
(Diamond, Grant, Feldman, Pencharz, Ling, Moore, & Wales, 2014).  As suggested by 
several researchers, a Delphi design is appropriate for situations where the goal is to 
understand or deal with a complex problem when precise information is not available, or 
where the goal is to understand opportunities and develop forecasts (Laick, 2012; Sobaih, 
Ritchie, & Jones, 2012).  The term “modified” has been used in many ways to refer to 
variations on the classic or traditional Delphi design (Davidson, 2013; Gallego & Bueno, 
2014; Withanaarachchi et al., 2015).  In the case of this study, modified was used 
primarily to refer to a design where the first round questionnaire is created by the 
researcher based on literature reviews, and is not a collaborative effort between the 
researcher and the expert panel members (Asselin & Harper, 2014).  A modified Delphi 
design where the first round questionnaire is created by the researcher based on literature 
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reviews was also recommended for new practitioners because of the relative ease of study 
management and general applicability to a wide range of situations (Asselin & Harper, 
2014; Davidson, 2013; Green, 2013; Skulmoski et al., 2007).  Other features of this 
modified Delphi design included expert input, selection of experts based on the aims of 
the research, limiting the study to three rounds, providing controlled feedback after each 
round, on-line administration of rounds, defining levels of consensus, and protecting the 
confidentiality of participants (Asselin & Harper, 2014; Sobaih et al., 2012).   
Consensus measurements are typically an important feature of Delphi designs, but 
there is considerable disagreement on definitions of consensus (von der Gracht, 2012).  A 
definition of consensus can be as simple as what the majority selects (von der Gracht, 
2012), or can involve more complex definitions such as Kendal’s W (Skulmoski et al., 
2007; Worrell, Di Gangi, & Bush, 2013) or other statistical tests (Ju & Jin, 2013).  
Researchers often define consensus using simple metrics such as the mean or median of 
responses (Kalaian & Kasim, 2012; von der Gracht, 2012; Wakefield & Watson, 2014).  
For Round 1, consensus was not an issue as the Round 1 questionnaire consisted of a 
short number of open-ended questions created by me (see Table 1) based on the literature 
review and that were designed to elicit suggested solutions that formed the basis for the 
Round 2 questionnaire. 
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Table 1  
Main Theme Framework   
Themes Round 1 derived question Literature references 
Competition In what ways could collaborative practices be 
improved between accredited U.S.-based industrial 
standards development organizations and 
unaccredited industrial standards development 
organizations in order to reduce conflict? 
 
Ernst, 2013; Fernando et al., 
2012; Fransen, 2011; Gadinis, 
2014 
Deregulation In what ways could leaders of accredited U.S.-based 
industrial standards development organizations and 
unaccredited industrial standards address the effects 
of deregulation that since the 1980’s have resulted 
in an increase in the number of unaccredited 
industrial standards development organizations? 
 
Brunsson et al., 2012; Ernst, 
2012; Wijen, 2014; Yates & 
Murphy, 2015 
Oversight In what ways could government or other third party 
participants help leaders of accredited industrial 
standards development organizations and 
unaccredited industrial standards development 
organizations improve collaborative practices? 
 
Behr & Diaz, 2014; Coates, 
2015; Henrik, 2015; Heras-
Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013 
Organizational 
structure 
What changes to standard development organization 
structures might improve collaborative practices 
between accredited and unaccredited industrial 
standards development organizations?  Accredited 
and unaccredited industrial standards development 
organizations in the United States are currently 
registered as nonprofit entities, but tend to be 
considered hybrid organizations in that they pursue 
both nonprofit and forprofit activities. 
 
Anheier & Krlev, 2015; 
Battilana et al., 2012;  Schröer 
& Jäger, 2015; Smith, 2014 
Leadership 
training 
What training should be required of leaders (or 
leadership) of accredited U.S.-based industrial 
standards development organizations and 
unaccredited industrial standards development 
organizations to improved collaborative practices? 
 
Battilana et al., 2012; Dimitrios 
et al., 2013; Hailey & James, 
2004; Walston, 2014 
Market-driven How can the unique market-driven, bottom-up U.S. 
approach to the development of industrial voluntary 
consensus standards be leveraged to improve 
collaborative practices between accredited U.S.-
based industrial standards development 
organizations and unaccredited industrial standards 
development organizations? 
 
Olshan, 1993; Pirard et al., 
2015; Reinecke et al., 2012; 
Sandholtz, 2012 
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Consensus for Rounds 2 and 3 were reached when the frequency of responses for 
options 4 and 5 (agree and strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for 
≥70% or more of the expert panel members’ responses (Asselin & Harper, 2014).  
Questions that met this definition of consensus for Round 2 were moved forward to 
Round 3.  Questions that met this definition of consensus for Round 3 were moved to the 
appropriate place in the results section because completion of Round 3 was the end of 
this study.  To mitigate the risk of not moving a primary question forward because of a 
tendency to select option 3 (neither agree or disagree), a median score of ≥ 3.5 (a 
tendency towards consensus) was left as an optional second test of consensus (Ju & Jin, 
2013).  An odd numbered Likert-type scale was recommended by several researchers to 
avoid forcing expert panel members to take a stance for or against a position (Asselin & 
Harper, 2014; Green 2013).  Regarding this studies end point, study end-points could be 
defined by levels of consensus, number of rounds, or some combination of definitions 
(Laick, 2012; Skulmoski et al., 2007; Withanaarachchi et al., 2015).  Three rounds was 
the definition of end-point for this study.  Three rounds was also supported by several 
researchers as a good balance between having sufficient rounds to explore the problem 
while maintaining study manageability (Asselin & Harper, 2014; Green, 2013; Habibi et 
al., 2014; Skulmoski et al., 2007).   
Also of potential interest in this study were issues of desirability, feasibility, 
importance, and confidence of responses.  Even if there was consensus regarding a 
primary question, expert panel member opinions regarding desirability, feasibility, 
importance, and confidence could be important considerations (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).  
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Desirability, as defined by Linstone and Turoff (1975) is a worthwhile endeavor that has 
few deleterious effects and is a choice worth including.  Linstone and Turoff (1975) 
defined feasibility as the ability to easily implement the desired policy or strategy.  
Importance and confidence were defined by Linstone and Turoff (1975) as an indication 
of a respondents’ belief in the practical importance of a concept, and the confidence the 
respondent has in their rating of importance.  Definitions of consensus for Rounds 2 and 
3 primary questions were also applied to questions related to desirability, feasibility, 
importance, and confidence. 
Participant Selection Logic 
Per Förster and von der Gracht (2014), the most appropriate type of panel 
composition for a modified Delphi design continues to be a subject of debate.  Critical 
reflection about a study through the eyes of experts is one of the primary features of a 
Delphi design, but there can be many ways in which panel selection and study design 
impacts critical reflection (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014; Kalaian & Kasim, 2012).   
The two primary categories of an expert panel are defined as homogeneous or 
heterogeneous.  Gallego and Bueno (2014) defined homogeneous participants as those 
with similar levels of knowledge, while heterogeneous participants were defined as those 
who exhibited different levels of knowledge or who possessed unique and different 
characteristics.  Förster and von der Gracht (2014) presented similar definitions of 
homogeneous and heterogeneous, but expanded on the definition of heterogeneous to 
include characteristics such as age, gender, culture, knowledge, profession, values, and 
attitudes.  Some researchers suggested a homogeneous panel was best for novice 
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researchers (Davidson, 2013; Green, 2013; Skulmoski et al., 2007).  The primary 
rationale for this recommendation is that a homogeneous panel generally requires fewer 
members than a heterogeneous panel, that studies using a homogeneous panel are easier 
to manage, and that expert panel member dropout is not as serious a threat to 
trustworthiness.  The primary negative of a homogeneous panel is an increased 
possibility of bias (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014; von der Gracht, 2012).  Based on the 
previous pros and cons, choosing a homogeneous panel was the approach selected for this 
study. 
Size of Panels 
Although researchers seemed to agree that homogeneous panels could be smaller 
in size than heterogeneous panels, the best expert panel member size continued to be a 
subject of debate (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014; Gallego & Bueno, 2014; 
Withanaarachchi et al., 2015).  There was, however, consensus that between 10 to 15 
homogeneous members was sufficient to explore a subject while not adversely affecting 
manageability or affecting trustworthiness (Birko at al., 2015; Ju & Jin, 2013; Paré et al., 
2013).  I sought upwards of 20 expert panel members as a buffer against expert panel 
member dropout or non-response.  Active voluntary participants in accredited U.S.-based 
industrial SDOs were the source for my expert panel members.  Per the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), the only congressionally approved U.S. Standards 
Setting Organization (SSO) authorized to represent the United States internationally 
regarding industrial voluntary consensus standards and manage the U.S. SDO 
accreditation process, there are currently over 240 active accredited U.S.-based industrial 
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SDOs.  I began by selecting large accredited SDOs that had been in existance for at least 
50 years.  This assured that the SDO had  a history that extended to a time before 
deregulation became popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  I identified 10 SDOs that 
met this time in existence criteria.  Regarding the overall sample population, the number 
of expert panel members being sought represented a small percentage of the thousands of 
potential SMEs that are members of accredited SDOs.  However, one of the features of 
this Delphi design, and Delphi designs in general, is that expert panel member selection is 
based on the assumption that selected expert panel members are experts regarding the 
subject matter, not that their opinions are statistically representative of the population of 
potential SMEs (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014).  A small number of expert panel 
members was therefore appropriate. 
Participant Selection Criteria 
For the purposes of this study, I kept the definition of SME simple and relatively 
broad in order not to limit the number and type of SME who could function as expert 
panel members.  Selection criteria included: 
1. Knowledge of expert panel members who  
 Were familiar with the technical jargon used in the world of industrial 
voluntary consensus standards. 
 Could describe cases that illustrate good versus poor decisions regarding 
the development of industrial voluntary consensus standards. 
2. Performance of expert panel members who 
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 Could communicate effectively in the spoken and written U.S. English 
language. 
3. Experience of expert panel members who 
 Were currently active with an accredited industrial SDO on a voluntary 
basis and have at least five years continuous involvement with developing 
industrial voluntary consensus standards. 
 Have been employed with or worked with organizations or industries that 
utilize industrial voluntary consensus standards. 
Uncritical adoption was the biggest obstacle and limitation to selecting qualified 
SMEs for my expert panel.  Uncritical adoption occurs when one takes an individuals’ 
claim of expertise at face value (Rowe & Wright, 2011).  This was an unavoidable risk 
based on time and cost restraints associated with this study. 
An important consideration for inclusion as an expert panel member, and listed in 
the preceding panel selection criteria section, was the expert panel members’ ability to 
communicate.  Several researchers made a point that good communication skills are an 
essential component of what defines a SME (Green, 2013; Laick, 2012).  If a SME 
cannot communicate well, especially regarding reading and writing skills, the fact that 
they are a SME may be a moot point if they cannot adequately understand questions or 
elucidate their positions.  Although the expert panel members were expected to have 
experience in the accredited U.S.-based industrial voluntary consensus standards process, 
this does not necessarily mean that their grasp of the writen or spoken U.S. English 
language would be sufficiently advanced.  Unfortunately the same researchers who 
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advocated the value of good communication skills did not offer much in the way of 
techniques for gauging how to establish an appropriate level of communications 
competency.  To try and mitigate this concern regarding ability to communicate, I spoke 
with each potential expert panel member befor accepting them as part of this study.  All 
of the potential expert panel members appeared to communicate verbally very well, and I 
assumed they could also communicate well in writing. 
Participant Selection Process 
As stated earlier, the pool from which expert panel members were recruited was a 
select number of the over 240 ANSI accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs.  ANSI is the 
only congressionally approved U.S. SSO authorized to represent the United States 
internationally regarding industrial voluntary consensus standards and manage the U.S. 
SDO accreditation process.  I planned on using a purposive sampling and/or snowballing 
strategy.  To help streamline the selection process, ANSI provided me with a link to their 
publicly available list of primary contacts at each ANSI accredited SDO.  I selected 10 
SDOs that had been in existence for at least 50 years so their history extended to a point 
before deregulation became popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Based on ANSI’s 
published contact list, I began the initial recruitment process by contacting individuals or 
the appropriate department within the selected 10 accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs.  
Initial contact was via phone.  Each accredited U.S.-based industrial SDO was asked to 
send the invitation to their member base.  Forwarding the invitation would imply an 
SDOs’ approval.  As a backup recruitment plan, I reserved the option of contacting 
specific potential expert panel members directly and asking them to participate or send 
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the invitation to other potential expert panel members.  The backup recruitment plan was 
the method ultimately used for identifying, contacting, and selecting expert panel 
members. 
Potential expert panel members were given my Walden e-mail address as the 
point of contact.  Interested potential expert panel members were encouraged to contact 
me using their own personal email in the interest of confidentiality and to avoid crossing 
any potential expert panel members’ company server.  All records were kept on my 
password protected computer and in my locked filing cabinet.  The recruitment process 
continued until 18 potential expert panel members had been identified.  I assigned each of 
the potential panel members a unique identification code (“P” code), and only I had the 
code key.  Each potential expert panel member was informed that this study was about 
industrial voluntary consensus standards, and not about a given expert panel members 
company. 
Conveying the importance of the study was another important aspect of the 
participant selection process and for supporting claims of trustworthiness.  Expert panel 
member dropout or non-response is a potential problem regarding trustworthiness (Green, 
2013; Kalaian & Kasim, 2012; Wakefield & Watson, 2014).  Expert panel members that 
are passionate about a topic of investigation are more likely to stay throughout the 
necessary rounds, provide thoughtful answers, and enhance claims of trustworthiness 
(Cafiso, Di Graziano, & Pappalardo, 2013).  Another consideration was to note now 
many of those who were contacted to be expert panel members actually accepted the 
invitation.  A low response rate could be indicative of an invitation that was not getting 
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the message across regarding the importance of the study in a way that excited potential 
expert panel members (Paré et al., 2013).  Every effort was made to communicate the 
importance of this study to potential expert panel members. 
Potential expert panel members were notified individually by e-mail, provided 
with an informed consent form, told of my intention to provide them with a unique 
identification code, and given more detailed information about me and how the study 
would proceed.  An important component of this notification was a statement that during 
the feedback portion of the study after each round, changes to answers from a previous 
round would be included in the results and analysis, but would not be incorporated into 
current rounds.  Notification also included a statement that while suggestions and/or 
general comments from expert panel members were encouraged and would be included in 
the results, suggestions and/or general comments might not be included in subsequent 
rounds.  The rationale I offered was that to incorporate changes or comments may 
invalidate the questions in current or subsequent rounds, may not support the research 
questions, may slow down the entire process, and may place an additional burden on 
expert panel members.  Although I had plans to notify potential expert panel members 
who were not selected and thank them for their interest, this never became an issue as the 
total number of potential expert panel members never exceeded the cutoff point of 20 
expert panel members.  Of the 18 potential exert panel members who were contacted, 15 
eventually responded to the informed consent form, “I consent”. 
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Instrumentation 
The instrument used during this study consisted of three independent 
questionnaires.  A well-designed instrument can help remove majority biases and let 
strong opinions show through (Rowe & Wright, 2011).  A well-designed instrument can 
also help remove or at least control panel member and researcher biases (Davidson, 2013, 
Skulmoski et al., 2007).  Before addressing the various questionnaires that comprised the 
instrument, it is important to point out some overarching considerations.  First, the nature 
of Delphi designs generally requires that instruments be created based on the specific 
goal of the study (Hasson & Keeney, 2011; Sobaih et al., 2012).  Using a custom 
instrument is a potential problem regarding issues of rigor and a common criticism of the 
Delphi design (Hasson & Keeney, 2011; Sobaih et al., 2012).  One of the primary 
considerations then when creating a specific instrument is to include details regarding 
how rigor will be addressed (Habibi et al., 2014; Kalaian & Kasim, 2012; Laick, 2012; 
Paré et al., 2013).  Questions for Round 1 were reviewed by me for clarity.  Questions 
deemed ambiguous, redundant, or double barreled (e.g., “we believe in X and Y”) were 
modified or eliminated (Schmiedel, Vom Brocke, & Recker, 2014). 
Researchers suggested the first round questionnaire is potentially the most 
significant (Ju & Jin, 2013; Paré et al., 2013; Wakefield & Watson, 2014).  The 
questionnaire for Round 1 is the starting point of data gathering and tends to be different 
than the questionnaires for Rounds 2 and 3 which build off previous rounds.  An 
important consideration in developing the Round 1 questionnaire is how well the 
questions support the primary research question (Laick, 2012; Sobaih et al., 2012; 
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Worrell et al., 2013).  If the research question is not properly defined or the Round 1 
questionnaire does not support the research question, the instrument that results over the 
span of rounds may be flawed from the beginning.  Another important consideration for 
Round 1 is the questionnaire form.  The questionnaires for Round 1 tend to take on two 
forms.  The first form is basically that of encouraging a brainstorming session among 
expert panel members.  Some researchers suggested that upwards of 100 questions may 
comprise a Round 1 brainstorming questionnaire (Paré et al., 2013).  Other researchers 
suggested as few as 30 questions are sufficient (Birko et al., 2015).  Regardless of the 
number of questions, the questions should be posed as broadly as possible to maximize 
the potential for identifying topics that are most important (Cafiso et al., 2013), and are 
primarily open-ended.  The second form tends to be more focused and the questionnaire 
is created by the researcher based primarily on the results of literature reviews.  For this 
form of questionnaire, Kalaian and Kasim (2012) recommended “a small number of 
open-ended questionnaire questions” (p. 3).  The idea behind the second form is that a 
review of the literature and gaps in the literature would help create a questionnaire that is 
more focused and potentially shorter (Kalaian & Kasim, 2012).  In the second form, the 
literature review derived questions would replace much of the brainstorming approach 
suggested for the first form.  Questions created following the second form approach are 
also primarily open-ended.  Several researchers recommended a Round 1 questionnaire 
developed using form two (a modified Delphi design) is best for novice researchers 
(Davidson, 2013, Skulmoski et at., 2007), and was the form used for this study.   
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In the case of this study, the Round 1 questions were based on the six primary 
themes discovered during the literature review, and that supported the research question.  
Expert panel members were asked to suggest possible solutions that addressed the six 
Round 1 questions.  Responses to the Round 1 questionnaire were evaluated by me using 
word frequency and interpretation of concepts using traditional text analysis to create 
questions for the Round 2 questionnaire. 
Round 2 and 3 questionnaires were based on closed-ended questions derived from 
responses to the previous rounds.  The form of responses to Round 2 and 3 questionnaires 
were based on a five-point Likert-type scale.  In addition to primary questions included in 
the Round 2 and 3 questionnaires, there were also secondary questions based on 
desirability, feasibility, importance, and confidence in relation to the primary questions.  
All secondary questions were rated using the same type of five-point Likert-type scale 
applied to the primary questions.  Desirability and feasibility comprised the secondary 
questions in Round 2, and importance and confidence comprised the secondary question 
in Round 3.  Responses to the Round 2 questionnaire were evaluated by me and 
responses that met the test of consensus were moved forward to the Round 3 
questionnaire.  Responses to the Round 3 questionnaire were evaluated by me and 
responses that met the test of consensus were moved to the final results.  Consensus 
regarding primary questions in Round 2 and 3 were used as metrics for moving a primary 
question to the next round or to the final results.  Consensus regarding secondary 
questions was part of the data analysis but was not used as a metric for moving a primary 
question forward. 
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Another consideration when designing the instrument was the potential for fatigue 
on the part of the expert panel members (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014).  As suggested 
by Green (2013), experts will only spend the minimum amount of time on a questionnaire 
or may drop out completely.  Even if expert panel members do not drop out, a complex 
questionnaire can increase fatigue that promotes answers that do not represent critical 
reflection from the expert panel member in order to get through the questionnaire as 
quickly as possible.  Birko et al. (2015) suggested designing questionnaires that take no 
more than 30 to 45 minutes to complete.  Time between providing feedback and next 
round questionnaires can also affect panel participation (Green, 2013).  An overly 
complicated questionnaire can slow down data analysis and timely feedback, and could 
potentially affect panel member fatigue, dropout, and response rate (Asselin & Harper, 
2014; Wakefield & Watson, 2014; Worrell et al., 2013).  Another aspect of time is simply 
the pace of modern life and the need for controlling complexity in the interest of 
timeliness (Wakefield & Watson, 2014).  Per one study, life happens, which can cause 
response problems for expert panel members because of time conflicts (Asselin & 
Harper, 2014).  Every effort was made to create questionnaires that did not violate the 30 
to 45 minute suggestion to reduce the potential for fatigue, drop out, and non-response.  
Each questionnaire was tested by me and an information technology individual I employ 
to assure each questionnaire could be completed in 30 to 45 minutes.  I also relied on 
tools provided by SurveyGizmo that measured test time, fatigue, and accessibility.  While 
some expert panel members chose to spend more than 45 minutes completing the 
questionnaires, the average time per SurveyGizmo never exceeded 35 minutes. 
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In the following sections, I address specific considerations for the creation of the 
instrument.  These considerations include the questionnaires used in each round, and how 
each round built on the previous round, and the ultimate goal of the instrument. 
Round 1  
Once the panel was assembled and the Round 1 questionnaire was ready, the 
Round 1 questionnaire was distributed via e-mail to the expert panel members along with 
Round 1 instructions.  Each panel member was provided a link to the questionnaire 
created in SurveyGizmo and instructed to log on.  Expert panel members were not able to 
access any other expert panel members’ questionnaire or responses.   
The purpose of the Round 1 questionnaire was to elicit thoughts and possible 
solutions from the expert panel members for each question.  These suggested solutions 
were then used to create the Round 2 questionnaire.  The Round 1 questionnaire was 
comprised of six questions based on the six themes that emerged from the literature 
review and only questions that supported the primary themes identified during the 
literature review were part of the Round 1 questionnaire.  A seventh question was also 
included but was only included to give expert panel members a platform for providing 
additional information if they felt the need.  Each expert panel member was encouraged 
to include explanations for question responses, but that these explanations should be short 
in the interest of completing the questionnaire in 30 to 45 minutes.  Each expert panel 
member was requested to provide between three and five responses for each of the 
questions.  The feedback report from Round 1 included the questionnaire results, 
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interpretation of the results, and the Round 2 questionnaire along with Round 2 
instructions. 
The protocol for converting responses to the Round 1 questionnaire to Likert-type 
items for Round 2 was to create a small number of closed-ended primary questions based 
on Round 1 responses.  This small number of closed-ended primary questions was 
designed to support the original six themes and resulting range of subthemes that emerge 
from evaluating the results of Round 1 and that supported the research question (Gallego 
& Bueno, 2014; Laick, 2012; Withanaarachchi et al., 2015).  The number of questions 
selected for the Round 2 questionnaire was based on the recommendation that no 
questionnaire should take longer than 30 to 45 minutes to complete (Birko et al., 2015), 
while at the same time covering the range of subthemes that emerged from Round 1.   
Round 2 
The Round 2 questionnaire was created based on the results of Round 1.  The 
primary difference between the Round 1 questionnaire and subsequent round 
questionnaires was the fact that questions presented in subsequent rounds were closed-
ended and rated on a five-point Likert-type scale.  The goal for Round 2 was to determine 
which primary questions created from Round 1 met the definition of consensus and 
should move to Round 3.  The feedback report from Round 2 included the questionnaire 
results, interpretation of the results, and the Round 3 questionnaire along with Round 3 
instructions.  Log on procedures used in Round 1 to access the questionnaire were 
duplicated for Round 2 to assure confidentiality. 
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The protocol for moving a Round 2 primary question forward was based on 
consensus defined as when the frequency of responses for options 4 and 5 (agree and 
strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more of the 
expert panel members’ responses.  To mitigate the risk of not moving an item forward 
because of a tendency to select option 3 (neither agree or disagree), a median score of 
≥3.5 (a tendency towards consensus) was kept as an optional second test of consensus to 
justify moving an item forward.  This second test of consensus was never used as the 
primary test of consensus was deemed sufficient. 
While the same tests for consensus were applied to secondary questions regarding 
desirability and feasibility of responses to primary questions, consensus regarding 
secondary questions was only part of data analysis and not used to determine if a primary 
question moved forward. 
Round 3 
The Round 3 questionnaire was created based on the results of primary questions 
that were moved forward from Round 2.  As with Round 2, Round 3 primary questions 
were closed-ended and rated on a five-point Likert-type scale.  The goal for Round 3 was 
to determine which primary questions that moved forward from Round 2 met the 
definition of consensus and should be moved to the final results.  The feedback report 
from Round 3 included the questionnaire result and interpretation of the results.  The 
final report was sent to the expert panel members once the study was complete.  Log on 
procedures used in Round 2 to access the questionnaire were duplicated for Round 3 to 
assure confidentiality.   
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The protocol for moving a Round 3 primary question forward was based on 
consensus defined as when the frequency of responses for options 4 and 5 (agree and 
strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more of the 
expert panel members’ responses.  To mitigate the risk of not moving an item forward 
because of a tendency to select option 3 (neither agree or disagree), a median score of 
≥3.5 (a tendency towards consensus) would be kept as an optional second test of 
consensus to justify moving as item forward.  This second test of consensus was never 
used as the primary test of consensus was deemed sufficient. 
While the same tests for consensus was applied to secondary questions regarding 
importance and confidence of responses to primary questions, consensus regarding 
secondary questions were only part of data analysis and not used to determine if a 
primary question moved forward.   
Procedures for Data Collection 
A homogeneous panel of SMEs provided the data for this study.  Data collection 
began with the first round of this three-round study.  All communication regarding 
questions were between the individual expert panel members and me either by phone, 
video conference, web based tools such as SurveyGizmo, or e-mail.  A log on password 
(unique identification code) was sent to all expert panel members to access the online 
questionnaire for each round created through SurveyGizmo, and all panel members were 
identify on the online questionnaires by their unique identification code to protect 
confidentiality.  The online questionnaires were the primary method used for data 
collection.  Expert panel members did not have access to any other expert panel 
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members’ on-line responses.  A secondary method of data collection was through 
member checking.  All communications between expert panel members and me were 
kept confidential, documented, and kept on my password protected computer and in my 
locked filing cabinet.  
For Round 1, each expert panel member was asked to answer a small number of 
open-ended questions relating to the research question and based on the six primary 
themes that resulted from the literature review.  For Rounds 2 and 3, each expert panel 
member was asked to rate a small number of closed-ended questions developed based on 
the results of the previous round.  Instructions for each round were included with that 
rounds questionnaire link.  Each questionnaire was submitted to each expert panel 
member via individual e-mail that included a link to the questionnaire and a unique log 
on code.  Each expert panel member was given an opportunity to comment on the results 
of the previous round, but was reminded that changes to responses or additional 
comments would only be included in the results.  Log on procedures used in Round 1 
were followed for Rounds 2 and 3 to assure confidentiality.   
For each primary question in Round 2 and 3 where the expert panel members 
were asked to rate their responses, there was a set of secondary questions where the 
expert panel members were asked to rate their responses to the primary question based on 
desirability and feasibility in Round 2, and importance and confidence in Round 3 
(Linstone & Turoff, 1975).  Each expert panel member was given a fixed amount of time 
to respond to each questionnaire which did not exceed 3 weeks from the time the 
questionnaire was sent.  Expert panel members that did not respond in the required period 
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could be removed from the panel.  At least two attempts were made by me to contact 
non-respondents before they were removed.  Valid explanations for late responses or 
non-responses were duly considered.  Answers to the questionnaires that were deemed 
incomplete by me were addressed in a follow up communication between me and the 
expert panel member before evaluating the data.  Once any issues were resolved, the data 
collection process for that round was complete.  Data from each round, including expert 
panel member comments, were entered into an appropriate computer aided qualitative 
data analysis system (CAQDAS).  The total time between rounds did not exceed 6 weeks, 
and time between the last round feedback report and distribution of a final report did not 
exceed 6 weeks. 
Data Analysis Plan 
Data Analysis was an ongoing process starting with the results of the first round.  
Major themes were determined a priori for Round 1 based on the literature reviews.  
Major themes were selected that supported the research question (Vaismoradi, Turunen, 
& Bondas, 2013).  Codes for major themes were created a priori using an open coding 
approach (Vaismoradi et al., 2013).  From the Round 1 data, additional subthemes and 
codes were developed.  Codes for subthemes were developed using open coding or axial 
coding techniques (Vaismoradi et al., 2013).  All data from Round 1 was nominal, and 
word count and interpretation of the responses using traditional text analysis was the 
primary statistical approach (Bright & O’Connor, 2007).  For Rounds 2 and 3, all rated 
data was ordinal.  In addition to the primary questions that resulted from Round 1, there 
were two additional rated questions in Round 2 and 3.  Additional rated questions for 
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Round 2 were based on desirability and feasibility of the primary question, and for Round 
3 were based on importance of the primary question and confidence of response to the 
primary question (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).   
Round 2 and 3 were focused on consensus.  Consensus for Rounds 2 and 3 were 
reached when the frequency of responses for options 4 and 5 (agree and strongly agree) 
on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more of the expert panel 
members’ responses to the primary question (Asselin & Harper, 2014).  Primary 
questions that met the definition of consensus for Round 2 were moved forward to Round 
3.  Primary questions that met the definition of consensus for Round 3 were moved to the 
final results section because completion of Round 3 was the end point of this study.  To 
mitigate the risk of not moving a primary question forward because of a tendency to 
select option 3 (neither agree or disagree), a median score of ≥3.5 (a tendency towards 
consensus) was kept as an optional second test of consensus (Ju & Jin, 2013).  The same 
definitions of consensus were applied to secondary questions in Rounds 2 and 3, but 
consensus regarding secondary questions was only recorded and not used to determine if 
a primary question moved forward. 
Issues of Trustworthiness  
This study used a qualitative method and a modified three-round Delphi design.  
Several studies have focused on rigor through the lens of the methodological trinity of 
reliability, trustworthiness, and validity (Hasson & Keeney, 2011; Rowe & Wright, 
2011).  However, according to other studies, the implication of blending reliability, 
trustworthiness, and validity is that there is also a blending of quantitative and qualitative 
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paradigms.  Per Wakefield and Watson (2014) for example, validity and reliability are 
characteristic of quantitative research while credibility and trustworthiness are 
characteristic of qualitative research.  This differentiation was supported by other 
researchers (Asselin & Harper, 2014).  Ju and Jin (2013) argued that when using a Delphi 
design, rigor is the umbrella under which all definitions fit, regardless of whether a study 
is qualitative or quantitative; while Diamond et al. (2014) claimed there is so much 
variation in the settings in which a Delphi design can be applied that there is no definition 
of validity, and that the best a researcher can hope for is to establish credibility by clearly 
defining how rigor was established.  These differences in opinion may explain why in 
addition to discussions of reliability, trustworthiness, credibility, and validity; there are 
studies that also employed terms such as transferability (Rowe & Wright, 2011), and 
confirmability and dependability (Green, 2013) without specifying whether the research 
was qualitative or quantitative.  Rounds 1 through 3 of this study did not extend beyond 
collecting ordinal date, which qualified this study as qualitative research (Elo, 
Kääriäinen, Kanste, Pölkki, Utriainen & Kyngäs, 2014; Houghton, Casey, Shaw, & 
Murphy, 2013).  The same researchers suggested trustworthiness is the defining feature 
of qualitative research under which fall all other terms such as credibility, dependability, 
conformability, confirmability, transferability, and authenticity.  From a Delphi design 
perspective, trustworthiness is a function of rigor, and lack of rigor continues to be a 
major criticism of Delphi designs (Gallego & Bueno, 2014; von der Gracht, 2012; 
Hasson & Keeney, 2011; Meijering, Kampen, & Tobi, 2013; Paré et al., 2013). 
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Credibility 
Common strategies for establishing rigor under the definition of credibility 
include prolonged engagement and observation, triangulation, peer debriefing, and 
member checking (Houghton et al., 2013).  This study employed three rounds of 
engagement with the expert panel members that included controlled feedback or member 
checking between rounds.  The entire process took approximately 4 to 6 months once 
data collection began, which included communication on a regular basis.  I submit this 
regular communication and the length of the study supported the concept of prolonged 
engagement and observation.  Triangulation was addressed through a combination of 
literature review, committee involvement, and feedback from the expert panel members 
(Laick, 2012).  Peer debriefing was an ongoing process with my doctoral committee.  
Member checking was a built-in feature of this Delphi design from the perspective of 
providing feedback and allowing expert panel members to comment on their own input 
(von der Gracht, 2012).  Although no changes resulted from member checking, a clear 
audit trail was still proved to support claims of rigor (Paré et al., 2013). 
Transferability 
Transferability as noted by Green (2013) and Gallego and Bueno (2014) can be a 
strength and a weakness of a Delphi design, and is typically a function of study 
uniqueness.  In the medical profession for example, transferability can be relatively high 
because of similarities in operations.  Ju and Jin (2013) suggested transferability was 
enhanced when there were clusters of similar studies looking at similar situations.  While 
studies regarding standards development are not new (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et 
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al., 2012; Ernst, 2013; Hopper, 2013), this study’s focus on accredited U.S.-based 
industrial SDO and unaccredited SDO leadership challenges may be unique enough to 
limit transferability.  A detailed account of events along with an a priori establishment of 
methodology, a specific focus on establishment of rigor, and the use of triangulation were 
used to improve transferability (Gallego & Bueno, 2014; Rowe & Wright, 2011), but I 
submit transferability was a potential limitation of this study. 
Dependability 
Dependability has been defined as the “stability of data over time and under 
different conditions” (Elo et al., 2014, p. 4).  Houghton et al. (2013) suggested that a 
robust audit trail combined with reflexivity can enhance dependability.  The robust audit 
trail began with detailed descriptions of panel selection criteria and a priori definitions of 
how rigor would be addressed.  Several researchers suggested that a priori definitions of 
consensus and under what circumstances the study would be terminated can support 
rigor, and therefore dependability (Kalian & Kasim, 2012; Meijering et al., 2013).  
Throughout the process, I maintained a robust audit trail.  The feedback process between 
rounds aided in establishing the audit trail.  Reflexivity was addressed by clearly 
disclosing my involvement with SDOs and SDO processes, along with my personal 
biases.  As suggested by Houghton et al. (2013), the researcher is part of the research 
process and demonstrating the researcher’s ability to be self-aware can enhance 
perceptions of dependability.  Demonstrating self-awareness was accomplished by 
recording my rationale for decision making and personal challenges faced by me during 
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the study.  My primary goal was to demonstrate transparency with regard to my 
involvement in the entire process. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability often refers to neutrality of the researcher and the accuracy of the 
data (Houghton et al., 2013).  Some researchers have also suggested that confirmability 
and dependability are closely related and that the processes for ensuring confirmability 
and dependability are similar (Houghton et al., 2013).  A robust audit trail was essential 
for supporting accuracy of the data, including a detailed description of the qualifications 
of all the selected expert panel members.  Another important consideration I addressed 
was the potential for ulterior motives on the part of the expert panel members.  Birko et 
al. (2015) suggested that consideration must be given to who panel members may be 
beholding too, and emphasized how assurances of confidentiality can reduce beholding 
biases.  Regarding neutrality of the researcher, Elo et al. (2014) suggested it is impossible 
for the researcher to be totally neutral, and the best way to support confirmability is to 
make sure the researchers interest in the study (including biases) are clearly stated.  My 
interest and biases were presented to the expert panel members before and during the 
study. 
Ethical Procedures 
Throughout this study, I adhered to the ethical guidelines as approved by IRB 
(approval number 06-10-17-0159246).  The ethical guidelines included: 
 Participant recruitment 
 Participant selection 
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 Data collection 
 Privacy and security 
 Data storage 
 Sharing results 
 Addressing risks 
 Conflicts of interest 
 Participant exclusion 
 Estimated time commitment 
 Informed consent 
Greater detail can be found in Appendixes A – H. 
The pool from which I selected my panel of SMEs are legally considered 
nonprofits.  One way to support ethical procedures was to only select panel members who 
were volunteer members of accredited SDOs and not paid SDO employees.  There were 
two potential advantages to this approach.  The first potential advantage was that none of 
the panel members would be at financial risk should their involvement become known to 
paid members.  The second potential advantage was that I would not need to get a letter 
of cooperation from selected SDOs because all I was asking of the SDOs was to send my 
invitation to their members.  There was the potential disadvantage that an expert panel 
members’ involvement might become known to their employer, but these issues were 
brought to potential expert panel members’ attention during the initial direct contact 
phase, along with steps I proposed to limit exposure.  I did not expect the potential for 
employee discovery to be a significant concern for potential expert panel members, and 
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none of the expert panel members expressed concern.  There was always the risk that an 
expert panel member might become concerned about employer discovery during the 
study, which could contribute to dropout.  Through experience, I have learned that what 
an expert panel member may say in private versus what they would tell their employer 
can be very different.  Assurances of confidentiality (privacy and security) were provided 
throughout the study to allay any expert panel members’ concerns regarding employer 
discovery.   
An ethical concern I did and still do have is how the results of the study may 
affect SDO nonprofit status.  The primary research question asks what desirable and 
feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better 
serve public interests.  Part of what I hope is a partial answer to the research question is 
how leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDO 
will deal with the hybrid nature of SDOs (blending nonprofit and forprofit activities).  I 
believed the best way to assure these legally incorporated nonprofits that my study posed 
no external threat was to point out that, in addition to preserving expert panel members 
confidentiality, the final report would be distributed only to expert panel members, and if 
approved by all exert panel members, relevant stakeholders.  Names of the SDOs would 
also be stored so as to assure confidentiality not only of the expert panel members, but of 
the SDOs as well.  As part of the initial panel selection process, I included a statement 
that the expert panel members should not share their involvement or the results with 
anyone.  Since responses from expert panel members were be coded and kept completely 
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confidential by me, there should be no way for paid members of the SDOs to know who 
panel members were and what a particular panel member contributed to the study unless 
an expert panel member decided to make that information known.  I also established and 
made known how data would be archived, and that records would only be kept for a 
predetermined amount of time.  At the end of this time (five years currently), all physical 
and electronic records would be destroyed.  SDOs and expert panel members did not 
express concerns regarding threats to nonprofit status. 
In the informed consent form, each expert panel member was also informed of 
their ability to withdraw at any time and should they chose to withdraw, any records of 
their involvement would be securely stored until destroyed.  While I expected drop out to 
be primarily a function of a members’ inability to commit to the full study, there could 
have been other reasons.  Again, each expert panel member was informed of their right to 
drop out at any time regardless of the reason.  Expert panel members were also informed 
that non-response to questionnaires within the allotted period could be grounds for 
elimination from the panel.  
A final ethical concern was that expert panel members might become known to 
each other through third party means.  Sobaih et al. (2012) suggested this is generally 
only a concern when the pool from which experts is drawn is so small that maintaining 
confidentiality is virtually impossible.  This concern was addressed during the initial 
contact with potential expert panel members, and that part of the selection process 
included such considerations.  Potential expert panel members that, for example, worked 
  
 
137 
for the same company at the same location, were not considered appropriate choices for 
inclusion.   
Summary 
In Chapter 3, I started with a restatement of the research question.  I then 
addressed the phenomenon of interest and central concepts, along with the research 
method and design, and rationale for the research method and design.  This section 
included comparisons with other research methods and why the specific design was 
selected.  The next section addressed the role of the researcher.  Attention was paid to 
explaining how claims of rigor would be supported.  Following the section on the role of 
the researcher, I described the methodology.  The next section focused on participant 
selection rationale, the pool from which expert panel members would be selected, and 
participant qualifications.  I then addressed the data collection instrument and how each 
section of the instrument would be constructed and vetted so that each section of the 
instrument would support the research question.  Since the instrument was composed of 
three sections (three separate questionnaires), I also discussed how the feedback process 
worked.  The next section addressed specifics of the data analysis plan, which included 
themes, subthemes, coding, and data analysis.  I then addressed issues of trustworthiness, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability.  I finished Chapter 3 with a review of 
ethical procedures.  Chapter 4 will cover the actual study, how data was collected and 
analyzed, how each round built upon the previous round(s), approaches to data analysis, 
and any changes to the approaches outlined in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Purpose of the Study 
Industrial voluntary consensus standards development was originally a relatively 
informal process on the part of the scientific community to establish common practices.  
Today the use of industrial standards has expanded greatly and tends to affect all aspects 
of life (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  However, the legitimacy of industrial standard 
development organizations (SDOs) in the United States and the industrial voluntary 
consensus standards they develop are being threatened by contentious political and 
economic processes driven by an increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs 
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012).  The Delphi design was appropriate based on the need for 
significant stakeholders to develop more collaborative practices in the United States and 
for reducing industrial voluntary consensus development conflicts and maintaining the 
legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus development process (Allen & 
Ramanna, 2013; Fransen, 2011).  Focusing on the need for more collaborative practices, 
the following research question guided this qualitative Delphi study:  What is the level of 
consensus among a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding desirable and 
feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better 
serve public interests?  This chapter provides information on the research setting, 
participant demographics, data collection, data analysis, and study results. 
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Field Test of Round 1 Questionnaire 
The six questions ultimately submitted to the expert panel members in Round 1 
were field tested and modified from the original list of questions shown in Table 1.  
Modifications included the following: 
1. Shortening some questions to improve consistency regarding interpretation and 
reduce fatigue.  The rationale was that shortening the questions would reduce the 
chances of expert panel members having different interpretations of the questions.  
Shortening the questions could also decrease expert panel member fatigue, 
resulting in a decrease in dropout rate and a tendency towards central response. 
2. Reducing the description of accredited and unaccredited SDOs to simple 
acronyms.  The rationale was that the descriptions of accredited and unaccredited 
SDOs was too long to be used repetitively without causing unnecessary fatigue.  
A suggestion was made to use ASDOs as the acronym for accredited U.S.-based 
industrial standard development organizations and UASDOs as the acronym for 
unaccredited industrial standard development organizations. 
The revised Round 1 questions are listed in Appendix I. 
Research Setting 
The research setting was industrial voluntary consensus SDOs in the United 
States, with data collection occurring by electronic means.  Selected SMEs (hereafter 
referred to as experts) were given a list of requirements by electronic means that would 
qualify them as expert panel members and as viable candidates to participate in this 
study.  Expert panel members were also provided by electronic means with an outline of 
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the study and an informed consent form.  Aside from statements provided by participants 
that they did qualify as expert panel members and agreed to participate in the study, no 
other personal demographic information was requested.  The instruments used in this 
study did not ask expert panel members to divulge personal or organizational 
information.  At the time of the study, and based on the electronic nature of data 
collection and data sharing, I was not able to observe directly any personal or 
organizational conditions.  Consequently, I had no knowledge of any personal or 
organizational conditions on the part of expert panel members that may have influenced 
their responses or my interpretation of the data. 
Demographics 
Each expert panel member in this study claimed to possess the following 
characteristics: (a) familiarity with the technical jargon used in the world of industrial 
voluntary consensus standards, (b) could describe cases that illustrate good versus poor 
decisions regarding the development of industrial voluntary consensus standards, (c) 
could communicate effectively in the spoken and written U.S. English language, (d) were 
currently active with an accredited industrial SDO on a voluntary basis and had at least 5 
years continuous involvement with developing industrial voluntary consensus standards, 
and (e) had been employed with or worked with organizations or industries that used 
industrial voluntary consensus standards.  These five characteristics represented expert 
panel member eligibility criteria.  No additional personal demographic was required, and 
each expert panel member acknowledged meeting these eligibility criteria. 
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Recruitment 
My original plan for identifying expert panel members involved contacting 
selected accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and asking them to forward my request 
for expert panel members to their volunteer members.  My rationale was based on 
contacting the International Society of Automation (ISA) and the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) membership departments prior to completing Chapter 3.  
The response from these two accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs was very positive.  
The secondary plan was to contact potential expert panel members directly using contact 
lists I had developed over many years.  After receiving IRB approval, I approached the 
International Society of Automation and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
before contacting other accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs.  At least 6 months had 
passed since my initial contact and I reminded each organization of our original 
conversation.  This time, both organizations declined to forward my request for expert 
panel members to their volunteer members.  In both cases, I was told that sending a 
request that was not directly related to accredited SDO business was not appropriate.  
Rather than pursue this original plan, I decided to switch to my secondary plan that 
involved contacting potential expert panel members directly.  Contacting potential expert 
panel members directly worked well in that responses were timely and allowed for 
greater control over diversity of expert panel members.  Although I had identified 200 
individuals I could contact directly, I decided not to do a group invitation of all 200 and 
instead identified 20 individuals who represented a broad spectrum of experience.  Of the 
20 individuals contacted, two did not respond, three declined, and 15 agreed to participate 
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in this study.  Recruitment began on June 28, 2017 and was complete by July 13, 2017. 
Data Collection 
This qualitative modified Delphi study was built around three rounds of 
questionnaires with each round questionnaire being sent sequentially.  Each questionnaire 
was created using SurveyGizmo.  For each round, expert panel members were provided 
with a unique link to the questionnaire.  I had originally envisioned assigning each expert 
panel member with a unique log on code to gain access to the questionnaires.  However, 
during the Round 1 questionnaire creation phase, both SurveyGizmo and my information 
technology person convinced me that creating a unique link to each round for each expert 
panel member was an easier approach and would still result in the same level of security 
and confidentiality.  The results from each questionnaire were downloaded to my 
personal password protected computer and analyzed by me.  This protocol was followed 
for each of the three rounds. 
Round 1 Data Collection  
The Round 1 questionnaire was comprised of six primary questions and an 
optional seventh question (See Appendix I).  All questions were open-ended, and the 
resulting data were nominal.  The six primary questions were developed based on themes 
that emerged from the literature review.  The six themes included competition, 
deregulation, oversight, organizational structure, leadership training, and market-driven.  
The seventh question allowed expert panel members to provide additional comments if 
they felt the need.  The Round 1 questionnaire instructions asked each panel member to 
provide at least three but no more than five suggestions/comments/opinions for the six 
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primary questions and stated question seven was optional.  None of the questions were 
mandatory (the questionnaire would let the expert panel members leave a question blank 
of they so desired).  No limits were placed on the length of an expert panel members’ 
response. 
Each expert panel member was given 3 weeks to complete the questionnaire.  The 
Round 1 questionnaire was sent to each expert panel member on July 14, 2017.  On July 
30, 2017, a first reminder was sent to panel members who had not completed the 
questionnaire.  On August 3, 2017, a second reminder was sent to expert panel members 
who had not completed the questionnaire.  The questionnaire was closed on August 7, 
2017.   
During Week 1, several expert panel members commented that the questionnaire 
link was slow and timed out.  Potential problems of this nature were verified by 
SurveyGizmo, but SurveyGizmo anticipated this being a “short term” problem (3-5 days 
maximum).  In the interest of not frustrating the expert panel members, I sent a word-
version of the Round 1 questionnaire to each expert panel member on July 18, 2017 and 
gave them the option of completing the questionnaire in word.  One expert panel member 
did use the word document and emailed me the document upon completion.  The word 
document was downloaded to my personal computer and the data was analyzed by me 
along with the data obtain via SurveyGizmo. 
Of the 15 expert panel members who were sent a questionnaire link, 14 
responded.  Of the 14 responses, 11 were complete and three were partially complete.  
The number of responses and response rate were sufficient to meet minimum 
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requirements and support claims of rigor (Asselin & Harper, 2014; Birko et al., 2015; 
Cafiso et al., 2013).  I did speak with the non-responding expert panel member by phone 
after the close of the Round 1 questionnaire.  They explained they were too busy, but 
expressed a desire to continue as an expert panel member.  I felt their continued 
participation was valuable and they were not removed from the study.  Three expert panel 
members who had responded to the Round 1 questionnaire asked to be removed from the 
study after Round 1 was complete.  Their requests were honored and noted in an e-mail 
sent to each of the three expert panel members acknowledging and accepting their request 
to be removed.  This e-mail was sent individually to all three expert panel members on 
August 24, 2017. 
Round 2 Data Collection 
In Chapter 3, the original plan was to ask expert panel members to rate each 
question in Round 2 on a five-point Likert-type scale.  Questions that met the definition 
of consensus would be passed to Round 3.  Expert panel members would also be asked to 
rate each Round 2 question based on desirability and feasibility separately although 
consensus regarding desirability and feasibility would not be used as a basis for moving a 
question to Round 3.  Since asking the expert panel members to rate the questions based 
on desirability and feasibility would not impact which questions move to Round 3, I 
decided to eliminate the request that expert panel members also rate the questions based 
on desirability and feasibility. 
The Round 2 questionnaire was comprised of 54 questions developed on the basis 
of the Round 1 answers (See Appendix J).  Each question was closed-ended and expert 
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panel members were asked to rate their responses on a five-point Likert-type scale.  All 
data resulting from rating questions was ordinal.  Each of the 54 questions included a 
section for comments.  All data resulting from comments was nominal.  None of the 
rating requests or the comment requests were mandatory (the questionnaire would let the 
expert panel members leave a rating or comment blank if they so desired). 
Expert panel members were given 3 weeks to complete the questionnaire.  The 
Round 2 questionnaire was sent to each expert panel member on August 22, 2017.  On 
August 31, 2017, a first reminder was sent to panel members who had not completed the 
questionnaire.  On September 6, 2017, a second reminder was sent to expert panel 
members who had not completed the questionnaire.  The questionnaire was closed on 
September 9, 2017.  
Of the remaining 12 expert panel members who were sent a questionnaire link, 11 
responded.  Of the 11 responses, all were complete based on the rating request.  The 
number of responses and response rate were sufficient to meet minimum requirements 
and support claims of rigor (Asselin & Harper, 2014; Birko et al., 2015; Cafiso et al., 
2013).  Not responding to one or more optional comments sections was not counted 
towards the questionnaire being complete.  I did speak with the non-responding expert 
panel member by phone after the close of the Round 2 questionnaire.  They explained 
they were too busy, but expressed a desire to continue as an expert panel member.  I felt 
their continued participation was valuable and they were not removed from the study.  
None of the responding expert panel members asked to be removed from the study. 
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Round 3 Data Collection 
In Chapter 3, the original plan was to ask expert panel member to rate each 
question on a five-point Likert-type scale.  Question ratings that met the definition of 
consensus would be passed to the final results.  Expert panel members would also be 
asked to rate each Round 3 question based on importance and confidence separately 
although consensus regarding importance and confidence would not be used as a basis for 
moving a question to the final results.  Since the research question focused on the 
desirability and feasibility of future-oriented actions, and since Round 3 terminated the 
questionnaires for this study, I decided to ask the expert panel member to only rate each 
question based on desirability and feasibility (two ratings for each question). 
The Round 3 questionnaire (See Appendix K) was comprised of the 31 questions 
from Round 2 that met the definition of consensus from the original 54 questions.  Each 
question was closed-ended and expert panel members were asked to rate their responses 
on a five-point Likert-type scale regarding desirability and feasibility.  Desirability and 
feasibility were separate questions.  All data resulting from rating questions was ordinal.  
Each of the 31 questions included a section for comments.  All data resulting from 
comments was nominal.  I made rating each question regarding desirability and 
feasibility mandatory.  My rationale was that during the creation and testing of the Round 
3 questionnaire by me, I found it was easy to miss a response and once the questionnaire 
was submitted, there was no way to go back and fill in ratings that had been missed.  I 
surmised the issue was in Round 3, two rating responses (desirability and feasibility) on a 
five-point Likert-type scale were being sought for each question, making it easier to 
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unintentionally miss a response.  Each expert panel member was notified of my decision 
and rationale for making rating responses mandatory and told to select the neutral 
response if they did not wish to answer all or part of a question regarding desirability and 
feasibility.  There were no objections.  Providing comments remained optional (the 
questionnaire would let the expert panel members leave a comment blank if they so 
desired). 
Each expert panel member was given 3 weeks to complete the questionnaire.  The 
Round 3 questionnaire was sent to each expert panel member on September 21, 2017.  
On October 5, 2017, a first reminder was sent to panel members who had not completed 
the questionnaire.  On October 10, 2017, a second reminder was sent to expert panel 
members who had not completed the questionnaire.  The questionnaire was supposed to 
be closed on October 13, 2017, but I was out of town and the questionnaire was closed on 
October 16, 2017.   
Of the 12 expert panel members who were sent a questionnaire link, 11 
responded.  Of the 11 responses, all were complete based on the rating request.  The 
number of responses and response rate were sufficient to meet minimum requirements 
and support claims of rigor (Asselin & Harper, 2014; Birko et al., 2015; Cafiso et al., 
2013).  Not responding to one or more optional comments sections was not counted 
towards the questionnaire being complete. 
Data Analysis 
This qualitative modified Delphi study was comprised of three separate 
questionnaires administered over a 4-month period.  This was an iterative process where 
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data analysis built on the results of the previous round.  Data was nominal in Round 1.  In 
Rounds 2 and 3, rating data used to determine consensus was ordinal.  Any data based on 
comments in Rounds 2 and 3 was nominal and only used to support interpretations of 
ordinal data.  The following sections explain how data was analyzed.   
Round 1 started with open-ended questions (See Appendix I) that were derived 
from the literature review and fit under one of six themes developed from the literature 
review.  Expert panel member were asked to comment on questions, and those responses 
were used to create closed-ended questions for Round 2.  In Round 2, expert panel 
members were asked to rate each question on a five-point Likert-type scale, and provide 
additional comments as appropriate.  Questions whose ratings met a predetermined 
definition of consensus passed on to Round 3.  Consensus was defined as when the 
frequency of responses for options 4 and 5 (agree and strongly agree) on a five-point 
Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more of the expert panel members’ responses.  
In Round 3, expert panel members were asked to rate each question on a five-point 
Likert-type scale regarding desirability and feasibility separately, and provide additional 
comments as appropriate.  Questions whose ratings for both desirability and feasibility 
met the same definition of consensus used in Round 2 passed to the final results.  The 
following sections describe the processes used to move inductively from the initial 
themes used for Round 1 to subthemes, and how subthemes were used to create questions 
that appeared in Rounds 2 and 3. 
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Round 1 Data Analysis 
All data from Round 1 was nominal.  From the responses to the Round 1 
questionnaire, I looked for concepts either shared or stand alone.  I then generated a list 
of potential subthemes under each main theme using traditional text analysis (Bright & 
O’Connor, 2007).  Subthemes were based on my interpretation of comments made by the 
expert panel members and the frequency of concepts.  From these subthemes, I then 
created over 300 initial closed-ended questions.  Many of the 300 initial questions were 
redundant by design as I experimented with a consistent way to present questions.  I then 
reduced the over 300 closed-ended questions to 54 closed-ended questions. 
Round 2 Data Analysis 
The data resulting from Round 2 that determined if a question moved to Round 3 
was ordinal.  Expert panel members were asked to rate each of the questions based on a 
five-point Likert-type scale.  Questions whose ratings met the definition of consensus 
were passed to Round 3.  Consensus was defined as when the frequency of responses for 
options 4 and 5 (agree and strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for 
≥70% or more of the expert panel members’ responses.  There was also an option for 
each question where the respondent could enter a comment.  Comment data was nominal.  
Comment data was only used to support interpretation of ordinal data. 
Round 3 Data Analysis 
The data resulting from Round 3 that determined if a question moved to the final 
results was ordinal.  Expert panel members were asked to rate each of the questions based 
on desirability and feasibility.  Desirability and feasibility were separate questions for 
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each of primary questions (two ratings for each primary question).  Questions whose 
desirability and feasibility ratings both met the definition of consensus were passed to the 
final results.  Consensus was defined as when the frequency of responses for options 4 
and 5 (agree and strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or 
more of the expert panel members’ responses.  There was also an option for each 
question where the respondent could enter a comment.  Comment data was nominal.  
Comment data was only used to support interpretation of ordinal data. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
The strategy I used throughout this study was constant communication.  During 
the data collection phase, I was in contact with each panel member at least three times via 
e-mail during each round.  The first contact was to present the round instructions and 
provide a link to each round questionnaire.  The second contact was to remind expert 
panel members about completing the study if they had not already.  This second contact 
generally occurred twice during the third week of data collection.  The third contact was 
to close each round questionnaire.  During each contact, expert panel members were 
encouraged to ask questions.  In some cases, I spoke with expert panel members either by 
phone are face-to-face.  I submit that this approach to interacting with expert panels 
members satisfied prolonged engagement and observation requirements.  Questionnaire 
questions were based on the literature review, my own personal understanding of how 
standards development works, input from the expert panel members, and input from my 
chair.  I submit that this approach to organizing the study met triangulation requirements. 
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In between data collection phases, I was in contact with the expert panel members 
at least twice to advise them of data analysis progress and when they could expect a full 
report of the particular round, and again with a recap of the preceding round.  Contact in 
between data collection period also gave expert panel members an opportunity to 
comment, and gave me the opportunity to question any responses.  Each contact I made 
with expert panel members always included an invitation to contact me. 
Transferability 
Transferability as noted by Green (2013) and Gallego and Bueno (2014) can be a 
strength and a weakness of a Delphi design, and is typically a function of study 
uniqueness.  I submit that this study was relatively unique for the following reasons.  
First, the study addressed the development of industrial voluntary consensus standards 
from a U.S. perspective and may not be applicable to voluntary consensus standards 
development processes outside of the United States.  Second, the organizations focused 
on during this study represented U.S. SDOs and may not be representative of SDOs 
outside of the United States.  The most transferable component of this study may be that 
understanding the scope and motivations of what are often competing organizations could 
be beneficial to other types of organizations and could also be beneficial across cultures.  
I mentioned in Chapter 3 that transferability could be a weakness of this study, and I still 
maintain that position. 
Dependability 
Dependability has been defined as the “stability of data over time and under 
different conditions” (Elo et al., 2014, p. 4).  I submit that the stability of the data is high 
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if the current U.S. approach to deregulation is stable.  Per Coates (2015) and Wijen 
(2014), deregulation is the primary reason for the rise in the number of unaccredited 
industrial SDOs in the United States and the primary reason the legitimacy of the 
industrial voluntary consensus standards process in the United States is under threat.  As 
long as the deregulation landscape in the United States remains stable, then the data 
should remain stable.  Should the deregulation landscape in the United States change over 
time, then the stability of data over time may suffer. 
Houghton et al. (2013) also stated the researcher is part of the research process 
and demonstrating the researcher’s ability to be self-aware can enhance perceptions of 
dependability.  I tried to be transparent to all expert panel members regarding my own 
involvement with industrial voluntary consensus standards development and biases that 
existed prior to and during this study.  The reader is left to determine how well I 
addressed transparency. 
One note of importance was that several expert panel members felt the questions 
in Round 1 may be leading.  I shared these concerns with all my expert panel members 
after the concerns were voiced and explained the Round 1 questions were based on 
themes derived from the literature review, not my own personal perspectives.  There were 
no more apparent concerns.  
Confirmability 
Confirmability often refers to neutrality of the researcher and the accuracy of the 
data (Houghton et al., 2013).  Regarding neutrality of the researcher, I do (as already 
stated) believe there is a problem to be researched.  Based on my belief that there is a 
  
 
153 
problem, one could argue that I am not neutral in that I have effectively taken a stance.  
As I stated in the dependability section, I have tried to address the potential neutrality 
concern by being transparent. 
What I submit is a larger concern regarding confirmability is accuracy of the data 
based on the number of expert panel members, the makeup of the expert panel, and the 
diversity of the expert panel members.  The expert panel members were for the most part 
suppliers or consultants.  Only two expert panel members were actual end users, and only 
one of these expert panel members who represented end users had experience with being 
a supplier.  The end users tended to respond in ways similar to non-end users, but many 
statements that either demonstrated consensus or not only did so by a few percentage 
points.  A different expert panel make up could have changed some of the outcomes.  
Similarly, I tried to select panel members I felt would provide honest answers.  While I 
believe this goal was achieved, I cannot say with certainty that all results would have 
been the same had the panel been made up of a different group of expert panel members.  
Finally, although the size of this homogeneous  panel of experts was determined to be 
acceptable for the purposes of claiming trustworthiness (Birko at al., 2015; Ju & Jim, 
2013; Paré et al., 2013), a cannot say with certainty that a different panel size would not 
have produced different results. 
Study Results 
The six themes that emerged from the literature review included competition, 
deregulation, oversight, organizational structure, leadership training, and market-driven.  
Each theme was based on what researchers had determined were specific issues related to 
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the current conflict between accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited 
industrial SDOs.  The first six questions in the Round 1 questionnaire were based on 
these six themes and were designed to explore the overarching question of how 
collaborative practices could be improved between accredited U.S.-based industrial 
SDOs (ASDOs in the questionnaires) and unaccredited industrial SDOs (UASDOs in the 
questionnaires).  A seventh open-ended question was presented that gave the expert panel 
members an opportunity to comment as they wished, and not be constrained by any 
particular theme.  The responses that resulted from expert panel members formed the 
basis for the iterative process that culminated in the study findings.  
Round 1 
Expert panel members were asked to provide at least three but no more than five 
responses to each of the six questions that were based on literature deduced themes.  Data 
provided in the seventh question was used be me to gain a deeper understanding of expert 
panel members’ responses to the six theme based questions.  The questionnaire was 
created using SurveyGizmo and the resulting data was entered into an Excel spreadsheet.  
In one case, data was collected from a word doc because the expert panel member was 
having issues with the online questionnaire, and then entered into the Excel spreadsheet.  
A partial set of responses from each expert panel member is shown in Appendix L.  A 
document showing all responses is available upon request.  
From the data collected in Round 1, subthemes were created that were used to 
create the 54 closed-ended questions that formed the Round 2 questionnaire.  Some 
responses that informed the creation of subthemes are showed in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
 
Sample of Round 1 Reponses 
 
Themes P Codes Responses 
Competition P20 “ASDOs and UASDOs need to align on the intent and 
purpose of both types of organizations, and focus on 
benefits of the end user (consumer) of the products and 
services they provide to the relevant market.  If they only 
focus on their own interests, without genuine collaboration, 
end users will suffers [sic] and industry progress will slow.” 
   
Competition P8 “ASDOs should/could provide representation within 
applicable UASDOs for the purpose of cross-pollination 
and an-fact, adoption of best practices. The inverse should 
be in-place also. The goal is to provide the best consensus 
standards and then facilitate the conformity assessment 
systems needed to maintain their integrity.” 
   
Deregulation P6 “Setting legal requirements for ASDOs and UASDOs to be 
recognized and legally referenced.” 
   
Deregulation P8 “Deregulation should be tailored to intent and not letter so 
that improvements to industrial (or other) standards will 
continually be encouraged.” 
   
Oversight P6 “Require referenced bodies to be peer-reviewed by non-
members of the standard.” 
   
Oversight P2 “Third party (non-governmental) oversight could sponsor 
collaborative efforts (i.e. joint conferences), at which 
representatives from the two types of standards groups 
could meet and discuss their concerns.” 
   
Organizational 
structure 
P8 “As the collaborative links between ASDOs and UASDOs 
are strengthened, consideration should be given to either 
scheduled joint sessions, or at a minimum, invitations to 
leadership of opposite numbers to attend meetings.” 
   
Organizational 
structure 
P6 “Review of collaboration by organizational leadership – 
regular evaluation of the status of collaboration can be 
added to committee agendas.” 
(table continues) 
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Themes P Codes Responses 
   
Leadership 
training 
P20 “Leadership training should be focused on the development 
of collaborative organizations.” 
   
Leadership 
training 
P2 “Leverage internal ASDO and UASDO members to 
determine which internal members are trainers in their 
respective field(s) of expertise.  The utilization of internal 
trainers would be more cost effective, and would likely be 
more well received by the other members.” 
   
Market-driven P7 “Since these standards are beneficial to the industry, the 
industry should push bottom up to the ASDOs and the 
UASDOs. They should demand standards that will help the 
industry with safety, lowering operating costs and 
increasing profits.” 
   
Market-driven P8 “Market reaction and acceptance is critical to the 
establishment of collaborative practices.  The effort will be 
self-correcting in the sense that widespread industry 
adoptions based on collaborative ASDO-UASDO efforts 
are the ultimate report card.” 
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A complete list of themes, theme codes, subthemes, subtheme codes, and frequencies 
created from the responses to the Round 1 questionnaire are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
 
Themes & Codes From Round 1 & Resulting Subthemes, Subtheme Codes, & Frequency 
 
Themes Theme 
codes 
Subthemes Subtheme 
codes 
Frequency 
Competition  101  Regular and Formalized 
Communication 
1011 5 
   Advanced Planning 1012 2 
   Alignment of intent and 
purpose/Assignment of 
Responsibilities 
1013 17 
   Industry Expectations 1014 1 
   
 Liaisons Between 
Organizations 
 
1015 
 
5 
   Joint Meetings/Cross 
Training/Shared Information 
1016 10 
   Industries/Trade 
Groups/Guidance 
1017 4 
   Incentives 1018 7 
   Coordination of Activities 
 
1019 6 
Deregulation  102  More Laws 1021 5 
   Less Laws 1022 6 
   State Laws 1023 1 
   Federal Laws 1024 6 
   Laws Do Not Matter (with 
regard to collaboration) 
1025 8 
   Laws Do Matter (with regard 
to collaboration) 
 
 
 
1026 15 
(table continued) 
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Themes Theme 
codes 
Subthemes Subtheme 
codes 
Frequency 
 
Oversight  
103  Consumer Based 1031 13 
   Government Based (note: 
most comments were 
negative) 
1032 10 
   Mandatory 1033 6 
   Voluntary 1034 9 
   Active 1035 12 
   Passive 1036 5 
   External 1037 14 
   Internal 1038 2 
   Value 
 
1039 13 
Organization
al structure  
104  Charters/Collaboration/Appre
ciation 
1041 12 
   Size 1042 4 
   Form 1043 4 
   Sub-Committees 1044 4 
   Formalized Liaison Functions 
(charter) 
1045 9 
   Political Differences (charter) 1046 8 
   Protocols 1047 5 
   Joint Reviews 1048 8 
   
 Shared Leadership 
 
 
1049 
 
1 
Leadership 
training  
105  Voluntary 1051 2 
   Mandatory 1052 4 
   In Collaboration 1053 5 
   In Empowerment 1054 1 
   In Leading by Example 1055 2 
   In Servant-Leadership 1056 1 
   In Feedback 1057 2 
   In Emotional Intelligence 1058 1 
   Clarity of Function  1059 12 
   In Understanding Other 10510 7 
(table continued) 
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Themes Theme 
codes 
Subthemes Subtheme 
codes 
Frequency 
 
 
 
 
Organizations 
   Function of Standards 10511 4 
   Familiarity with Nonprofit 
Organizations 
10512 2 
   Training at all Levels 10513 4 
   Joint Training 10514 4 
Market-
driven  
106  Consumer Needs 1061 4 
   Industry Needs 1062 9 
   SDO Needs 1063 6 
   Industries/Trade 
Groups/Guidance 
1064 10 
   Fragmentation Issues 1065 5 
   Joint Activities/Meetings 1066 6 
   Market Forces (drivers) 1067 10 
   Reward Structures/Incentives 1068 10 
 
Round 2 
Subthemes generated from the results of Round 1 were then used to create 54 
closed-ended questions that were presented to the expert panel members in Round 2.  The 
54 closed-ended questions are shown in Appendix J.  Expert panel members were asked 
to rate each of the 54 closed-ended questions on a five-point Likert-type scale.  A partial 
list of responses to the Round 2 questionnaire are showed in Appendix M.  A document 
showing all responses is available upon request.  Questions that demonstrated consensus 
with consensus being defined as when the frequency of responses for options 4 and 5 
(agree and strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more 
of the expert panel members’ responses were moved to the next round.  Of the original 54 
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questions, a list of questions that met the definition of consensus along with the 
corresponding question number are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Round 2 Questions That Resulted in Consensus 
 
Question 
No. from 
Round 2 
Questions % Agree or 
strongly agree 
Theme(s) 
1 Regular communication between ASDOs and UASDOs 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
100.0% Competition 
    
2 Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs by clarifying jointly to 
both ASDOs and UASDOs what industry expects of both 
groups. 
100.0% Competition 
    
3 Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could 
improve if both groups were incentivized to support each 
other’s work. 
72.8% Competition 
    
4 Having formal liaisons (reciprocal representation) 
between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve 
collaboration. 
81.9% Competition 
    
5 Defining clear areas of responsibility could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. 
81.8% Competition 
    
6 Publishing Agendas well before an event (including 
schedules of events) could help collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs. 
100.0% Competition 
    
7 Better coordination of meetings could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. 
100.0% Competition 
    
9 Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could be 
improved by introducing regulations that promoted 
collaboration. 
72.8% Deregulation 
    
17 Oversight could only improve collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs if both organizations were willing 
to accept oversight. 
90.9% Oversight 
    
21 Honoring ASDO and UASDO work in references, 
contracts, etc..., could improve collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs without the need for oversight. 
81.8% Oversight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   (table continued) 
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Question 
No. from 
Round 2 
Questions % Agree or 
strongly agree 
Theme(s) 
24 Oversight that encouraged collaboration with innovators 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
90.0% Oversight 
    
26 Flattening organizational structures (less hierarchical) 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
72.7% Organizational 
structure 
    
27 Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could 
improve if ASDOs and UASDOs shared similar 
protocols. 
81.8% Organizational 
structure 
    
28 Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and 
UASDOs if both types of organizations changed their 
charters to include a department whose function was to 
collaborate with other organizations. 
100.0% Organizational 
structure 
    
29 Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could 
improve if both types of organizations changed 
subcommittee mandates to include a specific venue to 
present findings. 
72.7% Organizational 
structure 
    
30 Charters that included specifics for working with other 
organizations could improve collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs. 
81.8% Organizational 
structure 
    
31 Shared leadership could improve collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs. 
72.7% Organizational 
structure 
    
32 Joint reviews of collaborative efforts between ASDOs and 
UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. 
90.9% Organizational 
structure 
    
35 Leaders trained in the concept of “leading by example” 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
72.7% Leadership 
training 
    
38 Collaborative leadership training could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. 
72.7% Leadership 
training 
    
42 Leadership training that included a focus on 
understanding the scopes and goals of similar ASDOs and 
UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. 
81.8% Leadership 
training 
    
43 Mandatory training of new members at all levels could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. 
72.8% Leadership 
training 
    
45 Increased training for leaders on the benefits of standards 90.9% Leadership 
(table continued) 
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Question 
No. from 
Round 2 
Questions % Agree or 
strongly agree 
Theme(s) 
to both society and business, with a focus on similarities 
of ASDOs and UASDOs, could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs. 
 
training 
46 Joint leadership cooperation training between ASDOs and 
UASDOs in the form of workshops could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. 
80.0% Leadership 
training 
    
47 Including relevant Industries and Trade Groups in a more 
broad discussion with ASDOs and UASDOs could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. 
100.0% Market-driven 
    
49 Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs if such groups made 
collaboration beneficial to both types of organizations. 
90.9% Market-driven 
    
50 Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs if they promoted both 
types of organizations. 
100.0% Market-driven 
    
51 Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs if they encouraged joint 
participation at trade shows and other venues. 
72.8% Market-driven 
    
52 Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs by publishing the benefits 
of both organizations types of work. 
100.0% Market-driven 
    
53 Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and 
UASDOs if both types of organizations agreed upon joint 
and/or shared articles of legitimacy. 
72.7% Market-driven 
    
54 Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could 
improve if ASDOs were more inclined to accept input 
from UASDOs and use this input to establish priorities. 
81.8% Market-driven 
Note. Consensus Definition = “Agree” & “Strongly Agree” are ≥70% of Responses 
Definitions:  ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development Organizations) UASDOs 
(Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations) 
Thirty-one of the 54 questions in Round 2 met the definition of consensus and were 
moved to Round 3.   
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Round 3 
In Round 3, the expert panel members were asked to rate each question on a five-
point Likert-type scale based on desirability and feasibility.  Desirability and feasibility 
were separate ratings.  A partial set of responses from each expert panel member is 
shown in Appendix N.  A document showing all responses is available upon request.  
None of the statements that demonstrated consensus with regard to feasibility failed to 
demonstrate consensus with regard to desirability.  Consensus was defined as when the 
frequency of responses for options 4 and 5 (agree and strongly agree) on a five-point 
Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more of the expert panel members’ responses.  
A list of questions that met the definition of consensus regarding desirability regardless 
of whether or not they met the definition of consensus regarding feasibility are shown in 
Table 5.  The question numbers were carried over from the Round 2 questions. 
Table 5  
Round 3 Questions That Resulted in Consensus Based on “Desirability” Only 
 
Question 
No. from 
Round 3 
Questions Desirability 
(% agree or 
strongly agree) 
Feasibility 
(% agree or 
strongly agree) 
Themes 
1 Regular communication between 
ASDOs and UASDOs could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
100.0% 72.7% Competition 
     
2 Industry/Trade Groups could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs by clarifying jointly to both 
ASDOs and UASDOs what industry 
expects of both groups. 
100.0% 90.9% Competition 
     
3 Collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs could improve if both groups 
were incentivized to support each other’s 
91.0% 63.6% Competition 
(table continued) 
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Question 
No. from 
Round 3 
Questions Desirability 
(% agree or 
strongly agree) 
Feasibility 
(% agree or 
strongly agree) 
Themes 
work. 
     
4 Having formal liaisons (reciprocal 
representation) between ASDOs and 
UASDOs could improve collaboration. 
81.8% 100.0% Competition  
     
5 Defining clear areas of responsibility 
could improve collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs. 
 
91.0% 81.8% Competition  
     
6 Publishing Agendas well before an event 
(including schedules of events) could 
help collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
100.0% 90.9% Competition 
     
7 Better coordination of meetings could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. 
100.0% 90.9% Competition 
     
21 Honoring ASDO and UASDO work in 
references, contracts, etc..., could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs without the need for 
oversight. 
81.8% 72.7% Oversight 
     
24 Oversight that encouraged collaboration 
with innovators could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
81.8% 63.6% Oversight 
     
27 Collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs could improve if ASDOs and 
UASDOs shared similar protocols. 
72.7% 45.5% Organizational 
Structure 
     
28 Collaboration could improve between 
ASDOs and UASDOs if both types of 
organizations changed their charters to 
include a department whose function 
was to collaborate with other 
organizations. 
81.8% 54.6% Organizational 
Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
(table continued) 
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Question 
No. from 
Round 3 
Questions Desirability 
(% agree or 
strongly agree) 
Feasibility 
(% agree or 
strongly agree) 
Themes 
29 Collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs could improve if both types of 
organizations changed subcommittee 
mandates to include a specific venue to 
present findings. 
72.7% 54.6% Organizational 
Structure 
     
30 Charters that included specifics for 
working with other organizations could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. 
81.8% 63.6% Organizational 
Structure 
     
32 Joint reviews of collaborative efforts 
between ASDOs and UASDOs could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. 
 
100.0% 63.6% Organizational 
Structure 
     
35 Leaders trained in the concept of 
“leading by example” could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
90.9% 54.6% Leadership 
Training 
     
38 Collaborative leadership training could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. 
81.9% 81.8% Leadership 
Training 
     
42 Leadership training that included a focus 
on understanding the scopes and goals of 
similar ASDOs and UASDOs could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. 
81.9% 63.6% Leadership 
Training 
     
43 Mandatory training of new members at 
all levels could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs. 
90.9% 45.5% Leadership 
Training 
     
45 Increased training for leaders on the 
benefits of standards to both society and 
business, with a focus on similarities of 
ASDOs and UASDOs, could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
100.0% 54.6% Leadership 
Training 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
(table continued) 
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Question 
No. from 
Round 3 
Questions Desirability 
(% agree or 
strongly agree) 
Feasibility 
(% agree or 
strongly agree) 
Themes 
46 Joint leadership cooperation training 
between ASDOs and UASDOs in the 
form of workshops could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
72.8% 36.4% Leadership 
Training 
     
47 Including relevant Industries and Trade 
Groups in a more broad discussion with 
ASDOs and UASDOs could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
100.0% 72.7% Market-driven 
     
49 Industry/Trade Groups could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs if such groups made 
collaboration beneficial to both types of 
organizations. 
100.0% 81.8% Market-driven 
     
50 Industry/Trade Groups could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs if they promoted both types of 
organizations. 
100.0% 90.9% Market-driven 
     
51 Industry/Trade Groups could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs if they encouraged joint 
participation at trade shows and other 
venues. 
91.0% 54.5% Market-driven 
     
52 Industry/Trade Groups could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs by publishing the benefits of 
both organizations types of work. 
100.0% 72.7% Market-driven 
     
53 Collaboration could improve between 
ASDOs and UASDOs if both types of 
organizations agreed upon joint and/or 
shared articles of legitimacy. 
72.8% 45.5% Market-driven 
     
54 Collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs could improve if ASDOs were 
more inclined to accept input from 
UASDOs and use this input to establish 
priorities. 
90.9% 54.5% Market-driven 
Note. Consensus Definition = “Agree” & “Strongly Agree” are ≥70% of Responses 
Definitions:  ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development Organizations) 
UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations) 
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Twenty-seven questions met the definition of consensus for desirability.  As 
already mentioned, none of the questions that met the definition of consensus for 
feasibility failed the definition of consensus for desirability.  For this reason, I believe 
Table 5 is important because it demonstrates that questions that were deemed desirable 
based on consensus were not always considered feasible based on the same definition of 
consensus.  A list of questions that met both the definition of consensus for both 
desirability and feasibility are shown in Table 6.  The question numbers were carried over 
from the Round 2 questions. 
Table 6 
Round 3 Questions That Resulted in Consensus Based on “Desirability” & “Feasibility” 
Question 
No. From 
Round 3 
Questions Desirability 
(% Agree or 
Strongly 
Agree) 
Feasibility 
(% Agree or 
Strongly 
Agree) 
Themes 
1 Regular communication between ASDOs 
and UASDOs could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
100.0% 72.7% Competition 
     
2 Industry/Trade Groups could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs by clarifying jointly to both 
ASDOs and UASDOs what industry 
expects of both groups. 
100.0% 90.9% Competition 
     
4 Having formal liaisons (reciprocal 
representation) between ASDOs and 
UASDOs could improve collaboration. 
81.8% 100.0% Competition  
     
5 Defining clear areas of responsibility 
could improve collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs. 
 
 
91.0% 81.8% Competition  
     
(table continued) 
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Question 
No. From 
Round 3 
Questions Desirability 
(% Agree or 
Strongly 
Agree) 
Feasibility 
(% Agree or 
Strongly 
Agree) 
Themes 
6 Publishing Agendas well before an event 
(including schedules of events) could 
help collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
100.0% 90.9% Competition 
     
7 Better coordination of meetings could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. 
100.0% 90.9% Competition 
     
21 Honoring ASDO and UASDO work in 
references, contracts, etc..., could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs without the need for 
oversight. 
81.8% 72.7% Oversight 
     
38 Collaborative leadership training could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. 
81.9% 81.8% Leadership 
Training 
     
47 Including relevant Industries and Trade 
Groups in a more broad discussion with 
ASDOs and UASDOs could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. 
100.0% 72.7% Market-driven 
     
49 Industry/Trade Groups could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs if such groups made 
collaboration beneficial to both types of 
organizations. 
100.0% 81.8% Market-driven 
     
50 Industry/Trade Groups could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs if they promoted both types of 
organizations. 
100.0% 90.9% Market-driven 
     
52 Industry/Trade Groups could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs by publishing the benefits of 
both organizations types of work.  
100.0% 72.7% Market-driven 
Table Notes: Consensus Definition = “Agree” & “Strongly Agree” are ≥70% of Responses 
Definitions:  ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development Organizations) UASDOs 
(Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations) 
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Twelve questions met the definition of consensus for both desirability and 
feasibility and were passed to the final results. 
Summary 
The answers to the research questions indicated the expert panel members did 
believe there were solutions to improving collaborative practices, however, there were 
caveats.  Answers generally focused on solutions that did not require an increase in 
regulations, did not involve increased governmental participation, and did not disregard a 
SDOs motivations.  Solutions were also not considered to be primarily the responsibility 
of accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs, and the potential role of industry and 
trade groups was pronounced.  Harmonization of motives was the overarching suggestion 
for improving collaboration, and until that happened, organizations would continue to do 
what they perceived to be in their best interests. 
Chapter 5 contains my evaluations of the expert panel members’ responses to the 
questions posed, my attempts to conclude what solutions were considered promising 
based on consensus, which suggestions may be better than others, and why some 
solutions were not considered viable.  In Chapter 5, I also address the limitations of this 
study, recommendations, and implications.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to discover what consensus could be built among 
expert panel members (previously called subject matter experts or SMEs) regarding 
desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial 
standard development organizations (SDOs) and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take 
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests.  This study was 
conducted using a qualitative method and modified three-round Delphi design.  
Qualitative research is consistent with the goal of exploring how leaders of industrial 
SDOs approach industrial voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and 
diffusion, and what changes might be conducive to improving collaborative practices 
between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs in the United States.  The selection 
of a Delphi design was deemed appropriate because of the desire to compare expert 
opinions regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions (Hasson & Keeney, 
2011).  Gaining insight into activities that may improve collaborative practices was 
important because industrial voluntary consensus standards are a critical social function 
that affects all members of society (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  If lack of 
collaborative practices in the United States is threatening the legitimacy of the U.S. 
industrial voluntary consensus standards process, then what has traditionally been a 
democratic and inclusive process designed to serve public interests is also at risk 
(Brunsson et al., 2012; Osula & Ng, 2014; Sandholtz, 2012). 
The results of this study demonstrated consensus on 12 approaches that may 
improve collaborative practices and alter what is becoming a more contentious process in 
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the United States.  These 12 approaches could affect how leaders of industrial SDOs 
work internally and externally to improve collaborative practices, and how external 
stakeholders participate in improving collaborative practices.  The 12 final consensus 
items consisted of  (a) formalizing communication processes – statements related to 
establishing liaison and communication functions within SDOs and communication 
between SDOs and external entities; (b) defining clear areas of responsibility – 
statements related to clarifying accredited and unaccredited industrial SDO functions, 
expectations of industry and trade groups, and expectations of third party participants 
such as government; (c) better coordination of activities – statements related to 
publication of agendas, coordination of meetings, honoring work, and general 
improvements in communication; (d) leadership training – statements related to training 
leaders and participants in the art of collaboration; and (e) industry and trade group 
involvement – statements related to communicating to SDOs what industry expects, 
extoling the benefits of both accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs, and helping all 
stakeholders understand the benefits of collaboration. 
The key findings of this study indicate that more regulation was not considered a 
viable solution to improving collaborative practices in the United States and that 
significant stakeholders had it within their power to improve collaborative practices 
without the necessity of forced intervention.  In this chapter, I compare my findings with 
the peer-reviewed literature presented in Chapter 2, consider the implications based on 
my findings and in the context of stakeholder and institutional theory, identify 
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limitations, and communicate recommendations.  I end this study with a final message 
that captures the importance of this study. 
Interpretation of Findings 
Researchers agreed that industrial voluntary consensus standards are critical to 
promoting communication between significant stakeholders and that voluntary consensus 
standards are vital to servicing public interests (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Ponte & Cheyns, 
2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Researchers also agreed that industrial voluntary 
consensus standards processes in general are becoming more contentious as various 
organizations fight for legitimacy (Osula & Ng, 2014).  The challenge is of importance in 
the United States because of the unique U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to 
industrial voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and diffusion (Strauss, 
2013).  None of the expert panel members appeared to disagree with these findings, but 
opinions varied regarding potential solutions, and potential solutions did not always 
match with opinions expressed by researchers.  My interpretation of the results of this 
study are presented based on the 12 final suggestions and within the confines of the six 
themes that emerged from the literature review. 
Deregulation 
Deregulation was considered by some researchers to be the primary reason for the 
increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs in the United States and the 
resulting increase in competition and conflict between accredited and unaccredited 
industrial SDOs (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Coates, 2015; Fransen, 2011; Wijen, 2014).  
Reinecke et al. (2012) suggested that the increasing tendencies of accredited and 
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unaccredited industrial SDOs to “sell their brand” (p. 798) should not be an unexpected 
outcome given the current state of deregulation and lack of oversight that has contributed 
to a more crowded field of industrial SDOs, each fighting for legitimacy.  As suggested 
by some researchers, seeking improvements in collaborative practices may be a moot 
point without reengagement on the part of legislative bodies (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; 
Brunsson et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Most expert panel members were 
not in favor of legislative solutions, and none of the final 12 suggestions included a 
legislative solution.  As suggested by one expert panel member,  
I don't think the collaborative practices, good or not good are affected in any way 
by regulation laws, nor by deregulation laws so I cannot believe that leveraging or 
changing regulation laws will make any impact at all on the collaborative 
practices. (P4) 
This perspective was echoed by other expert panel members.  My interpretation is that 
expert panel members felt efforts to improve collaborative practices would be better 
served by helping significant stakeholders realized the benefits of collaboration, and not 
by trying to force collaboration.  As suggested by one expert panel member, “Convince 
ASDOs and UASDOs that collaborative practices are to their benefit.  Identify the 
problem” (P10). 
Oversight 
A potential solution suggested by researchers was that as a result of deregulation 
in the United States, participation or oversight on the part of legislative or third party 
entities needed to be increased because any state or industry consortium can create an 
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SDO (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  
The rational offered was that from an economic perspective, unaccredited industrial 
SDOs are often motivated by business related objectives more so than accredited 
industrial SDOs (Reinecke et al., 2012).  An increase in oversight could help mitigate the 
differences in motivations and protect a process that has historically favored a 
deliberative and inclusive democratic approach.  While increased oversight was not 
generally rejected by the expert panel members, there tended to be consensus that passive 
oversight in the form of recognition of contributions could improve collaborative 
practices and was more desirable that a controlling type of oversight.  This perception 
was supported by one of the 12 final suggestions that focused on oversight in the form of 
honoring SDO activities as a desirable and feasible approach to improving collaborative 
practices.  My primary interpretation is that expert panel members felt active oversight 
had the potential for producing winners and losers and that passive oversight that 
recognized contributions was a more desirable approach to improving collaborative 
practices.  As one expert panel member suggested, “too much stick—need more carrot” 
(P8).  A secondary interpretation regarding oversight was potential concern on the part of 
expert panel members regarding oversight qualifications.  Although researchers often 
suggested oversight could improve collaboration, I could not find any suggestions in the 
literature for how an oversight function could be qualified.  As one expert panel member 
suggested regarding legislative oversight, “The government does not have the technical 
expertise or organizational structure to enact or enforce clear and non-conflicting [sic] 
  
 
176 
standards” (P10).  Expert panel members may have similar concerns regarding other 
types of oversight organizations. 
Organizational Structure 
Researchers pointed out that SDOs are generally incorporated as nonprofits, but 
that even as nonprofits, there is still an economic component to their structure (Pache & 
Santos, 2013).  Researchers referred to this type of structure as a hybrid structure, and 
suggested this could be a particular challenge for leaders of SDOs because leaders of 
SDOs typically came from forprofit backgrounds and might not be familiar with or 
qualified to address organizational situations where there is no single goal (Benner & 
Pastor, 2015; Osula & Ng, 2014; Smith, 2014).  Also mentioned by researchers was that 
organizations incorporated as nonprofits tend to have a leadership structure that relies 
more heavily on a board of directors than in forprofit organizations.  As a result, boards 
of nonprofits are more critical to addressing leadership issues because leadership tends to 
be more of a group activity in organizations incorporated as nonprofits than in 
organizations incorporated as forprofit (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Goldkind, 2015).  Expert 
panel members acknowledged these potential problems, but none of the final 12 
suggestions supported improving collaborative practices by changing U.S.-based 
industrial SDO organizational structures.  The closest suggestion to improving 
collaborative practices within the confines of existing organizational structures was 
consensus on the part of expert panel members that establishing liaison functions within 
and between industrial SDOs could improve collaboration.  As suggested by one expert 
panel member, “All organizations, ASDOs and UASDOs alike, would need an office or 
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directorate to perform the formal liaison functions with their opposite numbers” (P8).  
My interpretation is that expert panel members felt improving collaborative practices was 
more a function of reward structures, and that reward structures could be modified 
without the need for changing organizational structures.  The formation of liaison 
functions was not a solution suggested by researchers per se. 
Leadership 
Researchers made numerous references to the challenges of leadership in 
nonprofit or hybrid organizations and three overarching observations surfaced.  First, 
understanding desirable characteristics of leaders of hybrid organizations could 
illuminate potential collaborative practice improvements (McMurray, Islam, Sarros, & 
Pirola-Merlo, 2012).  Second, collaboration was not the norm within forprofit 
organizations leaders of industrial SDOs tended to come from (Benner & Pastor, 2015; 
Cho & Perry, 2012).  Third, leaders of hybrid organizations may need to be specifically 
selected or trained to do justice to a hybrid organization’s unique leadership challenges 
(Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  Expert panel members acknowledged that SDO leaders in the 
United States may not have the skill sets required for a collaborative environment and 
one of the 12 final suggestions focused on the need for collaborative training of SDO 
leaders and leadership.  As suggested by one expert panel member, “Leadership training 
should be focused on the development of collaborative organizations” (P20).  My 
interpretation is that while expert panel members were in agreement with researchers that 
leaders of industrial SDO may not be qualified, collaborative training was considered 
more desirable and feasible than other types of training or special selection criteria. 
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Market-Driven 
Some researchers suggested that what helped give rise to the increase in 
unaccredited industrial SDOs in the United States as a result of deregulation was the 
unique U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to the development, adoption, and 
diffusion of voluntary consensus standards (Ernst, 2013; Kaplan & Kinderman, 2015; 
Lampland & Star, 2009; Strauss, 2013).  Researchers tended to focus on two aspects of 
the market-driven, bottom-up environment.  These included the role of politics and 
economics (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Fransen, 2011) and the supposition that once 
formed, organizations like SDOs were reluctant to let go of what was publicly claimed to 
have added value, and privately perceived to be more about power (Fransen, 2011).  
Expert panel members did not appear to disagree with researchers with regard to the 
importance of market drivers within the U.S. context.  Five of the 12 final suggestions 
from expert panel members focused on the importance of market drivers and generally 
put the burden on industry and trade groups to provide the guidance that would allow 
market drivers to generate the type of collaborative behavior that would be beneficial to 
all stakeholders.  My interpretation is that expert panel members agreed with researchers 
that behavior in the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up environment is largely about profit 
and power.  However, I believe the consensus among expert panel members was that, 
rather than try and change the system, provide incentives that would encourage market-
driven solutions.  As one expert panel member suggested, “Since these standards are 
beneficial to the industry, the industry should push bottom up to the ASDOs and the 
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UASDOs. They should demand standards that will help the industry with safety, lowering 
operating costs and increasing profits” (P7). 
Competition 
Increased competition and resulting conflict tended to be the overarching concern 
of researchers and the reason that more collaboration was needed, especially in the 
United States.  A reduction in competition and conflict was deemed critical by 
researchers for protecting public interests and promoting positive social change by 
maintaining a deliberative and inclusive democratic process that supported the legitimacy 
of industrial SDOs and the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process (Behr & 
Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et al., 2012; Hopper, 2013; Olshan, 1993; Sandholtz, 2012; 
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Yates & Murphy, 2015).  Expert panel members did not 
disagree with researchers and felt communication was a key component to finding a 
solution. Three of the final 12 suggestions focused on the benefits of communication 
within and between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs.  As suggested by expert 
panel members, “Liaisons should be assigned between the two organizations, allowing 
for the open and honest transfer of ideas” (P2), “Have more joint meetings.  First each 
organization must now [sic] it's purpose and then they must come to the table and agree 
what each organization is best suited to publish” (P5), and “Providing liaisons regular 
scheduled time in regular meetings of related standards organizations enhances 
collaboration and promotes both groups” (P6).  My interpretation is that promoting 
communication was considered a more desirable and feasible solution to reducing 
conflict based competition than a more forced reduction in conflict.  Several of the final 
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12 suggestions that focused on industry and trade group particiaption also included a 
communication component within and between accredited and unaccredited industrial 
SDOs. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study had several limitations.  One of the features of this Delphi design, and 
Delphi designs in general, is that expert panel member selection is based on the 
assumption that selected expert panel members are experts regarding the subject matter, 
not that their opinions are statistically representative of the population of potential experts 
(Förster & Von der Gracht, 2014).  This feature brings into question the trustworthiness 
of this study.  Different expert panel members could have produced a different set of 
suggestions.  A second limitation is my use of purposive sampling to selected expert 
panel members.  Such an approach could have produced a panel that resulted in biases 
that skewed the results.  I attempted to address this concern by selecting expert panel 
members who represented different stakeholders and potentially different perspectives.  
A third limitation was non-response error.  As already mentioned, expert panel member 
selection is based on the assumption that selected expert panel members are experts 
regarding the subject matter, not that their opinions are statistically representative of the 
population of potential experts (Förster & Gracht, 2014).  Non-response error has the 
potential to exacerbate the potential problem of statistical representation (Hsu & 
Sandford, 2007).  Hsu and Sandford (2007) recommended contacting non-responders as 
soon as possible in order to promote participation in subsequent rounds.  I did contact 
non-responders and none asked to be removed from the panel.  This approach was used at 
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the end of Round 1 and Round 2 in an effort to reduce statistical representation error.  A 
forth limitation was participant drop out.  Drop out is a potential problem in a Delphi 
study due to the iterative nature of the Delphi design (Green, 2013; Kalaian & Kasim, 
2012).  Every effort was made to reduce drop out by expressing the importance of this 
study and creating instruments that could be completed in 30 to 45 minutes (Birko et al., 
2015).  Three expert panel members asked to be removed after the completion of Round 
1.  No expert panel members asked to be removed during or after subsequent rounds.  A 
fifth limitation is that this study appears to be unique.  Transferability is therefore a 
potential weakness.  There was nothing I could do about study uniqueness, and all I could 
do was focus on establishing rigor. 
Recommendations 
Industry and Trade Groups 
This study was primarily focused on collaborative practices between accredited 
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs.  Several of the 12 final 
suggestions for improving collaborative practices included more industry and trade group 
participation.  The rationale per the expert panel members was that standards greatly 
impact industry, and industry and trade groups would benefit by supporting collaborative 
practices.  As suggested by one expert panel member, “Since these standards are 
beneficial to the industry, the industry should push bottom up to the ASDOs and the 
UASDOs. They should demand standards that will help the industry with safety, lowering 
operating costs and increasing profits” (P7).  Researchers also suggested that trade 
benefited from industrial voluntary consensus standards (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 
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2013; Hopper, 2013; Pirard at al., 2015).  Per Timmermans and Epstein (2010), even if 
standards do not directly harmonize or globalize interchanges, they can help lead in that 
direction.  Considering the importance expert panel members placed on industry and 
trade group participation, researchers may wish to conduct studies focused specifically on 
industry and trade group perceptions regarding improving collaborative practices in the 
area of industrial voluntary consensus development, adoption, and diffusion.   
Legislative Bodies 
None of the 12 final suggestions included intervention by legislative bodies as 
desirable or feasible for improving collaborative practices in the United States.  However, 
converting industrial voluntary consensus standards to code though a process known in 
the United States as inclusion by reference (IRB) has become popular with legislative 
bodies (Abrams, 2014; Ernst, 2013; Ringsberg, 2015; Strauss, 2013).  The IRB process 
can reduce cost and accelerate codification processes.  Even if not codified, some 
researchers suggested that industrial voluntary consensus standards can benefit society 
when governmental regulations are weak or incompatible (Brunsson et al., 2012), or can 
act as viable substitutes for regulations (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Vogel, 2010; 
Wijen, 2014).  Other researchers suggested that reengagement on the part of legislative 
bodies might be necessary in order to maintain the legitimacy of industrial voluntary 
consensus standards processes (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 
2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Based on researcher suggestions, legislative 
bodies have a vested interest in how the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus process 
works.  The more legitimate the process, the more confidence legislative bodies have in 
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allowing standards to substitute for regulation (code), and the more confidence legislative 
bodies have in the codes that result from industrial voluntary consensus standards.  
Researchers may wish to conduct studies that focus on the U.S. industrial voluntary 
consensus standards process from a legislative perspective.  The results could encourage 
greater participation by legislative bodies, or at least help legislative bodies gain greater 
understanding of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process.  Research of 
this nature may also help motivate non-governmental stakeholder to take a greater 
interest in improving collaborative practices. 
Accredited and Unaccredited Industrial SDOs 
In this study, expert panel members were asked to comment on questions related 
to improving collaborative practices between accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs.  This study did not focus on gathering input from 
accredited or unaccredited industrial SDOs, especially paid SDO members.  As suggested 
by researchers, accredited industrial SDOs typically have different motivations from 
unaccredited industrial SDOs.  As suggested by one researcher, the increase in 
competition between accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial 
SDOs could be leading to conflicts that are not politically and economically neutral, and 
threaten public interests (Fransen, 2011).  More specifically, some researchers suggested 
that moral responsibility of industrial SDOs to serve public interests primarily by 
promoting uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer safety and quality control 
procedures was in danger of being replaced by political and economic motivations that 
placed special interests ahead of public interests (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013).  The rationale 
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offered by some researchers was that unaccredited industrial SDOs are often motivated 
by business related objectives more so than accredited industrial SDOs (Reinecke et al., 
2012).  This difference in motivation could result in a standards war as each side 
competes for legitimacy (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Ernst, 2013; 
Farrell & Simcoe, 2012; Pirard et al., 2015).  This potential difference between accredited 
and unaccredited industrial SDO motivations in the United States was encapsulated by 
one expert panel member who suggested,  
“It ends up being about politics in the end and who has the leverage.  Is it the 
accredited organization because they have governmental backing as law or the 
industry consortium because they have the money and power of the market?”. (P9) 
Researchers should consider studies that attempt to gain greater understanding of how 
U.S.-based accredited industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs see the role 
each type of organization plays.  Research that focused on the perceptions of accredited 
and unaccredited industrial SDOs could increase external understanding of what 
motivates each type of SDOs.  Such research could also help SDOs understand their own 
internal motivations.  Understanding internal motivations could be especially helpful 
because some researchers suggested organizations benefit from knowing themselves as 
well as other stakeholders (Tashman & Raelin, 2013).  The focus of research could be on 
senior volunteer members, paid members, or a combination of both.  Research that 
focused on paid members could be particularly enlightening because of the financial 
implications. 
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Leaders of Hybrid Organizations 
During this study, I tended not to focus just on leaders of U.S.-based industrial 
SDOs and broadened the scope of research to include other organizational components.  
My rationale was that while some researchers suggested leading hybrid organizations 
could present leaders with special leadership challenges (Bordia et al., 2011), the role of 
leaders was considered by researchers to represent a specific component of voluntary 
consensus standards development processes and was not representative of all challenges.  
Only one of the 12 final recommendations by expert panel members focused on 
leadership training as a way to improve collaborative practices in the United States.  
Research that focused more specifically on leaders in hybrid organizations like industrial 
SDO could be very useful.  As suggest by some researchers, there has been abundant 
research regarding leadership needs in forprofit organizations, considerably less research 
regarding leadership needs in nonprofit organizations, and even less research regarding 
leadership needs in hybrid organizations.  Researchers also pointed out that leadership of 
hybrid organizations tend to rely on boards, and that leadership is more of a group 
activity than in organizations incorporated as forprofit (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Goldkind, 
2015).  This lack of research into hybrid organization leadership needs represents a gap in 
the literature regarding specific challenges faced by leaders of hybrid organizations 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014; Schröer & Jäger, 2015).  Further research that focused more 
specifically on leadership skills required in hybrid organizations such as U.S.-based 
industrial SDOs could contribute to improving collaborative practices as well as 
expanding the understanding of hybrid leadership needs in general. 
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Different Experts and Researchers 
In the limitations section, one of the limitations I mentioned was that a feature of 
Delphi designs in general is that expert panel member selection is based on the 
assumption that selected expert panel members are experts regarding the subject matter, 
not that their opinions are statistically representative of the population of potential experts 
(Förster & Von der Gracht, 2014).  Researchers also suggested that instruments often had 
to be created based on the uniqueness of the study (Hasson & Keeney, 2011; Sobaih et 
al., 2012).  Research that used a different set of experts and different researchers could 
make two important contributions to the body of knowledge.  First, opinions of different 
experts familiar with the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process could 
result in different recommendations for improving collaborative practices.  Second, 
different researchers may create instruments that guide the experts in different directions.  
Both changes could support or bring into question the trustworthiness of the current 
study. 
Open Question Evaluation Techniques 
The interpretation of responses to Round 1 questions were made by me using 
traditional text analysis versus computer text analysis.  These interpretations formed the 
basis for questions used in subsequent rounds.  As suggested by Bright and O’Connor 
(2007), traditional text analysis has both strengths and weakness compared to computer 
text analysis.  One of the primary strengths of traditional text analysis is that the 
researcher can bring unique perspectives to the analysis process.  One of the primary 
weaknesses of traditional text analysis is the potential for inconsistent analysis.  Based on 
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the iterative nature of Delphi designs and potential uniqueness of a study, additional 
research into traditional text analysis versus computer text analysis could help future 
researchers select the best way to analyze nominal data, and add more credibility to 
qualitative Delphi studies. 
Implications  
Positive Social Change 
The overarching implication for positive social change as a result of improving 
collaborative practices regarding the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards 
process is that all of society would benefit because all of society is affected by industrial 
voluntary consensus standards (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).  Regarding how positive 
social change might be realized in tangible ways, I submit that organizational and 
societal/policy benefits are the most likely to surface as a result of this study, with 
organizational benefits being the most obvious.  From an organizational perspective, 
reduced conflict between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs through 
communication and understanding is the most important implication drawn from the 
expert panel members’ final 12 recommendations.  Industrial SDOs tend to be where 
voluntary consensus standards development starts.  This is not to say that industrial SDOs 
create the need for a voluntary consensus standard, but industrial SDOs are where 
concepts are often first given tangible form.  In some respects, the role of industrial SDOs 
may be compared to the first round of a Delphi study in that the first round tends to set 
the tone for the iterative processes that follow.  Defining responsibilities, improving 
agreement on standards development priorities, reducing the number of conflicting 
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standards, faster standards development time, better working relationships with industry 
and government, an increase in communication, and less government incentive to 
interfere with market processes are all positive implications as a result of improving 
collaborative practices between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs.   
Industry could enjoy many of the benefits of improved collaborative practices 
between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs.  As suggested by several expert 
panel members, industry is directly impacted by voluntary consensus standards.  When a 
voluntary consensus standards process is not in harmonization, there is a cost associated 
with lack of harmonization.  This cost is often passed on to the public and may not be 
beneficial to society.  This may be why at least five of the 12 final recommendations for 
improving collaborative practices between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs 
involved industry and trade group participation.  The implication is that industry would 
benefit if they were to actively help with collaborative practices, and that this benefit 
would then pass to the public and benefit society.  By helping to improve collaborative 
practices between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs, industry may help reduce 
legislative burdens.  Legislative burdens are another form of cost that industry must 
absorb or pass on to others.  The implication is that if the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial 
voluntary consensus standards process benefits from improved collaborative practices, 
there would be less incentive for government to impose regulatory solutions, which could 
reduce cost to industry and benefit society. 
Government could also benefit from more collaborative practices between 
accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs.  Legislative solutions are not free and the 
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U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to developing industrial voluntary consensus 
standards has kept legislative solutions in check by supporting a deliberative and 
inclusive democratic process that allowed the market to drive the process.  The 
implication is that improving collaborative practices between accredited and unaccredited 
industrial SDOs would reduce cost to both government and industry.  Government would 
benefit from not having to incur the cost of creating legislative solutions, and industry 
would not have to deal with the cost of addressing increased legislation.  Cost savings to 
government and industry would ideally benefit society who would not have these costs 
passed to them.  Codification of industrial voluntary consensus standards by Government 
could also benefit from improved collaborative practices.  The implication is that 
maintaining the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process 
would give the government more confidence in industrial voluntary consensus standards 
that government wished to codify.  Increased confidence could result in more 
codification, reduce bureaucracy, reduce cost, and benefit society through a more 
streamlined and consistent process. 
Another implication of the 12 final recommendations provided by expert panel 
members is that by improving collaborative practices in the United States, there would be 
a reduction in winners and losers.  SDOs, industry, and government would be motivated 
to improve collaborative practices because each organization would be inclined to see 
collaboration as being in their best interests.  The implication for society is that society 
would benefit, although maybe more indirectly than with organizations, by not being the 
victim of standards wars created by lack of collaboration between SDOs, industry, and 
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government.  Benefits to society could be in the form of reduced monetary costs, fewer 
conflicting standards, less fragmentation regarding adoption of standards, and more rapid 
access to technology. 
Theoretical Implications 
Regarding theory, the 12 final suggestions of expert panel members supported 
both stakeholder theory and institutional theory.  In the case of stakeholder theory, the 
results of this study tended to confirm that expert panel members believed understanding 
one’s own organization as a stakeholder is important for understanding other 
stakeholders.  This perception was supported by researchers who claimed mutual 
understanding would improve if stakeholders included their own organization in the 
stakeholder mix (Tashman and Raelin, 2013).  Expert panel members also acknowledged 
that while society benefits from a functioning industrial voluntary consensus standards 
process, there was a tendency to focus on SDOs, industries, and governments as the most 
valuable stakeholders.  This perception of value was supported by researchers who 
suggested that stakeholders are not homogeneous, and have different claims to value 
(Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; Garriga, 2014; Hasnas, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012).  
Implications for stakeholder theory are support for the belief that stakeholder value 
varies, and that understanding one’s own organization can improve stakeholder relations.   
In the case of institutional theory, the results of this study showed a preference 
among expert panel members for normative and memetic isomorphic solutions as being 
more desirable and feasible than coercive isomorphic solutions.  This perspective was 
supported by researchers who suggested desirable behavior was more likely to occur if 
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compliance was voluntary rather than coerced (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Grob & Benn, 
2014, Guerreiro et al., 2012).  The implications for institutional theory are that coercive 
isomorphic pressure should be a last resort if voluntary collaboration is the goal. 
A More Collaborative Process  
Figure 2 in Chapter 2 presented a visual interpretation of the current situation 
based on the literature review.  In Figure 2, accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs were shown in competition with each other in a battle for 
legitimacy with other significant stakeholders being the prize.  Figure 3 shows the 
situation that could be realized if accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited 
industrial SDOs where working together, guided by industry and trade groups.  The 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the key player in representing the United 
States on the world stage, would still occupy an important role.  However, I submit 
ANSI’s role would now be more focused on presenting the best of U.S. developed 
industrial voluntary consensus standards locally and globally rather than playing the role 
of referee in regard to bridging the gap between accredited and unaccredited industrial 
SDOs, industry, and government.  This role would now be assumed more by industry and 
trade groups, and could result in a less continuous process that promoted organizational 
cooperation, did not produce winners and losers, and ultimately served public interests 
more effectively. 
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Figure 3. Reduced tensions and greater collaboration.   
Conclusions 
The market-driven, bottom-up approach to the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus 
standards process has served the United States, the world, and public interests well over 
the past two centuries.  However, over that time the world has changed, and old 
approaches may no longer be viable.  One solution is to try and roll back certain events so 
that previous ways of accomplishing tasks that historically were beneficial to society 
could still be viable.  Another solution is to consider new ways of accomplishing tasks 
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that are more in alignment with current and future realities, but that still keep social 
interests at the forefront.   
If positive social interests are to prevail while not being perceived as threats to 
significant stakeholders, the focus needs to be on finding the right reward structures that 
promote desirable behavior.  In the case of industrial voluntary consensus standards in the 
United States, an improvement in collaborative practices whose aim is to find the right 
balance of rewards could be a viable solution.  By focusing on establishing the right 
balance of rewards by gaining understanding of all significant stake holders, and possibly 
led by industry and trade groups, the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary 
consensus standards process may be preserved and produce results that are ultimately in 
the best interests of society.   
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Appendix A:  Request to SDOs to Forward the Invitation to Their Volunteer Members 
 
Dear : 
 
Thank you for agreeing to consider my request to send this invitation to your members.  
As per our conversation, I am looking for people who are familiar with Industrial 
Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) and Voluntary Consensus Standards 
(VCS) processes to answers questions about the dynamics that exist between Accredited 
U.S.-based Industrial SDOs (ASDOs) and Unaccredited Industrial SDOs (UASDOs).  
Participation will help pave new ground in research that may improve collaborative 
practices between Accredited and Unaccredited Industrial Standards Development 
Organizations.  Interested parties can contact me directly at XXX@waldenu.edu.  
 
I have also attached a document that explains what I am doing in more detail so potential 
volunteers can make a more informed decision.  If your organization agrees to forward 
this invitation, simply reply to this email with your intentions, and include me on the 
email list when you send it out so I know it has been done. 
 
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.  Thank you for your time 
and consideration.   
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Appendix B: Detailed Attachment to SDO Request/Invitation E-mail  
(The same information was sent to potential expert panel members I contacted directly) 
 
 
My name is Joel Blumenthal.  I am an engineer who has spent many years working with 
industrial instrumentation.  I am also a doctoral student at Walden University pursuing a 
PhD in management with a specialization in leadership and organizational change.  My 
dissertation is focused on exploring the dynamics between Accredited U.S.-based 
Industrial Standards Development Organizations (ASDOs) and Unaccredited Industrial 
Standards Development Organizations (UASDOs).   
 
I am seeking subject matter experts (SMEs) in the field of Industrial Voluntary 
Consensus Standards (VCSs) to answer questions related to how ASDOs and UASDOs 
interact.  This study is being conducted separate from any of my other roles. 
  
If you participate in this three-round Delphi study, you and other members of the study 
panel will be asked to complete three separate electronic questionnaires (one 
questionnaire per round) over approximately a four month period.  You will have 3 
weeks to complete each questionnaire, with an expectation that each questionnaire will 
take no more than 30 to 45 minutes to complete. 
 
Inclusion criteria includes familiarity with technical jargon used in the world of 
industrial voluntary consensus standards, ability to describe cases that illustrate good 
versus poor decision regarding the development of industrial voluntary consensus 
standards, ability to communicate effectively in the spoken and written U.S. English 
language, currently active with an accredited industrial SDO on a voluntary basis with a 
least five years continuous involvement, and have been employed with or worked with 
organizations or industries that utilized industrial voluntary consensus standards.  
 
Your participation will help pave new ground in research that may improve collaborative 
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs.  I hope that you will be willing to provide your 
insight and expertise to my study.  Given the importance of Industrial VCSs to industry 
and society, I believe that learning from the shared wisdom of experts will continue to 
expand knowledge in this important field.  All participant information including identities 
will be kept anonymous from other participants. 
 
If you are willing to participate in this study, please reply to me at XXX@waldenu.edu.  
If you know someone else who may qualify as an expert and be interesting in 
participating, please forward this message to him or her. 
 
  
 
215 
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.  Thank you kindly for 
your time and consideration. 
Sincerely, 
 
Joel Blumenthal 
MS, MBA 
Doctoral Student, Walden University 
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Appendix C: Notification to Potential Expert Panel Members Accepted Invitation 
Dear : 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in participating in this study.  As per the original 
invitation, I am a Doctoral Student at Walden University.  This qualitative Delphi study is 
directly towards U.S.-based industrial standards development organizations (SDOs), with 
a specific focus on exploring leaderships role in addressing how accredited and 
unaccredited industrial SDOs could collaborate in the creation of voluntary consensus 
standards (VCSs).  Your role would be that of a Subject Matter Expert (SME) and you 
would be asked to answer questions related to the state of industrial standards 
development processes in the United States.  The attached informed consent letter 
describes the research in more detail.  For more information on Delphi study designs, the 
following link may be useful (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delphi_method).   
 
Regarding my background, I have an engineering degree from the University of 
Washington and an MBA from the University of Phoenix.  After spending several years 
selling specialty chemicals to the Pulp & Paper Industry, I found myself becoming 
increasingly involved in the marketing and sales side of industrial instrumentation.  Over 
the years, I have worked with and for a variety of instrumentation companies and also 
become heavily involved in a variety of standards organizations, either contributing 
content or developing VCSs.  My past and current work with SDOs helping to develop 
VCSs is what led me to this dissertation topic. 
 
You should review the attached informed consent letter.  If you are satisfied with what is 
being requested, please respond to this e-mail.  A simple “I Consent” will do.  Assuming 
you consent, and after I have finished identifying expert panel members, I will send you 
and the other expert panel members the first round questionnaire.  This communication 
will also include your individual identification code which you will use to protect 
confidentiality. 
 
Industrial VCSs are an important way in which the world communicates and one of the 
primary mechanisms for protecting public safety and serving public interests.  I look 
forward to working with you on this important subject.   
 
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.  
Thank you. 
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Appendix D: Notification to Potential Expert Panel Members Not Selected  
Dear : 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in participating in this study.  However, I currently 
have a sufficient number of volunteers.   
 
I will certainly keep your name on file until I have confirmation that those who have 
already expressed an interest do in fact follow through.  If not, I may contact you again 
and see if you are still available.   
 
Again, thank you for your interest.  I hope that the results will point to areas of future 
research, and maybe some actionable items!  In my experience, the Industrial Voluntary 
Consensus Standards process is just too important to take for granted.   
  
If you have any further comments or questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 
XXX@waldenu.edu.  Thank you. 
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Appendix E:  First Reminder to Complete Questionnaire 
Dear : 
 
Just a friendly reminder that the round [select round] questionnaire is due in one week.  If 
there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.  
Thank you.  
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Appendix F:  Second Reminder to Complete Questionnaire 
Dear : 
 
Just a friendly reminder that the round [select round] questionnaire is due in three days.  
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.  
Thank you.  
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Appendix G:  Notification to Expert Panel Member of Removal From Panel  
Dear : 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.  However, it is important for 
demonstrating study rigor that all panel members participate.  Non-participation is 
potentially harmful to the study as it leaves data gaps, could delay data analysis and 
timely data feedback to other panel members, and could place additional burden on other 
panel members by extending the length of this study. 
 
This e-mail serves as notice of your removal from the study.  No one will treat you 
differently as a result of being removed from the study.  Any data you may have provided 
including your identity will remain confidential and will be destroyed at the end of the 
five-year period that began with the start of this study. 
 
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.  
Thank you for your understanding.   
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Appendix H:  Acknowledgement of Expert Panel Member Resignation 
Dear : 
 
I am sorry to hear of your decision to resign from this study.  However, I understand and 
thank you for agreeing to participate in this study in the first place.   
 
No one will treat you differently as a result of your decision to resign.  Any data you may 
have provided including your identity will remain confidential and will be destroyed at 
the end of the five-year period that began with the start of this study. 
 
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.  Thank 
you.   
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Appendix I:  Round 1 Questions 
Definitions:  ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations) 
 
 In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and 
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition) 
 
 How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or changed to improve 
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation) 
 
 In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve 
collaborative  practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight) 
 
 What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might 
improve collaborative practices?  (Theme - Organizational Structure) 
 
 What leadership training could improve collaborative practices between ASDOs 
and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training) 
 
 In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the 
development of industrial voluntary consensus standards be leveraged and/or 
changed to improve collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? 
(Theme - Market-driven) 
 
 Additional comments and/or suggestions regarding how to improve collaborative 
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Optional Question) 
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Appendix J:  Round 2 SurveyGizmo Instrument and Questions 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
The following statements were created based on responses to the Round 1 
questionnaire.  In this round, the primary goal is to see which statements generate 
consensus on the part of panel members.  Some statements fit into multiple themes (listed 
at the end of the statement).  None of the statements require an answer, but if you wish to 
abstain answering any statement, checking option 3 (Neutral) would be preferable rather 
than no answer at all - your call. Comments are also optional.  In the interest of time, I 
would suggest you not provide comments unless you feel the comments are necessary. 
Theme Codes Legend (Theme Codes at end of statement) 
 
C = Communication 
DE = Deregulation 
OV = Oversight 
OS = Organizational Structure 
LT = Leadership Training 
MD = Market Driven 
 
Statement 1:  Regular communication between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [C]  
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
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____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 2:  Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs by clarifying jointly to both ASDOs and UASDOs what industry 
expects of both groups. [C] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 3:  Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if both 
groups were incentivized to support each other’s work. [C] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 4:  Having formal liaisons (reciprocal representation) between ASDOs 
and UASDOs could improve collaboration. [C][OS] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 5:  Defining clear areas of responsibility could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs. [C][DE] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 6:  Publishing Agendas well before an event (including schedules of 
events) could help collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [C] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 7:  Better coordination of meetings could improve collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs. [C] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 8:  Deregulation of laws that hinder cooperation between ASDOs and 
UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [DE] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 9:  Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could be improved by 
introducing regulations that promoted collaboration. [DE] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 10:  Regulations that establish clear lines of demarcation (boundaries and 
responsibilities) for ASDOs and UASDOs could reduce duplication of effort and 
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [DE] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 11:  Government actions that could help set goals for ASDOs and 
UASDOs through accreditation and legal reference could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs. [DE] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 12:  Deregulation could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs because deregulation would encourage development of new standards or 
adoption of other standards to fill the regulatory void. [DE] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 13:  Non-Government Based Oversight Committees could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 14:  Government Based Oversight Committees could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 15:  Passive government oversight that rewarded joint results could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 16:   Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs through oversight 
could only improve if oversight committees were willing to use the court system if 
collaboration was not being observed. [OV][DE] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
  
  
 
232 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 17:  Oversight could only improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs if both organization were willing to accept oversight. [OV] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 18:  Facilitation of collaboration rather than oversight of collaboration 
would improve collaborative between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 19:  Greater oversight with at least the specter of authority could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV][DE] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 20:  Making ASDOs and UASDOs realize that regulated oversight is 
potentially a common enemy could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. [OV][DE] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 21:  Honoring ASDO and UASDO work in references, contracts, etc..., 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs without the need for 
oversight. [OV] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 22:  Oversight that changed ASDO and UASDO attitudes could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 23:  Some form of regulatory oversight would be required to improve de 
jure (by entitlement or law) collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 24:  Oversight that encouraged collaboration with innovators could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 25:  Reducing ASDO size or splitting ASDOs into smaller organizations 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 26:  Flattening organizational structures (less hierarchical) could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 27:  Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if 
ASDOs and UASDOs shared similar protocols. [OS] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 28:  Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and UASDOs if both 
types of organizations changed their charters to include a department whose 
function was to collaborate with other organizations. [OS] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 29:  Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if both 
types of organizations changed subcommittee mandates to include a specific venue 
to present findings. [OS] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 30:  Charters that included specifics for working with other organizations 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
  
  
 
239 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 31:  Shared leadership could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. [OS] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 32:  Joint reviews of collaborative efforts between ASDOs and UASDOs 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 33:  Including a statement in the charter and/or bylaws that an 
organization values the work performed by other organizations could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 34:  Charters that reduced political differences between ASDOs and 
UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 35:  Leaders trained in the concept of “leading by example” could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 36:  Making leadership training a mandatory component of accreditation 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 37:  Leadership training that emphasized the necessity to demystify the 
“black box” of standards could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 38:  Collaborative leadership training could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 39:  Leadership training that emphasized the importance of 
“empowerment” at all levels could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 40  “Servant-Leadership” training could improve collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 41:  Feedback training at all levels could for improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 42:  Leadership training that included a focus on understanding the 
scopes and goals of similar ASDOs and UASDOs could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 43  Mandatory training of new members at all levels could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 44:  Leadership training (both leaders of ASDOs and UASDOs) on the 
concept of “emotional intelligence” could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 45: Increased training for leaders on the benefits of standards to both 
society and business, with a focus on similarities of ASDOs and UASDOs, could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 46:  Joint leadership cooperation training between ASDOs and UASDOs 
in the form of workshops could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. [LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 47:  Including relevant Industries and Trade Groups in a more broad 
discussion with ASDOs and UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. [MD] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 48:  ASDOs that are responsive to how market forces motivate UASDOs 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [MD][LT] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 49:  Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs if such groups made collaboration beneficial to both types of 
organizations. [MD] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 50:  Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs if they promoted both types of organizations. [MD] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 51:  Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs if they encouraged joint participation at trade shows and other 
venues. [MD] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 52:  Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs by publishing the benefits of both organizations types of work. [MD] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 53:  Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and UASDOs if both 
types of organizations agreed upon joint and/or shared articles of legitimacy. [MD] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Round 2 Questionnaire 
 
Statement 54:  Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if 
ASDOs were more inclined to accept input from UASDOs and use this input to 
establish priorities. [MD] 
( ) Strongly disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly agree 
 
Comments? (Optional): 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Thank You! 
 
Thank you for taking our questionnaire. Your response is very important to 
us. 
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Appendix K:  Round 3 SurveyGizmo Instrument and Questions 
Third & Final Questionnaire 
 
Definitions:     ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
                          UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Statement 1:  Regular communication between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 100%. 
Theme = Competition) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 2:  Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs by clarifying jointly to both ASDOs and UASDOs what industry expects of 
both groups. (Consensus from Round 2 = 100%. Theme = Competition) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Statement 3:  Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if both 
groups were incentivized to support each other’s work. (Consensus from Round 2 = 
72.8%. Theme = Competition) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 4:  Having formal liaisons (reciprocal representation) between ASDOs and 
UASDOs could improve collaboration. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.9%. Theme = 
Competition & Oversight) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Statement 5:  Defining clear areas of responsibility could improve collaboration 
between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.8%. Theme = 
Competition & Deregulation) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 6:  Publishing Agendas well before an event (including schedules of events) 
could help collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 
100%. Theme = Competition) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 7:  Better coordination of meetings could improve collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 100%. Theme = Competition) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
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It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 9:  Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could be improved by 
introducing regulations that promoted collaboration. (Consensus from Round 2 = 
72.8%. Theme = Deregulation) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 17:  Oversight could only improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs if both organization were willing to accept oversight. (Consensus from Round 
2 = 90.9%. Theme = Oversight) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 21:  Honoring ASDO and UASDO work in references, contracts, etc..., 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs without the need for 
oversight. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.8%. Theme = Oversight) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 24:  Oversight that encouraged collaboration with innovators could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 90.0%. 
Theme = Oversight) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Statement 26:  Flattening organizational structures (less hierarchical) could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%. 
Theme = Organizational Structure) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 27:  Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if ASDOs 
and UASDOs shared similar protocols. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.8%. Theme = 
Organizational Structure) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 28:  Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and UASDOs if both 
types of organizations changed their charters to include a department whose function 
was to collaborate with other organizations. (Consensus from Round 2 = 100%. Theme 
= Organizational Structure) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
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It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 29:  Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if both 
types of organizations changed subcommittee mandates to include a specific venue to 
present findings. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%. Theme = Organizational 
Structure) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 30:  Charters that included specifics for working with other organizations 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 
= 81.8%. Theme = Organizational Structure) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
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____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 31:  Shared leadership could improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%. Theme = Organizational Structure) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 32:  Joint reviews of collaborative efforts between ASDOs and UASDOs 
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 
= 90.9%. Theme = Organizational Structure) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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Statement 35:  Leaders trained in the concept of “leading by example” could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%. 
Theme = Leadership Training) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 38:  Collaborative leadership training could improve collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%. Theme = Leadership 
Training) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 42:  Leadership training that included a focus on understanding the scopes 
and goals of similar ASDOs and UASDOs could improve collaboration between 
ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.8%. Theme = Leadership 
Training) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
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It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 43:  Mandatory training of new members at all levels could improve 
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.8%. 
Theme = Leadership Training) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 45:  Increased training for leaders on the benefits of standards to both 
society and business, with a focus on similarities of ASDOs and UASDOs, could 
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 
90.9%. Theme = Leadership Training) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
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____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 46:  Joint leadership cooperation training between ASDOs and UASDOs in 
the form of workshops could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. 
(Consensus from Round 2 = 80.0%. Theme = Leadership Training) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 47:  Including relevant Industries and Trade Groups in a more broad 
discussion with ASDOs and UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 100%. Theme = Market Driven) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
  
 
263 
Statement 49:  Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs if such groups made collaboration beneficial to both types of 
organizations. (Consensus from Round 2 = 90.9%. Theme = Market Driven) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 50:  Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs if they promoted both types of organizations. (Consensus from Round 2 
= 100%. Theme = Market Driven) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 51:  Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs if they encouraged joint participation at trade shows and other venues. 
(Consensus from Round 2 = 72.8%. Theme = Market Driven) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
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It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 52:  Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs 
and UASDOs by publishing the benefits of both organizations types of work. 
(Consensus from Round 2 = 100%. Theme = Market Driven) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 53:  Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and UASDOs if both 
types of organizations agreed upon joint and/or shared artifacts of legitimacy. 
(Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%. Theme = Market Driven) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
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____________________________________________  
 
 
 
Statement 54:  Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if ASDOs 
were more inclined to accept input from UASDOs and use this input to establish 
priorities. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.8%. Theme = Market Driven) 
 
It is Desirable* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
It is Feasible* 
( ) Strongly Disagree  ( ) Disagree  ( ) Neutral  ( ) Agree  ( ) Strongly Agree 
 
Optional Comments 
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
____________________________________________  
 
 
Thank You! 
 
Thank you for taking our questionnaire. Your response is very important. 
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Appendix L: Sample of Raw Round 1 Results 
 
Round 1 - Themes and Expert Panel Member Responses   
P Code Questionnaire 
 ID Number 
Themes Themes Themes Themes Themes Themes Themes 
  Competition Deregulation Oversight Organizational Structure Leadership Training Market-Driven Optional Seventh 
Question - No 
Theme 
P20 ID 8 SG1. ASDOsSDOs and UASDOsSDOs 
need to align on the intent and 
purpose of both types of 
organizations, and focus on benefits 
of the end 
user (consumer) of the products 
and services they provide to the 
relevant market. If they only focus 
on their own interests, without 
genuine collaboration, end users 
will suffers and industry progress 
will slow. 
 
SG2. ASDOsSDOs and UASDOsSDOs 
should continuously communicate 
with industry users to understand 
their needs and challenges, and 
come up with realistic plan to 
improve industry practices and 
standards to reduce bureaucracy. 
Knowledge sharing between 
ASDOsSDOs and UASDOsSDOs will 
benefit both organizations. 
 
SG3. Both types of organizations 
should "market" their benefits to the 
end user in front of federal and states 
regulators. 
SG1. Deregulation 
laws should focus 
on current industry 
practices and reduce 
regulations that 
stopping progress. 
 
SG2. Deregulation 
laws should focus 
on prevention of 
the competition 
between 
ASDOsSDOs and 
UASDOsSDOs by 
giving them 
flexibility to apply 
standards based on 
specific 
applications. 
SG1. Third party 
oversight should come 
from independent 
consumer 
organizations, not 
government. 
 
SG2. Independent 
consumer organizations 
should work with federal 
and local government 
departments to ask for 
support in the promotion 
of collaborative practices 
between ASDOsSDOs and 
UASDOsSDOs. 
 
SG3. Government should 
periodically audit ASDO 
and UASDO practices to 
prevent potential conflict 
of interest. 
SG1. ASDO or 
UASDO 
organizational 
structures should be 
simplified to 
minimize autocracy 
and support 
democracy, so 
everybody's opinion 
can be heard and 
count. 
 
SG2. ASDO or UASDO 
organizational 
structures should be 
of a manageable size. 
SG1. Leadership 
training should be 
focused on the 
development of 
collaborative 
organizations. 
 
SG2. Leadership 
training should be 
focused on 
"leading by 
example". 
 
SG3. Leadership 
training should be 
focused on 
sustaining 
organizational 
health. 
SG1. 
ASDOsSDOs and 
UASDOsSDOs 
should focus on 
the consumer 
needs in specific 
market, 
collaborate with 
other relevant 
industries 
governing 
organizations to 
prevent legal 
conflicts between 
different types of 
standards. 
 
SG2. ASDOsSDOs 
and UASDOsSDOs 
in one industry 
should learn best 
practices from 
other industries 
ASDOsSDOs and 
UASDOsSDOs. 
Both type of 
organization 
should 
prevent 
creating 
"special 
interest 
groups" 
within 
themselves. 
P4 ID 9 SG1. I will have to make the argument 
that an 
'unaccredited standard' is not a 
standard. A group of companies can 
join a trade organization; for 
membership, payment is required. 
They can all agree on putting out 
publications that further their 
agenda; they might represent some 
big players in the industry but not 
necessary the smartest or with the 
most engineering expertise; and they 
benefit directly. They write 
publications to make their lives 
easier which saves them money. An 
accredited standard such as ASME, 
membership is based primarily on 
expertise. You cannot pay to be a 
voting member. While being a 
member, might give your company 
some exposure, you are primarily 
there to ensure the good design of 
equipment so that the industry does 
better, for the public's benefit. 
However, to help the industry, the 
UASDOs, as you call them, need to 
bring their information to the 
ASDOsSDOs, and be open to the fact 
that the Standard organization have 
experts and voting in place, and only 
the information that has consensus 
on, will be published. Publishing on 
their own will only go so far, because 
as I said earlier, they are not 
standard organizations and thus 
their publications are not standards. 
SG1. I don't think 
the collaborative 
practices, good or 
not good are 
affected in any 
way by regulation 
laws, nor by 
deregulation laws 
so I cannot believe 
that leveraging or 
changing regulation 
laws will make any 
impact at all on the 
collaborative 
practices. 
SG1. I think UASDOsSDOs 
are too far down the food 
chain so to speak, to be 
impacted or bring any 
action from any 
government. A 
standard organization 
by definition has 
oversight; that is why it 
is accredited. You are 
comparing apples and 
oranges with these 
ASDO/UASDO see my 
1st suggestion to 
Question 1 
SG1. A publication 
from a UASDO is a 
wishful thinking, 
protecting 
themselves 
guideline. Their 
organization 
structure will be 
equal representation 
by all companies. I 
don't think they are 
open to change and 
the organizational 
structure of a ASDO 
is critical and 
inherent to be able 
to call itself a 
standard 
organization 
SG1. Leadership 
qualities do not 
define expertise. A 
document that will 
help the industry do 
their work correctly 
and help the public, 
needs 
to be based on 
expertise. 
Leadership, in a 
ASDO, is voted on 
by the Standards 
Committee. The 
UASDOsSDOs 
leadership is simply 
voted on by the 
participating, 
money/paid 
members. 
However, leaders 
from ASDOsSDOs 
could familiarize 
themselves with 
the UASDOs so that 
when information 
is brought to them 
from these 
organizations, they 
understand the 
limitations of that 
information and 
encourage their 
own members to 
evaluate the 
information strictly 
on science. 
SG1. Standards will 
always be market 
driven initially, but I 
believe many 
members of ASDOs 
care about the 
general public as 
well. And while 
market drive is 
inevitable, there 
are enough 
protocols in place 
to ensure that 
most of the time, 
the Standards can 
be relied on 
sufficiently to 
protect the public, 
more than if they 
were not 
published. The 
more that the 
UASDOs recognize 
the 
importance of 
these protocols, 
which keeps 
market driven 
initiatives from 
tainting the final 
publishing, the 
more UASDOs 
will realize that 
they need 
ASDOS to give 
more value to 
the information 
they produce. 
I again 
reiterate that 
to call an 
organization 
unaccredited 
but still call it a 
standard 
development 
organization is 
simply wrong. 
And it confuses 
the issue. A 
standard is there 
for a very 
different reason, 
than a guideline 
by a UASDO. 
Collaboration is 
important if it 
brings value to 
the industry and 
all parties are 
interested in 
collaborating. You 
cannot improve 
collaboration 
unless both 
types of 
organizations 
have strong 
interest and 
see the value 
of 
collaboration. 
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Appendix M:  Sample of Raw Round 2 Results 
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Appendix N:  Sample of Raw Round 3 Results 
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Appendix O: Round 1 Instructions 
Dear : 
 
Again, thank you for agreeing to be part of this important study.  Your unique 
identification code is [Code].  Please do not share this code with anyone.  This code will 
be used throughout the study. 
 
When you are ready to answer the Round 1 questionnaire, please click on the following 
link [link], or copy and paste this link into your browser.  When prompted, please enter 
your unique identification code.  The questionnaire is designed so that you can save your 
work at any time.  When you have finished and reviewed your answers, please click on 
the “submit” button.  Once you submit your answers, you will not be able to change 
them, so please review your answers carefully. 
 
To recap, the basic research question is how could collaborative practices be improved 
between Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standards Development Organizations and 
Unaccredited Industrial Standards Development Organizations?  
 
The Round 1 questionnaire is composed of seven questions.  The first six questions are 
based on the major themes that emerged from the literature reviews.  Please provide 
between three and five suggestions for each of the first six question, and add any 
comments you would like.  Question seven presents an opportunity for other suggestions 
such as additional themes.  Answers and comments should be short if at all possible in 
order for you to complete this questionnaire quickly (30 to 45 minutes) and not burden 
your time. 
 
Any responses are acceptable – positive, negative, or merely commentary.  Answers and 
comments that may appear extreme are just as valuable as more mainstream answers and 
comments.  If you are not sure how to respond to a particular question, please do the best 
you can.  This study is designed to seek your opinion with as little influence as possible 
from me as the researcher.  Even so, if you feel there is need for clarification, please 
contact me at XXX@waldeu.edu.   
 
Please complete the questionnaire in 3 weeks.  During the third week, I will send out two 
reminder e-mails, unless you have already completed the questionnaire.  Failure to 
respond could result in being removed from the panel.  To protect confidentiality, it is 
recommended that you do not share your involvement or results with anyone. 
 
Thank you again for your participation and I look forward to seeing your responses. 
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Appendix P: Round 1 SurveyGizmo Instrument 
 
First Round  Questionnaire - Accredited vs Unaccredited 
 
Standard Development Organizations in the U.S. 
Competition 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 1: In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and 
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
1st Suggestion * 
 
Competition 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 1: In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and 
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
2nd Suggestion 
 
Competition 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
& UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations) 
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Question 1: In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and 
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
3rd Suggestion 
 
Competition 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 1: In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and 
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
4th Suggestion 
 
Competition 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 1: In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and 
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
5th Suggestion 
 
Deregulation 
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Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 2: How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or  changed to improve 
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
Question 2 
1st Suggestion * 
 
Deregulation 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 2: How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or  changed to improve 
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
2nd Suggestion 
 
Deregulation 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 2: How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or  changed to improve 
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
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3rd Suggestion 
 
Deregulation 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 2: How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or  changed to improve 
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
4th Suggestion 
 
Deregulation 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 2: How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or  changed to improve 
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
5th Suggestion 
 
Oversight 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
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Question 3: In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve 
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight) 
 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
Question 3 
1st Suggestion * 
 
Oversight 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
 
Question 3: In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve 
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight) 
 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
2nd Suggestion 
 
Oversight 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
& UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations) 
 
Question 3: In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve 
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
3rd Suggestion 
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Oversight 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
& UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations) 
 
Question 3: In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve 
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
4th Suggestion 
 
Oversight 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 3: In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve 
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
Question 4 
5th Suggestion 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
& UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations) 
 
Question 4: What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might 
improve collaborative practices? (Theme - Organizational Structure) 
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Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
1st Suggestion * 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 4: What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might 
improve collaborative practices? (Theme - Organizational Structure) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
2nd Suggestion 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 4: What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might 
improve collaborative practices? (Theme - Organizational Structure) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
3rd Suggestion 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
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Question 4: What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might 
improve collaborative practices? (Theme - Organizational Structure) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
4th Suggestion 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 4: What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might 
improve collaborative practices? (Theme - Organizational Structure) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
Question 5 
5th Suggestion 
 
Leadership Training 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 5: What leadership training could improve collaborative practices between 
ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
1st Suggestion * 
 
Leadership Training 
 
Page description: 
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Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 5: What leadership training  could improve collaborative practices between 
ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
2nd Suggestion 
 
Leadership Training 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 5: What leadership training  could improve collaborative practices between 
ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
3rd Suggestion 
 
Leadership Training 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 5: What leadership training  could improve collaborative practices between 
ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
4th Suggestion 
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Leadership Training 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 5: What leadership training could improve collaborative practices between 
ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
Question 6 
5th Suggestion 
 
Market Driven 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 6: In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the 
development of standards be leveraged and/or  changed to improve collaborative 
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Market Driven) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
1st Suggestion * 
 
Market Driven 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
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Question 6: In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the 
development of standards be leveraged and/or  changed to improve collaborative 
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Market Driven) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
2nd Suggestion 
 
Market Driven 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 6: In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the 
development of standards be leveraged and/or  changed to improve collaborative 
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Market Driven) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
3rd Suggestion 
 
Market Driven 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
Question 6: In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the 
development of standards be leveraged and/or  changed to improve collaborative 
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Market Driven) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
4th Suggestion 
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Market Driven 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
& UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations) 
 
Question 6: In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the 
development of standards be leveraged and/or  changed to improve collaborative 
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Market Driven) 
 
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is 
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of 
completing the questionnaire quickly. 
 
5th Suggestion 
 
Additional Suggestions (If Any) 
 
Page description: 
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development 
Organizations) 
 
If you  have any additional suggestions that might fit under themes not covered, please 
make them here. 
 
31. Additional Suggestions 
Thank You! 
 
Thank you for taking this questionnaire 
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Appendix Q: Results From Round 1 and Round 2 Instructions 
Dear : 
 
Again, thank you for agreeing to be part of this important study.  Attached you will find 
the results of Round 1.   
 
When you are ready to answer the Round 2 questionnaire, please click on the following 
link [link], or copy and paste this link into your browser.  When prompted, please enter 
your unique identification code.  The questionnaire is designed so that you can save your 
work at any time.  When you have finished and reviewed your answers, please click on 
the “submit” button.  Once you submit your answers, you will not be able to change 
them, so please review your answers carefully. 
 
To recap, the basic research question is how could collaborative practices be improved 
between Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standards Development Organizations and 
Unaccredited Industrial Standards Development Organizations? 
 
The Round 2 questionnaire is composed of [ ] primary questions, each potentially with 
two secondary questions.  Please rate each question using the five-point Likert-type 
scales provided.  Like the Round 1 questionnaire, the Round 2 questionnaire should not 
take you more than 30 to 45 minutes to complete.  Comments are welcome but should be 
kept short in order not to burden your time. 
 
If you are not sure how to respond to a particular question, please do the best you can.   
Please complete the questionnaire in 3 weeks.  During the third week, I will send out two 
reminder e-mails, unless you have already completed the questionnaire.  Failure to 
respond could result in being removed from the panel. 
 
To protect confidentiality, it is recommended that you do not share your involvement or 
results with anyone.  
 
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.  
Thank you again for your participation and I look forward to seeing your responses. 
  
283 
 
 
Appendix R:  Round 1 Results Cover Letter 
Dear : 
 
Attached is a document that presents the overview of the results from Round 1.  The 
primary value of this document is that it indicates trends in responses.  Reading the entire 
document closely is probably not required, however, you are welcome to do so.  I would 
tend to focus on the short summary at the end of the document as this lays out the path 
for rounds two and three.   
 
My plan is to provide each of you a link to the second round questionnaire by the end of 
today or early tomorrow. 
 
If there are any questions, please let me know.  Thank you. 
 
Joel Blumenthal 
Walden University 
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Appendix S: Round 1 Results Overview - Included as Attachment of Results 
Results Cover Letter (See Appendix N) 
 
Preface 
 
Definitions: ASDOs = Accredited Standard Development Organizations (under ANSI).  
UASDOs = Unaccredited Standard Development Organizations.  Acronyms for UASDOs 
include but are not limited to “Industry Consortiums”, “User Groups”, and “Vendor 
Groups”.  
 
The basic premise of the research question is that collaboration between U.S.-based 
Industrial ASDOs and UASDOs is a good thing.  The “good” aspect of collaboration will 
continue to be the premise of this study. 
 
Please keep these definitions and comments in mind as you review the following.   
 
Overview of Round 1 
 
The primary themes that resulted from the literature review are listed below and formed 
the basis for the first round questions: 
 
1. Competition 
2. Deregulation 
3. Oversight 
4. Organizational Structure 
5. Leadership Training 
6. Market-Driven 
 
These are very broad terms and subject to interpretation.  My intention was to generate 
thoughts and suggestions so I did not attempt to define these terms outside of the context 
in which the questions were written.  Highlights based on feedback from Round 1 are as 
follows: 
 
Competition 
 
There was general agreement that ASDOs and UASDOs could be doing a better job of 
collaborating.  While improvements in communication tended to be the central theme for 
improving collaboration, there was considerable diversity regarding what steps could be 
most effective.  Highlights related to improved collaboration included: 
 
1. Assignment/Alignment of Responsibility and Goals 
285 
 
 
2. Liaisons between different groups 
3. Joint Meetings 
4. Better Meeting Planning 
5. Role of Industry/Trade Groups 
6. Joint Training 
7. Joint Presentations 
8. Sharing of Information 
9. Shared Protocols 
 
Deregulation 
 
There were definitely differences of opinion regarding the value and impact of 
regulations.  Some panel members felt that regulations simple added layers of 
bureaucracy to an already over regulated process and really did not help collaboration.  
Others felt that regulations were needed to encourage or even force collaboration.  Still 
others felt that more or less regulations would have little effect on collaboration.  
Highlights related to improved collaboration included: 
 
1. Types of Regulations 
2. Effects of Regulations 
3. Value of Regulations 
4. Regulations at the State level 
5. Regulations at the Federal level 
6. Navigation of Regulations 
 
Oversight 
 
There was general agreement that oversight could be a good thing.  Several members 
pointed out that ASDOs already agree to some form of oversight by agreeing to follow 
ANSI’s “Essential Requirements”.  Most panel members felt that if oversight were to be 
put in place, a consumer-type group would probably be best.  While government 
oversight was not uniformly dismissed as a possibility, there was general agreement that 
government organizations lacked the technical skills to really provide any sort of 
meaningful oversight.  Whether oversight should be mandatory or voluntary was a point 
of contention.  Highlights related to improved collaboration included: 
 
1. Consumer Group Oversight 
2. Government Oversight 
3. Mandatory Oversight 
4. Voluntary Oversight 
5. Responsibilities of an Oversight Organization 
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6. Value of Oversight 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
There was general agreement that charters of ASDOs and UASDOs which were more in 
alignment with one another could promote collaboration.  Several panel members also 
felt that some organizations (ASDOs in particular) were simply too large, and 
restructuring them could improve collaboration by making them more responsive to 
industry and consumer needs.  Formalizing liaison functions in particular seemed to be a 
general point of agreement with regard to improving collaboration.  There was little 
disagreement that goals of ASDOs and UASDOs tended to be different, but that having 
different goals was not necessarily an impediment to collaboration.  Rather, 
understanding different goals and focusing on changing organizational structures 
(charters) to work with as opposed to against another set of goals could improve 
collaboration.  Highlights related to improved collaboration included: 
 
1. Charters 
2. Organizational Size 
3. Sub-committee Responsibilities 
4. Training (internal and external) 
5. Formalizing Liaison Functions 
 
Leadership Training 
 
Some form of formal leadership training was recommended by most panel members, if 
for no other reason, than most leaders of ASDOs and UASDOs come from forprofit 
backgrounds and ASDOs and UASDOs tend to be incorporated as nonprofits.  Training 
was also recommended, not just for leaders, but for all volunteer members.  There 
seemed to be a general opinion that many volunteer members are just thrown into their 
roles and must learn as they go.  Joint training of leaders of different organizations was 
also suggested by several panel members as a way to improve collaboration by getting 
everyone on the same page (so to speak).  Highlights related to improved collaboration 
included: 
 
1. Collaboration Training 
2. Empowerment Training 
3. Leading-by-Example Training 
4. Servant-Leadership Training 
5. Feedback Training 
6. Joint Training 
7. Emotional Intelligence Training 
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Market-Driven 
 
There was general agreement that changing market drivers/forces was probably not a 
good way to approach collaboration.  Market drivers/forces are what they are, and finding 
better ways to work within existing structures was probably a better approach to 
improving collaboration.  Industry/Trade Groups were often singled out as organizations 
that could improve collaboration by making more of an effort to inform ASDOs and 
UASDOs what was expected to support industry and consumer needs.  Several panel 
members suggested formalizing involvement by Industry/Trade Groups could improve 
collaboration.  Highlights related to improved collaboration included: 
 
1. Consumer Needs 
2. Industry Needs 
3. Reducing Complexity and Duplication of Effort 
4. Industry/Trade Group Involvement 
5. Reward Structures 
6. Healthy Competition 
 
Summary 
 
Although standards tend to be a Domestic and International issue, this study is narrowly 
focused on steps that could be taken to improve collaboration between ASDOs and 
UASDOs in the United States.  Of the suggestions made, I expect that some are deemed 
more practical than others.  Suggestions from Round 1 will be consolidated into 
statements for Round 2.  For Round 2, panel members will be asked to cast a vote for 
each statement.  Only statements that pass the “consensus” test (frequency of responses 
for options 4 and 5 [agree and strongly agree] on a five-point Likert-type scale account 
for ≥70% of the panel members’ responses) will pass to Round 3.  In Round 3, panel 
members will be asked to vote on the desirability and feasibility of statements that pass 
the consensus test from Round 2.  The results will be tabulated in the final report and then 
presented to significant stakeholders. 
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Appendix T:  Round 2 Questionnaire – Proposed Template 
 
The following primary statements were identified by participants in this study in response 
to the first round questionnaire. In addition to rating the primary question, please rate 
each statement as to both desirability and feasibility.  Comments are optional.  
 
 
Primary Statement 
 
Desirability 
(Is the primary statement 
option desirable or 
undesirable?) 
Feasibility 
(Is the primary statement 
option feasible or infeasible) 
1.Strongly Disagree  
 
1    Highly Undesirable 1     Highly Infeasible 
2.Disagree 2     Undesirable 2    Infeasible 
 
3. Neither Agree or 
Disagree 
 
 
3    Neither Desirable nor 
Undesirable 
 
3    Neither Feasible nor 
Infeasible 
4. Agree 4    Desirable 4    Feasible 
 
5    Highly Desirable 
 
5    Highly Feasible 5. Strongly Agree 
 
Comments? (Optional)   
 
 
More Primary Statements following a similar format. 
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Appendix U:  Round 2 Questionnaire – Actual Template 
 
The following primary statements were identified by participants in this study in response 
to the first round questionnaire.  Comments are optional.  
 
 
Primary Statement 
1.Strongly Disagree  
 
2.Disagree 
 
3. Neither Agree or Disagree 
 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly Agree 
  
 
Comments? (Optional)   
 
 
More Primary Statements following a similar format. 
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Appendix V:  Round 2 Results and Round 3 Instructions 
Dear : 
 
Again, thank you for agreeing to be part of this important study.  Attached you will find 
the results of Round 2.   
 
When you are ready to answer the Round 3 questionnaire, please click on the following 
link [link], or copy and paste this link into your browser.  When prompted, please enter 
your unique identification code.  The questionnaire is designed so that you can save your 
work at any time.  When you have finished and reviewed your answers, please click on 
the “submit” button.  Once you submit your answers, you will not be able to change 
them, so please review your answers carefully. 
 
To recap, the basic research question is how could collaborative practices be improved 
between Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standards Development Organizations and 
Unaccredited Industrial Standards Development Organizations? 
 
The Round 3 questionnaire is composed of [ ] primary questions, each potentially with 
two secondary questions.  Please rate each question using the five-point Likert-type 
scales provided.  Like the Round 2 questionnaire, the Round 3 questionnaire should not 
take you more than 30 to 45 minutes to complete.  Comments are welcome but should be 
kept short in order not to burden your time. 
 
If you are not sure how to respond to a particular question, please do the best you can.   
Please complete the questionnaire in 3 weeks.  During the third week, I will send out two 
reminder e-mails, unless you have already completed the questionnaire.  Failure to 
respond could result in being removed from the panel. 
 
To protect confidentiality, it is recommended that you do not share your involvement or 
results with anyone.  
 
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.  
Thank you again for your participation and I look forward to seeing your responses. 
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Appendix W:  Round 2 Results Cover Letter 
Dear : 
 
Attached are two word documents.  The first word document (Overview of Round 2 
Results) provides an overview of the results from Round 2.  The second word document 
(Consensus Results of Round 2) presents specific data for those statements where panel 
member responses met the definition of “consensus”.  I am very encouraged that panel 
members did believe, in one way or another, improved collaboration between all 
stakeholders was a possibility. 
 
In the third and final round, I will be asking panel members to weigh in on what they 
believe is the desirability and feasibility of acting upon statements that met the definition 
of consensus from Round 2.  You should receive a link to the third and final 
questionnaire before the end of this week. 
 
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
Joel Blumenthal 
Walden University 
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Appendix X:  Round 2 Results Overview  
Included as Attachment of Results Cover Letter (See Appendix U) 
Dear : 
 
The following is an overview of the results of Round 2. 
 
Preface 
(ASDOs vs UASDOs) 
 
Experts (per the literature) tend to agree that the role of Accredited Standards 
Development Organizations (ASDOs) is relatively well understood.  In the case of this 
study, the focus is on organizations accredited by ANSI.  The role (and definition) of 
Unaccredited Standards Development Organizations may not be so well understood.  
Unaccredited organizations (generally referred to in the literature as “Consortia”) often 
provide many of the same functions as accredited organizations in that they develop 
concepts that if widely adopted, are often utilized by regulatory bodies and other 
stakeholders.  The following link may be of interest for those that wish to know more 
about how unaccredited organizations can or do participate in the development of 
standards (http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/creating.php). 
 
An Overview of the Results From Round 2 
(By Theme) 
 
Competition 
 
Under the umbrella of Competition, improved cross-pollination in the form of more 
discussion and dialog between ASDOs and UASDOs garnered the most support from 
panel members as a way to improve collaboration.  One interpretation is that the panel 
members were suggesting that reducing silo mentalities and encouraging productive 
interaction could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. 
 
Deregulation 
 
The use of regulations to improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs was often 
met with skepticism.  While some statements that fit under the theme of deregulation did 
meet the definition of consensus, opinions varied greatly.  Some felt more regulations had 
too much of a “stick” feel and would not improve collaboration.  Concern was also 
expressed that more regulations could complicate what is already a regulated process.  
One the other hand, some panel members felt that more deregulation might simple result 
in greater chaos.   
 
Oversight 
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Oversight to improved ASDOs and UASDOs collaboration was generally viewed as 
potentially positive.  However, even those statements that met the definition of consensus 
came with caveats from the panel members.  As a general rule, “carrots” were preferred 
to “sticks”.  The real questions seemed to revolve around which carrots were most 
effective, and how to deploy these carrots.  Government oversight was generally not 
viewed in a favorable light, and there was also general consensus that ASDOs and 
UASDOs would have to buy in to oversight if oversight was to be effective in improving 
ASDO and UASDO collaboration. 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
Statements under the theme of organizational structure were often closely related to those 
under the theme of competition.  The most popular statements were those that addressed 
how changes to organization structures might improve discussion and dialog between 
ASDOs and UASDOs.  In general, changes to organizational structures that still 
supported organizational goals while improving communication were viewed in a 
positive light. 
 
Leadership Training 
 
Several panel members pointed out that focusing on just leadership training was not by 
itself going to promote better collaboration.  However, training in general regarding a 
variety of topics and at various levels was often supported as a way to improve 
collaboration by encouraging understanding of the larger picture. 
 
Market-driven 
 
Industries and Trade Groups were generally viewed by panel members as a potentially 
positive force for improving collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs.  Again, many 
of the opinions were focused on improving understanding and communication.  
Statements that received the greatest support were those that suggested Industries and 
Trade Groups could play a larger role in getting all stakeholders to work more closely 
and productively.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Please keep the previous impressions in mind when reviewing the actual consensus 
results from Round 2. 
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Appendix Y:  Third Round Questionnaire - Proposed Template  
 
The following primary statements were identified by participants in this study in response 
to the second round questionnaire. In addition to rating the primary question, please 
rate each statement as to importance and confidence.  Comments are optional. 
 
 
Primary Statement 
 
Importance 
(In Comparison with 
other Statements) 
Confidence 
(In your assessment of the 
primary statement and the 
importance you assigned to 
the primary statement in 
comparison with other 
statements) 
1     Strongly Disagree 
2     Disagree 
3     Neither Agree or Disagree 
 
4     Agree 
 
 
5     Strongly Agree 
 
1    Highly 
Unimportant 
1    Very Unconfident 
2    Unimportant 2    Unconfident 
3    Neither Important 
nor Unimportant 
3    Neither Confident nor 
Confident 
 
4    Important 
 
4     Confident 
 
5     Highly 
Important 
 
5    Highly Confident 
 
Comments? (Optional)     
 
 
More Primary Statements following a similar format. 
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Appendix Z:  Third Round Questionnaire - Actual Template 
 
The following primary statements were identified by participants in this study in response 
to the second round questionnaire. Please rate each statement as to desirability and 
feasibility.  Comments are optional. 
 
 
Primary Statement 
 
Desirability 
(Is the primary statement 
option desirable or 
undesirable?) 
Feasibility 
(Is the primary statement 
option feasible or infeasible) 
 
 
1    Highly Undesirable 1     Highly Infeasible 
 2     Undesirable 2    Infeasible 
 
 
 
 
 
3    Neither Desirable nor 
Undesirable 
 
3    Neither Feasible nor 
Infeasible 
 4    Desirable 4    Feasible 
 
5    Highly Desirable 
 
5    Highly Feasible  
 
Comments? (Optional)   
 
 
More Primary Statements following a similar format. 
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Appendix AA:  Round 3 Recap and Overview of Study Results 
Dear : 
 
The following is an overview of the results of Round 3.  I have attached a spreadsheet 
that includes the results as well as comments, and a table that shows only statements 
where feasibility met the definition of consensus.  My focus tended to be on what the 
panel members felt was feasible, and from this perspective the attached table is much 
easier to read. 
 
Round 3 was by far the most interesting in that the results provided a glimpse of what 
might be possible as far as improved collaboration is concerned.  Overall, the results were 
as follows: 
 
1. 27 of the 31 statements from a “desirability” perspective met the definition of 
consensus (agree & strongly agree ≥70% of responses).  I am not terribly 
surprised that most of the statements met the definition of consensus because the 
statements from Round 2 that passed to Round 3 had already been culled by the 
panel members for ideas that were considered bad. 
 
2. 12 of the 31 statements from a “feasibility” perspective met the definition of 
consensus (agree & strongly agree ≥70% of responses).  I think feasibility of ideas 
is the real heart of this study.  Ideas that are not considered feasible, even if 
desirable, are probably non-starters. 
 
3. No statements that failed the desirability consensus test passed the feasibility 
consensus test.  I actually would have been surprised if an idea (a good idea 
anyway) was considered feasible, but not desirable. 
 
There is much room for additional research, but there were many opinions that indicated 
improved collaboration could be achieved without draconian measures.  As was often 
pointed out, organizations will tend to respond to what they believe is in their best 
interests, and finding the right carrots would probably be more effective than finding the 
right sticks.   
 
Comments by panel members also shed light on what approaches could make feasibility a 
reality.  Some of the comments also pointed out weaknesses in this study.  However, this 
too was valuable information because future research could improve on the approaches 
used in this study.  Of note (in my opinion) were the following: 
 
1. Silos between various stakeholders (primarily ASDOs, UASDOs, and End Users) 
need to be broken down if collaboration is to improve (OK, pretty obvious). 
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2. There are ways to break down silos that do not create clear winners and losers and 
generally revolve around incentivizing communication and cooperation. 
 
3. Industries and Trade Groups could play a much larger role in getting ASDOs and 
UASDOs to collaborate more effectively (especially by incentivizing 
communication and cooperation), and all stakeholders could potentially benefit 
from a less bureaucratic and contentious environment. 
 
4. Changing organizational structures and/or changing regulations (although in some 
cases considered desirable) are not necessarily required to get ASDOs and 
UASDOs to collaborate more effectively in a market-driven environment as long 
as power structures are not threatened. 
 
5. Leadership training, while maybe desirable, is probably not going to create the 
incentives required to promote collaboration. 
 
Specific suggestions that garnered support included: 
 
1. Creating liaisons and/or divisions within both ASDOs and UASDOs tasked with 
improving communications between ASDOs and UASDOs through sharing of 
information, training, and increasing understanding.   
 
2. Industry and Trade Groups need to become more active participants in providing 
guidance as to what they expected from ASDOs and UASDOs. 
 
3. Oversight in some form could have a positive impact upon collaboration, but I 
think this gets back to the whole issue of improving communication and providing 
guidance. 
 
The underlying theme behind these suggestions was, how to come up with the incentives 
that would encourage collaboration.  Virtually no one felt that creating such incentives 
could happen without some serious mind-set recalibrations, but that mind-set 
recalibrations could be accomplished if there were the proper incentives to do so. 
 
Possibly the most important suggestion I got out of this study was that Industry and Trade 
Groups could improve collaboration by taking a more active role in providing guidance 
to ASDOs and UASDOs.  If Industry and Trade Groups are not on the same page, then 
how can ASDOs and UASDOs be expected to work together? 
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What the final study will look like is still very much a work in progress.  At the moment I 
can only state that I was more encouraged than I thought I would be, and thank you all 
for your time and input.  It will probably be several months before the final study is 
blessed, and you will all be provided a copy.  The “Holy Grail” (so-to-speak) is to create 
a study that everyone can at least agree was done well, even if not everyone agrees with 
the results.  We shall see. Thank you again for your time and input. 
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Appendix AB:  Final Results 
Dear : 
 
Thank you for agreeing to be part of this important study.  Attached you will find the 
final results of this study.   
 
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.  
Thank you again for your participation. 
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Appendix AC: Permission to Cite 
Hi, Joel— 
You may certain cite the paper—since it is a working paper, it shouldn’t require authors’ 
permission to cite. And I’d love to know more about your dissertation. Craig Murphy and 
I are currently revising a book manuscript on the history of private, voluntary standard 
setting from the late 19
th
 century to the present. I’d love to know about your findings, and 
perhaps to cite them. 
Best, 
JoAnne 
From: Joel A. Blumenthal [mailto:joel.blumenthal@waldenu.edu]  
Sent: Wednesday, January 24, 2018 10:38 AM 
To: JoAnne Yates <jyates@mit.edu> 
Cc: Karla S. Phlypo <karla.phlypo2@mail.waldenu.edu> 
Subject: Permission to Cite 
Hello Dr. Yates: 
My name is Joel Blumenthal and I am a Doctoral Student at Walden University.  I am 
hopefully about a month from graduation.  My dissertation is focused on Industrial 
Voluntary Consensus Standards, and what I will call the growing battle between Standard 
Development Organizations accredited by ANSI, and those that are not.  I have been 
involved with Industrial VCSs since the mid-80s starting with 3A.  The working paper 
authored by you and Dr. Murphy has been key to my research, but I noticed as I was 
doing a final links check that your paper now requires authors permission to cite. 
So this is a formal request to obtain permission to cite this paper.  For your information, I 
have included what Google Scholar currently lists as the citation reference.  If permission 
is granted, I would appreciate any guidance as to how you would like me to include the 
citation in the reference section of my Dissertation.  I have included my chair, Dr. 
Phlypo, on this e-mail.  Thank you for your time. 
Sincerely, 
Joel Blumenthal 
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Appendix AD:  National Institutes of Health (NIH) Extramural Research Certificate  
 
   
 
Certificate of Completion 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Extramural Research 
certifies that Joel Blumenthal successfully completed the NIH Web-
based training course “Protecting Human Research Participants”. 
Date of completion: 03/20/2013  
Certification Number: 1142156  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
